2,055 research outputs found
Enumeration of PLCP-orientations of the 4-cube
The linear complementarity problem (LCP) provides a unified approach to many
problems such as linear programs, convex quadratic programs, and bimatrix
games. The general LCP is known to be NP-hard, but there are some promising
results that suggest the possibility that the LCP with a P-matrix (PLCP) may be
polynomial-time solvable. However, no polynomial-time algorithm for the PLCP
has been found yet and the computational complexity of the PLCP remains open.
Simple principal pivoting (SPP) algorithms, also known as Bard-type algorithms,
are candidates for polynomial-time algorithms for the PLCP. In 1978, Stickney
and Watson interpreted SPP algorithms as a family of algorithms that seek the
sink of unique-sink orientations of -cubes. They performed the enumeration
of the arising orientations of the -cube, hereafter called
PLCP-orientations. In this paper, we present the enumeration of
PLCP-orientations of the -cube.The enumeration is done via construction of
oriented matroids generalizing P-matrices and realizability classification of
oriented matroids.Some insights obtained in the computational experiments are
presented as well
Network Cournot Competition
Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms
competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize
its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the
product---by deciding on the amount of production. In today's dynamic and
diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market
simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these
firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the access restriction where
firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate
whether a firm has access to a market or not. We call this game \emph{Network
Cournot Competition} (NCC). In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding
pure Nash equilibria of NCC games in different situations. First, we carefully
design a potential function for NCC, when the price functions for markets are
linear functions of the production in that market. However, for nonlinear price
functions, this approach is not feasible. We model the problem as a nonlinear
complementarity problem in this case, and design a polynomial-time algorithm
that finds an equilibrium of the game for strongly convex cost functions and
strongly monotone revenue functions. We also explore the class of price
functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the revenue function, and show it
consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we discuss the uniqueness of
equilibria in both of these cases which means our algorithms find the unique
equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production in one
market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all
firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical
\emph{Cournot Oligopoly} problems. We give the first combinatorial algorithm
for this widely studied problem
Counting Unique-Sink Orientations
Unique-sink orientations (USOs) are an abstract class of orientations of the
n-cube graph. We consider some classes of USOs that are of interest in
connection with the linear complementarity problem. We summarise old and show
new lower and upper bounds on the sizes of some such classes. Furthermore, we
provide a characterisation of K-matrices in terms of their corresponding USOs.Comment: 13 pages; v2: proof of main theorem expanded, plus various other
corrections. Now 16 pages; v3: minor correction
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