Research program of the Research Center (SFB) 700

The governance problematique constitutes a central research focus in contemporary social sciences. Yet, the debate remains centered on an „ideal type“ of the modern nation-state – with full sovereignty and a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. From a global as well as a historical perspective, however, the Western modern nation-state is an exception rather than the rule. Outside the developed world, we fi nd areas of “limited statehood”, from developing and transition countries to „failing“ and „failed states“ in today’s confl ict zones and – historically – in colonial societies. Our Research Center focuses on these areas of limited statehood which lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions or even lack the monopoly over the means of violence. We ask: How can eff ective and legitimate governance be sustained in areas of limited statehood? Which problems emerge under these conditions? We assume that “multi-level governance” is the rule in areas of limited statehood, linking the local with the national, regional, and global levels. We also assume that governance in areas of limited statehood involves a variety of public and private actors, such as states, international organizations, fi rms, and civil society. Governance entails negotiations, bargaining, and arguing among these actors rather than hierarchical „command and control“

effectiveness and legitimacy in areas of limited statehood

While it is widely acknowledged that effectiveness and legitimacy both play an important role in the evaluation of governance, the causal relationship between these two concepts is far from clear. While some theorists hold that there is an inevitable trade-off between the demands of effectiveness and legitimacy, others argue that both qualities are mutually reinforcing. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between these two standards under conditions of limited statehood. The paper is organized into three sections: In the first section I will define the central concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy. While the main features of the concept of effectiveness are straightforward, the concept of legitimacy is notoriously opaque. In the second section, I will argue that the causal relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is far more complex than usually assumed. Most scholars describe the connection as a virtuous circle: The more effective a political order or institution is, the more legitimate it is, and the more legitimate it is, the more effective it becomes. While the causal pathway from legitimacy to effectiveness is well understood, this does not hold true for the reverse connection from effectiveness to legitimacy. I will therefore identify four necessary conditions which have to be met in order to make the virtuous circle argument compelling. These are the conditions of (1.) “instrumental legitimacy belief,” (2.) “shared social goals,” (3.) “transparency,” and (4.) “generalization”. Finally, I will argue that these conditions are serious challenges to effective and legitimate governance in areas of limited statehood.In der Governance-Literatur ist es nahezu unumstritten, dass der Erfolg oder Misserfolg eines Governance-Regimes an seiner Effektivität und Legitimität gemessen werden kann. Weit weniger klar ist hingegen ob, und wenn ja, in welcher Hinsicht beide Kriterien kausal miteinander verbunden sind. Während einige Autoren argumentieren, dass ein unauflöslicher Zielkonflikt zwischen Effektivität und Legitimität besteht, vertreten andere die Ansicht, dass sich beide Qualitäten gegenseitig zu einem Tugendzirkel verstärken. Ziel dieses Papiers ist es, ein neues Modell dieser Kausalbeziehung zu entwickeln und die Konsequenzen dieses Modells im Kontext von Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit näher zu bestimmen. Das Papier ist dabei in drei Schritte gegliedert: Im ersten Abschnitt werde ich die zentralen Begriffe der Effektivität und Legitimität für die Zwecke dieses Beitrags definieren. Anschließend werde ich im zweiten Abschnitt ein komplexes Modell der kausalen Beziehung zwischen Effektivität und Legitimität entwickeln, das auf der Idee des Tugendzirkels beruht, jedoch diese um vier notwendige Bedingungen für eine wechselseitige Verstärkung der Merkmale erweitert. Im abschließenden dritten Abschnitt wird schließlich geprüft, wie sich diese Bedingungen auf die Erbringung von Governance-Leistungen in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit auswirken

