Manipulation through political endorsements

We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise split their votes and lead to the victory of the condorcet loser. When the endorser has an ideological bias towards one of the candidates, the coordination impact of endorsements remains unaltered, moreover the endorser successfully manipulates the outcome of the election in favor of his bias, even if his ideological bias is known by the voters. The results are true for any endorsement cost and any magnitude of bias as long as the electorate is large enough.Strategic voting; Condorcet loser; Signalling; Multiple candidates JEL Classification Numbers: D70, D74, D80

Kingmakers or Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements

When parties make endorsements in primary elections, does the favored candidate receive a real boost in his or her vote share, or do parties simply pick the favorites who are already destined to win? To answer this question, we draw on two research designs aimed at isolating the causal effect of Democratic Party endorsements in California’s 2012 primary election. First, we conduct a survey experiment in which we randomly assign a party endorsement, holding all other aspects of a candidate’s background and policy positions constant. Second, we use a unique dataset to implement a regression discontinuity analysis of electoral trends by comparing the vote shares captured by candidates who barely won or barely lost the internal party endorsement contest. We find a constellation of evidence suggesting that endorsements do indeed matter, although this effect appears to be contingent upon the type of candidate and voter: endorsements matter most for candidates in their party’s mainstream, and for voters who identify with that party and for independents. The magnitude of their impact is dramatically smaller than might be estimated from research designs less attuned to recent advances in causal inference

Influential Opinion Leaders

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert influence is fully decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.election, manipulation, global game

Influential Opinion Leaders

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert influence is fully decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.Voting, coordination, experts

Bots increase exposure to negative and inflammatory content in online social systems

Societies are complex systems which tend to polarize into sub-groups of individuals with dramatically opposite perspectives. This phenomenon is reflected -- and often amplified -- in online social networks where, however, humans are no more the only players, and co-exist alongside with social bots, i.e., software-controlled accounts. Analyzing large-scale social data collected during the Catalan referendum for independence on October 1, 2017, consisting of nearly 4 millions Twitter posts generated by almost 1 million users, we identify the two polarized groups of Independentists and Constitutionalists and quantify the structural and emotional roles played by social bots. We show that bots act from peripheral areas of the social system to target influential humans of both groups, bombarding Independentists with violent contents, increasing their exposure to negative and inflammatory narratives and exacerbating social conflict online. Our findings stress the importance of developing countermeasures to unmask these forms of automated social manipulation.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure

Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power

What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics (Meyer 2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987) none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. This paper will draw on these resources to investigate the issue of celebrity involvement in politics, specifically as this involvement relates to democratic theory and its implications for democratic practice. We will argue that an important and underexplored form of power, which we will call epistemic power, can explain one important way in which celebrity involvement in politics is problematic. This is because unchecked uses and unwarranted allocations of epistemic power, which celebrities tend to enjoy, threaten the legitimacy of existing democracies and raise important questions regarding core commitments of deliberative, epistemic, and plebiscitary models of democratic theory. We will finish by suggesting directions that democratic theorists could pursue when attempting to address some of these problems

Platform Advocacy and the Threat to Deliberative Democracy

Businesses have long tried to influence political outcomes, but today, there is a new and potent form of corporate political power—Platform Advocacy. Internet-based platforms, such as Facebook, Google, and Uber, mobilize their user bases through direct solicitation of support and the more troubling exploitation of irrational behavior. Platform Advocacy helps platforms push policy agendas that create favorable legal environments for themselves, thereby strengthening their own dominance in the marketplace. This new form of advocacy will have radical effects on deliberative democracy. In the age of constant digital noise and uncertainty, it is more important than ever to detect and analyze new forms of political power. This Article will contribute to our understanding of one such new form and provide a way forward to ensure the exceptional power of platforms do not improperly influence consumers and, by extension, lawmakers

Moral Principles and Political Ideology: Exploring the Mediating Role of Abstract Value Endorsements

Much research has examined the association between political ideology and endorsement of distinct moral principles (e.g. Goren, 2005; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The associations that have typically been observed show that political liberals tend to endorse moral principles that place the individual at the center of concern, resulting in judgments of right and wrong based on caring for individuals and promoting fairness (individualizing foundations); while political conservatives tend to endorse moral principles that include the group as an equally worthy recipient of concern and priority (binding foundations), resulting in moral judgments based on maintaining and preserving important traditions, hierarchies, and social systems as well as caring for individuals and promoting fairness (Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, research has also shown that endorsement of certain moral principles could be a result of adhering to specific political ideologies (i.e. liberalism versus conservatism) (Goren, 2005; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In addition, research has also shown that endorsement of abstract values, or overarching principles that guide our behavior, our judgment of others’ behavior, and assist us in explaining our choices, actions, beliefs, and intentions (e.g. universalism, egalitarianism, traditionalism, Schwartz, 1992), are associated with both political ideology and with endorsement of moral principles (Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012). The main goals of the current research were to 1) provide an experimental test of the causal link from endorsement of moral foundations to endorsement of specific political ideology predicted by moral foundations theory researchers and to provide an experimental test of the causal direction of endorsement of specific political ideology to endorsement of specific moral foundations predicted by some political science researchers, and 2) propose a role for abstract value endorsements as a mediator between both the morals-to-ideology link and the ideology-to- morals link. In order to accomplish these goals, I conducted two studies that each examined one direction of the causal link between political ideology and endorsement of moral principles. Study 1 manipulated endorsement of moral foundations (increase individualizing foundations versus increase binding foundations conditions) through a writing task and measured responses to questions assessing abstract value endorsement and political ideology. Study 2 manipulated endorsement of political ideology (increase conservatism versus decrease conservatism conditions), also through a writing task, and measured responses to abstract values and moral foundations questions. For Study 1, I expected that those in the increase individualizing foundations condition would report more liberal leaning political ideology and that those in the increase binding foundations conditions would report more conservative political ideology. However, these associations would be mediated by endorsement of certain abstract values associated with the primed moral foundations. For Study 2, I expected that those in the increase conservatism condition would report greater endorsement of binding foundations and that those in the decrease conservatism condition would report greater endorsement of individualizing foundations. Again, these associations would be mediated by endorsement of specific abstract values associated with the primed political ideology. The results of Study 1 were inconclusive at best. Manipulating one’s moral foundation endorsement had no effect on their political ideology or their endorsement of specific abstract values within the context of this study. The current research showed that it is difficult to manipulate people’s locus of moral concern, which in turn makes it difficult to predict how those concerns will relate to their political ideology. The Study 2 data revealed that a relationship does exist between political ideology and moral principle endorsement and that this relationship was at least partially explained by the values that one endorsed. While the Study 1 was unsuccessful at manipulating moral foundation endorsement, it did shed some light on areas for future research to further address the methodological shortcomings. By taking into account the presented suggestions for future research, it may be possible to more clearly identify the causal role that moral concerns may have on one’s political ideology. And even though the results of Study 2 are not completely conclusive, they get us on the right track to further discovering the complex relationship between ideology, morality, and values