The Relationship Between Employee Perceptions of the Employment Game and Their Perceptions of Cooperative Knowledge Behavior in High Tech Firms

The relationship between knowledge sharing and organizational performance for high technology start-up companies is not well understood. Using game theory and the concept of competitive advantage through human resource management, I examine employee perceptions of the employment game relating to cooperative knowledge behavior and firm performance as an entry point into researching organizational knowledge utilization. I draw upon classical game theory to develop four measures of perceptions critical to game playing and apply these to organizational situations via a survey instrument. I propose that perceptions of the employment game held by organization members are determinants of cooperative knowledge sharing and subsequently firm performance. I analyze survey data gathered from high-tech workers using both regression and path analysis techniques. The results from this study offer new insights into methods for measuring both the connections between knowledge work and firm performance and the perceptions critical for fostering collaborative knowledge work in high tech firms. Results of the study show a significant relationship between the game theory construct of reciprocity, knowledge building behavior and firm performance. The mediation model was weakly supported but shows potential usefulness for further research in the field of strategic human resource management

Contractual Alliance Governance: Impact of Different Contract Functions on Alliance Performance

Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a control and coordination function. In this paper, we test the impact of these different contract functions on alliance performance. Conducting structural equation analyses on a sample of 270 Dutch technology alliances, we disentangle the relationship between different contract functions, partner cooperation and alliance success. Our data show that different contract roles have a different impact on partner cooperation within the alliance. In addition, we find strong indications that the presence/absence of prior trustful collaboration and the number of alliance partners moderate the relationship between contract functions and partner cooperation. Finally, our data provide evidence that contract functions indirectly influence alliance success via partner cooperation

More than two are a crowd. Different paths to effectiveness in dyadic and multi-party joint ventures

Using data from 87 joint venture (JV) experiences, we compared the effectiveness of dyadic and multi-party JVs. We show that dyadic JVs are more effective than multi-party ones, and that the conditions resulting in an enhanced effectiveness differ for the two groups: while relational embeddedness significantly influences the effectiveness of dyadic JVs, monitoring mechanisms are pivotal in the case of multi-party JVs.joint venture;

Cooperation, competition and the longevity of stakes in joint ventures: A value creation approach

This research used a transaction value perspective (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Madhok and Tallman, 1998) to examine the impact of competitive and cooperative forces on joint venture (JV) duration. We argue that some factors increasing the management cost of the JV may also increase its value potential. Such factors include whether the partners are direct competitors, and whether their nationality is the same. Findings from a survey study provided support for all of our hypothesesCooperation; joint ventures; competition;

Bank institutional setting and risk-taking: The missing role of directors’ education and turnover

Purpose: This paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to jointstock banks. Design/methodology/approach: Based on a comprehensive dataset of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, we examine whether these board characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Zindex, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. Findings: The findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and education. Furthermore, we find that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and bank risk-taking, we do not find evidence of board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks. Implications: The findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, our results point to the need to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a more ad hoc perspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education’s effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully monitored. Originality/value: Through a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bankinstitutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature

Modeling Complex Systems

Abstract Empirical observations suggest that linear dynamics are not an adequate representa- tion of ecological systems and that a realistic representation would require adoption of complex nonlinear dynamical systems with characteristics encountered in complex adaptive systems (CAS). Adequate modelling should include and combine, among others, strategic interactions among economic agents, nonconvexities induced by non-linear feedbacks, separate spatial and temporal scales and modeling of spatiotempo-ral dynamics, and allowance of alternative time scales. Ignoring these characteristics might obscure very important features that we observe in reality such as bifurcations and irreversibilities or hysteresis. As a consequence, the design of policies that do not take CAS characteristics into account might lead to erroneous results and undesirable states of managed economic-ecological systems.Complex adaptive systems, differential games, spatiotemporal dynamics, fast-slow variables.

Realising Team-Working in the Field: An Agent-based Approach

Multi-agent systems technology is applied to enable co-operation between mobile workers in the field, minimising user intervention and increasing reachability. A component-based approach is taken to simplify the management of deployed co-operation services. A Personal Assistant running on a mobile device is introduced to show how an intelligent and autonomous agent can increase the utility of users during workforce co-operation processes. Finally, a real world trial of the technology by network installation and maintenance engineers in the UK is described. Some technical issues revealed during the trial are discussed, as is the impact of the technology on the business process

Human Error Management Paying Emphasis on Decision Making and Social Intelligence -Beyond the Framework of Man-Machine Interface Design-

How latent error or violation induces a serious accident has been reviewed and a proper addressing measure of this has been proposed in the framework of decision making, emotional intelligence (EI) and social intelligence (SI) of organization and its members. It has been clarified that EI and SI play an important role in decision making. Violations frequently occur all over the world, although we definitely understand that we should not commit violations, and a secret to prevent this might exist in the enhancement of both social intelligence and reliability. The construction of social structure or system that supports organizational efforts to enhance both social intelligence and reliability would be essential. Traditional safety education emphasizes that it is possible to change attitudes or mind toward safety by means of education. In spite of this，accidents or scandals frequently occur and never decrease. These problems must be approached on the basis of the full understanding of social intelligence and limited reasonability in decision making. Social dilemma (We do not necessarily cooperate in spite of understanding its importance, and we sometimes make decision not to select cooperative behavior. Non-cooperation gives rise to a desirable result for an individual. However, if all take non-cooperative actions, undesirable results are finally induced to all.) must be solved in some ways and the transition from relief (closed) society to global (reliability) society must be realized as a whole. New social system, where cooperative relation can be easily and reliably obtained, must be constructed to support such an approach and prevent violation-based accidents

Alliance Coordination, Dysfunctions, and the Protection of Idiosyncratic Knowledge in Strategic Learning Alliances

In high technology industries firms use strategic learning alliances to create value that can’t be created alone. While they open their interorganizational membrane to gain new skills and competences, generate new products and services, accelerate development speed, and enter into new markets their idiosyncratic knowledge base may be impaired when knowledge related dysfunctions like the unintended knowledge transfer, asymmetric learning speed or premature closing occur. Within a value approach we examine the interplay of alliance coordination activities that enhance value creation, emerging knowledge related dysfunctions, and formal and organizational protections measures which shall safeguard firms intellectual crown jewels. We tested our hypotheses with a sample of 111 strategic alliances of young technology based Enterprises (YTBEs) with competing partners in high and key technology industries. Our findings suggest that a focal firm’s alliance management is well advised to intensely coordinate the alliance and to be aware of dysfunctional tendencies that erode alliance value. Since organizational protection measures could exaggerate dysfunctional effects they should be deployed very deliberately on a modest level. Formal protections measures, in contrast, seem to aggravate coordination activities’ value creation effect by setting behavioral guidelines. Moreover, an unsuccessful negotiation process of formal protection agreements may allow a deselection of partners that would not obey others intellectual property interests. Finally, we highlight theoretical and managerial implications that arise from these findings. --Strategic Learning Alliance,Protection