Culture change in a professional sports team: Shaping environmental contexts and regulating power

Although high performing cultures are crucial for the enduring success of professional sport performance teams, theoretical and practical understanding of how they are established and sustained is lacking. To develop knowledge in this area, a case study was undertaken to examine the key mechanisms and processes of a successful culture change programme at English Rugby Union’s Leeds Carnegie. Exploring the change process from a 360 degree perspective, semi-structured interviews were conducted with team management, one specialist coach, six players, and the CEO. Analysed and explained through decentred theory, results revealed that culture change was effectively facilitated by team management: a) subtly and covertly shaping the physical, structural, and psychosocial context in which support staff and players made performance-impacting choices, and b) regulating the ‘to and fro’ of power which characterises professional sport performance teams. Decentred theory is also supported as an effective framework for culture change study

Collective Action forWatershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya

The dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, and above external regulations, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.Collective Action, Watersheds, Field Experiments, Colombia, Kenya

Collective Action for Watershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya

The dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, and above external regulations, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.Collective Action, Watersheds, Field Experiments, Colombia, Kenya, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Q0, Q2, C9, H3, H4,