A Formal Context Representation Framework for Network-Enabled Cognition

Network-accessible resources are inherently contextual with respect to the specific situations (e.g., location and default assumptions) in which they are used. Therefore, the explicit conceptualization and representation of contexts is required to address a number of problems in Network- Enabled Cognition (NEC). We propose a context representation framework to address the computational specification of contexts. Our focus is on developing a formal model of context for the unambiguous and effective delivery of data and knowledge, in particular, for enabling forms of automated inference that address contextual differences between agents in a distributed network environment. We identify several components for the conceptualization of contexts within the context representation framework. These include jurisdictions (which can be used to interpret contextual data), semantic assumptions (which highlight the meaning of data), provenance information and inter-context relationships. Finally, we demonstrate the application of the context representation framework in a collaborative military coalition planning scenario. We show how the framework can be used to support the representation of plan-relevant contextual information

A Java implementation of Coordination Rules as ECA Rules

This paper gives an insight in to the design and implementation of the coordination rules as ECA rules. The language specifications of the ECA rules were designed and the corresponding implementation of the same using JAVA as been partially done. The paper also hints about the future work in this area which deals with embedding this code in JXTA, thus enabling to form a P2P layer with JXTA as the back bone

Cognitive context and arguments from ontologies for learning

The deployment of learning resources on the web by different experts has resulted in the accessibility of multiple viewpoints about the same topics. In this work we assume that learning resources are underpinned by ontologies. Different formalizations of domains may result from different contexts, different use of terminology, incomplete knowledge or conflicting knowledge. We define the notion of cognitive learning context which describes the cognitive context of an agent who refers to multiple and possibly inconsistent ontologies to determine the truth of a proposition. In particular we describe the cognitive states of ambiguity and inconsistency resulting from incomplete and conflicting ontologies respectively. Conflicts between ontologies can be identified through the derivation of conflicting arguments about a particular point of view. Arguments can be used to detect inconsistencies between ontologies. They can also be used in a dialogue between a human learner and a software tutor in order to enable the learner to justify her views and detect inconsistencies between her beliefs and the tutor’s own. Two types of arguments are discussed, namely: arguments inferred directly from taxonomic relations between concepts, and arguments about the necessary an

Knowledge Nodes: the Building Blocks of a Distributed Approach to Knowledge Management

Abstract: In this paper we criticise the objectivistic approach that underlies most current systems for Knowledge Management. We show that such an approach is incompatible with the very nature of what is to be managed (i.e., knowledge), and we argue that this may partially explain why most knowledge management systems are deserted by users. We propose a different approach - called distributed knowledge management - in which subjective and social (in a word, contextual) aspects of knowledge are seriously taken into account. Finally, we present a general technological architecture in which these ideas are implemented by introducing the concept of knowledge node

If P, Then P!

The Identity principle says that conditionals with the form 'If p, then p' are logical truths. Identity is overwhelmingly plausible, and has rarely been explicitly challenged. But a wide range of conditionals nonetheless invalidate it. I explain the problem, and argue that the culprit is the principle known as Import-Export, which we must thus reject. I then explore how we can reject Import-Export in a way that still makes sense of the intuitions that support it, arguing that the differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals play a key role in solving this puzzle