Using fMRI in experimental philosophy: Exploring the prospects

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions

Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences

Determining what people feel and think when interacting with humans and machines

Any interactive software program must interpret the users’ actions and come up with an appropriate response that is intelligable and meaningful to the user. In most situations, the options of the user are determined by the software and hardware and the actions that can be carried out are unambiguous. The machine knows what it should do when the user carries out an action. In most cases, the user knows what he has to do by relying on conventions which he may have learned by having had a look at the instruction manual, having them seen performed by somebody else, or which he learned by modifying a previously learned convention. Some, or most, of the times he just finds out by trial and error. In user-friendly interfaces, the user knows, without having to read extensive manuals, what is expected from him and how he can get the machine to do what he wants. An intelligent interface is so-called, because it does not assume the same kind of programming of the user by the machine, but the machine itself can figure out what the user wants and how he wants it without the user having to take all the trouble of telling it to the machine in the way the machine dictates but being able to do it in his own words. Or perhaps by not using any words at all, as the machine is able to read off the intentions of the user by observing his actions and expressions. Ideally, the machine should be able to determine what the user wants, what he expects, what he hopes will happen, and how he feels

The role of automaticity and attention in neural processes underlying empathy for happiness, sadness, and anxiety.

Although many studies have examined the neural basis of empathy, relatively little is known about how empathic processes are affected by different attentional conditions. Thus, we examined whether instructions to empathize might amplify responses in empathy-related regions and whether cognitive load would diminish the involvement of these regions. Thirty-two participants completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging session assessing empathic responses to individuals experiencing happy, sad, and anxious events. Stimuli were presented under three conditions: watching naturally, actively empathizing, and under cognitive load. Across analyses, we found evidence for a core set of neural regions that support empathic processes (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, DMPFC; medial prefrontal cortex, MPFC; temporoparietal junction, TPJ; amygdala; ventral anterior insula, AI; and septal area, SA). Two key regions-the ventral AI and SA-were consistently active across all attentional conditions, suggesting that they are automatically engaged during empathy. In addition, watching vs. empathizing with targets was not markedly different and instead led to similar subjective and neural responses to others' emotional experiences. In contrast, cognitive load reduced the subjective experience of empathy and diminished neural responses in several regions related to empathy and social cognition (DMPFC, MPFC, TPJ, and amygdala). The results reveal how attention impacts empathic processes and provides insight into how empathy may unfold in everyday interactions

The Ouroboros Model

At the core of the Ouroboros Model lies a self-referential recursive process with alternating phases of data acquisition and evaluation. Memory entries are organized in schemata. Activation at a time of part of a schema biases the whole structure and, in particular, missing features, thus triggering expectations. An iterative recursive monitor process termed ‘consumption analysis’ is then checking how well such expectations fit with successive activations. A measure for the goodness of fit, “emotion”, provides feedback as (self-) monitoring signal. Contradictions between anticipations based on previous experience and actual current data are highlighted as well as minor gaps and deficits. The basic algorithm can be applied to goal directed movements as well as to abstract rational reasoning when weighing evidence for and against some remote theories. A sketch is provided how the Ouroboros Model can shed light on rather different characteristics of human behavior including learning and meta-learning. Partial implementations proved effective in dedicated safety systems

Miss, I got mad today! : the anger diary, a tool to promote emotion regulation

Effective management of emotions has strong implications in the development of adaptive behaviours during childhood and adolescence. The purpose of this study was to examine the use of a new method of emotion regulation named the ‘aRRabbiadiaro’ (Anger Diary), with primary school children. The participants included 119 children attending 7 classes from three primary schools located in middle-class urban communities in the province of Pavia, Italy. In the first phase, the participants were asked to complete a narrative tool which investigated how they coped with anger in their everyday life and whether the use of narrative applied to episodes of anger and facilitated adaptive ways of coping with negative feelings. Subsequently the study assessed the relationship between effective anger management and social functioning in the peer group. Our findings suggest that the use of diary writing seems to represent a promising instrument to promote the development of emotional and socio-cognitive skills in school children.peer-reviewe