fostering resilience in areas of limited statehood and contested orders

EU-LISTCO starts from the assumption that Europe’s internal and external environment is characterized by two risk factors, which represent challenges for the external action of the EU and its member states: - Areas of limited statehood (ALS), in which central government authorities and institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the monopoly over the means of violence. Such areas of limited statehood are ubiquitous. They characterise large parts of the regions surrounding the EU in the East and in the South. However, areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Some ALS are reasonably well governed by a whole variety of actors – state and non-state, domestic/local and international, while others are not. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster good governance in areas of limited statehood. - Contested orders (CO), in which state and non-state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules according to which societies and political systems are or should be organised. At the global and regional level, powers such as Russia and – somewhat less aggressive – China call the liberal and law-based order into question. The Trump administration in the United States adds a new dimension to order contestations by appearing to turn away from the liberal international order which the U.S. itself was instrumental in creating. Finally, and domestically, Western and non-Western societies struggle with the rise of actors that question their current political and legal order from the inside as well as from the outside. The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster conditions in which order contestations remain peaceful and do not contribute to governance breakdowns in areas of limited statehood. Neither limited statehood nor contested orders will go away. They create vulnerabilities and pose risks, but they do not in themselves amount to threats to the EU. Only if and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdowns and violent conflict, do the risks turn into threats to the security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens. The main research task of EU-LISTCO is to investigate the “tipping points” at which risks of limited statehood and contested orders turn into threats leading to governance breakdowns and violent conflict. Two factors are decisive in affecting such tipping points: - Global, diffuse, and regional risks, such as nuclear proliferation, transnational terrorism, economic crises, aggressive powers, cyber threats, and climate change, are likely to promote governance breakdowns and violent conflict in areas of limited statehood and contested orders. - Resilience is likely to help societies to sustain good and effective governance at the local/domestic as well as regional levels. We understand resilience as the “capacity of societies, communities and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful and stable manner, and to build, maintain or restore livelihoods in the face of major pressures.” (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017, 3). In other words, the various risks, on the one hand, and resilience, on the other, affect tipping points in opposite ways. Whether or not risks turn into threats for European security then depends on the extent to which resilient societies can successfully contain these risks through effective and legitimate governance at the local, domestic, and regional levels. Last but not least, we use three indicators to measure degrees of resilience: - Social trust in societies and local communities; - Legitimacy (or social acceptance) of governance actors and institutions at the various levels; - Institutional design of local, domestic, and regional governance arrangements including what is left of central state institutions. Research in EU-LISTCO – particularly Work Packages 2, 3, and 4 – will focus on exploring the relationships between the various factors outlined above which affect the tipping points between risks and threats. The remainder of this paper introduces the various concepts used in the framework in more detail, namely areas of limited statehood, governance, contested orders, threats, resilience, as well as the three factors fostering the latter

Information and Communication Technologies in Areas of Limited Statehood

This paper analyzes the effects of information and communication technology (ICT) on governance where the state‘s ability to authoritatively implement and enforce political decisions is weak or functionally absent – areas of limited statehood (AoLS). How do ICTs influence the provision of collective goods in AoLS, especially in policy fields such as security, welfare and the environment? In addressing this question we focus on the emergence of ICT- enabled forms of steering. Virtual organizations such as Ushahidi and FrontlineSMS enable the coordination of collective goods without the same level of hierarchical structure historically associated with traditional forms of governance. The focus lies on quasi-organizational forms that rely on mass collaborative action across electronic networks. The consideration of these questions is supported by fieldwork in Africa in 2011, and on previous research in Afghanistan and various African countries in 2010. The paper concludes with some tentative hypotheses on the interconnection between ICT, statehood and governance.Dieses Arbeitspapier analysiert die Effekte von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (ICT) in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit (RbS) mit Bezug auf Governance. Es geht dabei v.a. der Frage nach, wie ICTs die Bereitstellung kollektiver Güter insbesondere in den Politikfeldern Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt und Umwelt beeinflussen. Bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage konzentrieren wir uns auf die Entstehung neuer Steuerungsformen, die auf ICTs basieren. Virtuelle Organisationen wie Ushahidi oder FrontlineSMS beispielsweise ermöglichen die Erbringung kollektiver Güter auch ohne staatlich-hierarchische Strukturen, die in einem traditionellen Verständnis häufig als Voraussetzung von Governance betrachtet werden. Unser Fokus liegt somit auf Governance-Formen die auf kollektivem Handeln über elektronische Netzwerke basieren. Die Diskussion dieser Fragen wird durch die Ergebnisse von Forschungsaufenthalten illustriert, die in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 in Afghanistan und verschiedenen afrikanischen Staaten stattgefunden haben. Das Paper endet mit einigen vorläufigen Hypothesen zu der Verbindung von ICTs, Staatlichkeit und Governance

Social Capital and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood

Im Gegensatz zu Hobb’schen Argumentationen ist die Bereitstellung von Governance nicht notwendigerweise an starke Staatlichkeit gebunden: Empirische Belege zeigen, dass verschiedene (nicht-staatliche) Akteure Governance- Leistungen trotz zumindest begrenzter Staatlichkeit bereitstellen – entgegen vieler Stimmen in zeitgenössischen Diskursen zu schwacher und gescheiterter Staatlichkeit. Der Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, wie die Fälle erklärt werden können, wo Governance erfolgreich bereitgestellt wird obwohl der Staat entweder keine Governance-Leistungen erbringt oder erbringen kann. Im Rahmen des Transfers von Forschungsergebnissen der Politischen Soziologie in die Analyse von „Governance ohne Staat“ geht der Aufsatz von der Annahme aus, dass Art und Weise wie Gesellschaften sich organisieren maßgeblich von deren sozialstruktureller Bedingtheit abhängen. Diese spezifiziert der Aufsatz mithilfe des Sozialkapitaltheorie. Auf dem Weg zu einer Politischen Soziologie der „Governance ohne Staat“, stellt der Aufsatz die Beziehung zwischen Sozialkapital, vor allem in seiner Ausprägung als interpersonelles Vertrauen, und sozialer Handlungskoordination als Grundlage von Governance her. In diesem Kontext wird die Bereitstellung von Governance als Spiel kollektiven Handelns verstanden („Governance Game“), in dem das Verhalten sozial-eingebetteter (kollektiver) Akteure (und insbesondere ihre Kooperationsentscheidungen) maßgeblich von dem Umfang ihres Sozialkapitals abhängen. Das zentrale Argument des Aufsatzes ist, dass spezifische Typen von Sozialkapital bestimmte Modi der sozialen Handlungskoordination in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit ermöglichen und entsprechend erklären. Im Rahmen eines explorativen Zugangs werden konzeptuelle und theoretische Begründungen vorgebracht, die bei der Erklärung der Varianz und der Prozesse von Governance außerhalb der OECD-Welt neue Perspektiven eröffnen.Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by a lack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak, failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited. This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the state cannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “gov- ernance without the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically depends on social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a political sociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, to social coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted as a collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen as players whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capital endowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus, explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, con- ceptual and theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance and mechanisms of governance outside the OECD world

Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The NGOization of Palestine

In this article we examine the shifting roles played by non-state actors in governing areas of limited statehood. In particular we focus on the emergence of voluntary grassroots organizations in Palestine and describe how regimes of international development aid transformed these organizations into professional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that created new forms of colonial control. Based on in-depth interviews with 145 NGO members and key stakeholders and a historical analysis of limited statehood in Palestine, we found that social relations became disembedded from the local context and re-embedded in new relations with international donor organizations resulting in a depoliticized public sphere. NGOization of the economy also resulted in new forms of exclusion and inclusion as well as contestations between a new class of urban middle class professionals working in NGOs and the older generation of activists that were involved in grassroots organizations. Our findings have implications for business and human rights and governance in areas of limited statehood, in particular how private actors like NGOs are able to exercise power in the economy

Does it really take the state?

This paper explores the role of the state for an effective engagement of multinational corporations (MNCs) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the OECD context, the “shadow of hierarchy” cast by the state is considered an important incentive for MNCs to engage in CSR activities that contribute to governance. However, in areas of limited statehood, where state actors are too weak to effectively set and enforce collectively binding rules, profit-driven MNCs confront various dilemmas with respect to costly CSR standards. The lack of a credible regulatory threat by state agencies is therefore often associated with the exploitation of resources and people by MNCs, rather than with business’ social conduct. However, in this paper we argue that there are alternatives to the “shadow of hierarchy” that induce MNCs to adopt and implement CSR policies that contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood. We then discuss that in certain areas such functional equivalents still depend on some state intervention to be effective, in particular when firms are immune to reputational concerns and in complex-task areas that require the involvement of several actors in the provision of collective goods. Finally, we discuss the “dark side” of the state and show that the state can also have negative effects on the CSR engagement of MNCs. We illustrate the different ways in which statehood and the absence thereof affect CSR activities of MNCs in South Africa and conclude with some considerations on the conditions under which statehood exerts these effects.</jats:p

International Humanitarian Law in Areas of Limited Statehood

Areas of limited statehood, in which the territorial State lacks effective control, either completely or in part, challenge International Humanitarian Law in various ways. This volume explores if and how the law adapts to these challenges on the basis of mainly two legal issues: detention and investment protection in (non-)international armed conflict. Does a sufficient legal basis exist for the former? Is it International Humanitarian Law that determines what the investor is owed under a ‘full protection and security’ standard? More fundamentally, the contributions strive to shed light on these practical legal issues in a manner that is also historically and theoretically informed. How can international law be effective in areas of limited statehood, in particular as regards non-State actors? Can the law provide incentives for compliance? Is it in need of being developed? If so, who enjoys the legitimacy to do so

Local Self‐Governance and the State in South Sudan: Studying Gendered Tenure Relations in Times of Uncertainty

With governance increasingly regarded as co-governance, states' capacity to steer, correct, and discipline a wide range of self-governing actors becomes crucial for states' effectiveness, efficiency, and democracy. This article investigates that capacity and the relationship between formal institutions and customary self-governance in areas of limited statehood. In South Sudan, the field of land governance can be regarded as an area of limited statehood. As land relations are closely connected to clan structures and intra-familial relationships, customary norms and institutions enjoy great legitimacy and are an important locus of local land governance and dispute resolution. The South Sudanese government has promulgated legal provisions for equal rights to property and inheritance that clash head-on with customary notions of gender roles in the family and the preservation of family land. By focusing on the case of women’s land rights in South Sudan, combining literature study with data from exploratory fieldwork in two South Sudanese towns, this article aims to reflect on the cohabitation of customary and formal norms and values and the role formal legal and administrative systems, in areas of limited statehood, can and do play in boundary setting for customary self-governance

engaging armed non-state groups in areas of limited statehood

Armed non-state groups pose a severe challenge for peace- and state-building processes. Depending on the situation, they may act as both spoilers and governance actors. This paper aims at presenting a framework for analysing armed groups as well as forms of engagement for international actors. It first describes various armed groups, which need to be distinguished in order to highlight specific profiles, as ideal types. Secondly, a number of strategies for dealing with these groups will be introduced and discussed by referring to realist, institutionalist and constructivist approaches. Thirdly, the conclusion will point to key problems and limits of these approaches when addressing the spectrum of armed groups. The argument here is that these approaches - despite their differences - by and large are directed to similar profiles of armed groups while other forms of non-state violence are systematically neglected.Nicht-staatliche Gewaltakteure sind eine besondere Herausforderung für Peace- und Statebuilding- Prozesse. Je nach Situation agieren bewaffnete Gruppen als „Störenfriede“ oder als Governance-Akteure. Dieses Papier verfolgt die Absicht, einen konzeptionellen Rahmen für die Analyse von nicht-staatlichen Gewaltakteuren sowie der Gegenstrategien durch internationale Akteure bereitzustellen. Zunächst werden verschiedene Profile von bewaffneten Gruppen in Form von Idealtypen unterschieden. Zweitens werden eine Reihe von Strategien im Umgang mit solchen Akteuren eingeführt und diskutiert, wobei zwischen realistischen, institutionalistischen und konstruktivistischen Ansätzen unterschieden wird. Drittens verweist das Papier auf zentrale Probleme und Grenzen dieser Ansätze. Insbesondere wird deutlich, dass sich diese Strategien – ungeachtet ihrer inhaltlichen Differenzen – auf ähnliche Profile bewaffneter Gruppen konzentrieren, während andere Formen von nichtstaatlicher Gewalt systematisch vernachlässigt werden