Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design

The different auction types are outlined using a classification framework along six dimensions. The economic properties that are desired in the design of auction mechanisms and the complexities that arise in their implementation are discussed. Some of the most interesting designs from the literature are analyzed in detail to establish known results and to identify the emerging research directions.Engineering and Applied Science

Multi-attribute auctions with different types of attributes: Enacting properties in multi-attribute auctions

International audienceMulti-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). In this paper we analyze attributes involved during the auction process and propose to classify them between verifiable attributes, unverifiable attributes and auctioneer provided attributes. According to this classification we present VMA2, a new Vickrey-based reverse multi-attribute auction mechanism which, taking into account the different types of attributes involved in the auction, allows the auction customization in order to suit the auctioneer needs. On the one hand, the use of auctioneer provided attributes enables the inclusion of different auction concepts such as social welfare, trust or robustness whilst, on the other hand, the use of verifiable attributes guarantee truthful bidding. The paper exemplifies the behaviour of VMA2 describing how an egalitarian allocation can be achieved. The mechanism is then tested in a simulated manufacturing environment and compared with other existing auction allocation methods

Combinatorial Auction-based Mechanisms for Composite Web Service Selection

Composite service selection presents the opportunity for the rapid development of complex applications using existing web services. It refers to the problem of selecting a set of web services from a large pool of available candidates to logically compose them to achieve value-added composite services. The aim of service selection is to choose the best set of services based on the functional and non-functional (quality related) requirements of a composite service requester. The current service selection approaches mostly assume that web services are offered as single independent entities; there is no possibility for bundling. Moreover, the current research has mainly focused on solving the problem for a single composite service. There is a limited research to date on how the presence of multiple requests for composite services affects the performance of service selection approaches. Addressing these two aspects can significantly enhance the application of composite service selection approaches in the real-world. We develop new approaches for the composite web service selection problem by addressing both the bundling and multiple requests issues. In particular, we propose two mechanisms based on combinatorial auction models, where the provisioning of multiple services are auctioned simultaneously and service providers can bid to offer combinations of web services. We mapped these mechanisms to Integer Linear Programing models and conducted extensive simulations to evaluate them. The results of our experimentation show that bundling can lead to cost reductions compared to when services are offered independently. Moreover, the simultaneous consideration of a set of requests enhances the success rate of the mechanism in allocating services to requests. By considering all composite service requests at the same time, the mechanism achieves more homogenous prices which can be a determining factor for the service requester in choosing the best composite service selection mechanism to deploy

Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

There is a veritable menagerie of auctions-single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid-and these have been extensively discussed and analyzed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this article is to survey this literature from a computer science perspective, primarily from the viewpoint of computer scientists who are interested in learning about auction theory, and to provide pointers into the economics literature for those who want a deeper technical understanding. In addition, since auctions are an increasingly important topic in computer science, we also look at work on auctions from the computer science literature. Overall, our aim is to identifying what both these bodies of work these tell us about creating electronic auctions. © 2011 ACM.This work was funded in part by HP under the “Always on” grant, by NSF IIS-0329037 “Tools and Techniques for Automated Mechanism Design”, and by IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), OK (IST-4-027253-STP), eREP(EC-FP6-CIT5-28575) and Agreement Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010).Peer Reviewe

Design and Evaluation of Feedback Schemes for Multiattribute Procurement Auctions

Multiattribute auctions, which allow bids on multiple dimensions of the product, are IT-enabled sourcing mechanisms that increase the efficiency of procurement for configurable goods and services compared to price-only auctions. Given the strategic nature of procurement auctions, the amount of information concerning the buyer’s preferences that is disclosed to the suppliers has implications on the profits of the buyer and suppliers and, consequently, on the long-term relationship between them. This study develops novel feedback schemes for multiattribute auctions that protect buyer’s preference information from the supplier and suppliers’ cost schedule from the buyer. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study bidder behavior and profit implications under three different feedback regimes. Our results indicate that bidders are able to extract more profit with more information regarding the state of the auction in terms of provisional allocation and prices. Furthermore, bidding behavior is substantially influenced by the nature and type of feedback

Decentralized Resource Scheduling in Grid/Cloud Computing

In the Grid/Cloud environment, applications or services and resources belong to different organizations with different objectives. Entities in the Grid/Cloud are autonomous and self-interested; however, they are willing to share their resources and services to achieve their individual and collective goals. In such open environment, the scheduling decision is a challenge given the decentralized nature of the environment. Each entity has specific requirements and objectives that need to achieve. In this thesis, we review the Grid/Cloud computing technologies, environment characteristics and structure and indicate the challenges within the resource scheduling. We capture the Grid/Cloud scheduling model based on the complete requirement of the environment. We further create a mapping between the Grid/Cloud scheduling problem and the combinatorial allocation problem and propose an adequate economic-based optimization model based on the characteristic and the structure nature of the Grid/Cloud. By adequacy, we mean that a comprehensive view of required properties of the Grid/Cloud is captured. We utilize the captured properties and propose a bidding language that is expressive where entities have the ability to specify any set of preferences in the Grid/Cloud and simple as entities have the ability to express structured preferences directly. We propose a winner determination model and mechanism that utilizes the proposed bidding language and finds a scheduling solution. Our proposed approach integrates concepts and principles of mechanism design and classical scheduling theory. Furthermore, we argue that in such open environment privacy concerns by nature is part of the requirement in the Grid/Cloud. Hence, any scheduling decision within the Grid/Cloud computing environment is to incorporate the feasibility of privacy protection of an entity. Each entity has specific requirements in terms of scheduling and privacy preferences. We analyze the privacy problem in the Grid/Cloud computing environment and propose an economic based model and solution architecture that provides a scheduling solution given privacy concerns in the Grid/Cloud. Finally, as a demonstration of the applicability of the approach, we apply our solution by integrating with Globus toolkit (a well adopted tool to enable Grid/Cloud computing environment). We also, created simulation experimental results to capture the economic and time efficiency of the proposed solution

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations