8 research outputs found
A MAC Mode for Lightweight Block Ciphers
status: accepte
A Guess-and-Determine Attack on Reduced-Round Khudra and Weak Keys of Full Cipher
Khudra is a lightweight block cipher designed for Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based platforms.
The cipher has an 18-round generalized type-2 Feistel structure with 64-bit block size.
The key schedule takes 80-bit master key and produces 32-bit round keys performing very simple operations.
In this work, we analyze the security of Khudra.
We first show that the effective round key length is 16-bit.
By the help of this observation, we improve the 14-round MITM attack proposed by Youssef et al. by reducing the memory complexity from to .
Also, we propose a new guess-and-determine type attack on 14 rounds where only 2 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs are required to mount the attack in a time complexity of encryption operations.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the best attack in the single key model in terms of time, memory and data complexities where the data complexity is equal to the minimum theoretical data requirement.
Moreover, we present two observations on differential probabilities of the round function and the symmetric structure of the cipher.
We introduce weak keys for the full cipher by exploiting the symmetric structure of the cipher
RoadRunneR: A Small And Fast Bitslice Block Cipher For Low Cost 8-bit Processors
Designing block ciphers targeting resource constrained 8-bit
CPUs is a challenging problem. There are many recent lightweight ciphers designed for better performance in hardware. On the other hand, most software efficient lightweight ciphers either lack a security proof or have a low security margin. To fill the gap, we present RoadRunneR which is an efficient block cipher in 8-bit software, and its security is provable against differential and linear attacks. RoadRunneR has lowest code size in Atmel’s ATtiny45, except NSA’s design SPECK, which has no security proof. Moreover, we propose a new metric for the fair comparison of block ciphers. This metric, called ST/A, is the first metric to
use key length as a parameter to rank ciphers of different key length in a fair way. By using ST/A and other metrics in the literature, we show that RoadRunneR is competitive among existing ciphers on ATtiny45
Fault Attacks In Symmetric Key Cryptosystems
Fault attacks are among the well-studied topics in the area of cryptography. These attacks constitute a powerful tool to recover the secret key used in the encryption process. Fault attacks work by forcing a device to work under non-ideal environmental conditions (such as high temperature) or external disturbances (such as glitch in the power supply) while performing a cryptographic operation. The recent trend shows that the amount of research in this direction; which ranges from attacking a particular primitive, proposing a fault countermeasure, to attacking countermeasures; has grown up substantially and going to stay as an active research interest for a foreseeable future. Hence, it becomes apparent to have a comprehensive yet compact study of the (major) works. This work, which covers a wide spectrum in the present day research on fault attacks that fall under the purview of the symmetric key cryptography, aims at fulfilling the absence of an up-to-date survey. We present mostly all aspects of the topic in a way which is not only understandable for a non-expert reader, but also helpful for an expert as a reference
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license
Unleashing the Power of Differential Fault Attacks on QARMAv2
QARMAv2 represents a family of lightweight block ciphers introduced in
ToSC 2023. This new iteration, QARMAv2, is an evolution of the original QARMA
design, specifically constructed to accommodate more extended tweak values while
simultaneously enhancing security measures. This family of ciphers is available in
two distinct versions, referred to as QARMAv2--, where ‘’ signifies the block
length, with options for both 64-bit and 128-bit blocks, and ‘’ signifies the key
length. In this paper, for the first time, we present differential fault analysis (DFA)
of all the QARMAv2 variants- QARMAv2-64, and QARMAv2-128 by introducing
an approach to utilize the fault propagation patterns at the nibble level, with the
goal of identifying relevant faulty ciphertexts and vulnerable fault positions. This
technique highlights a substantial security risk for the practical implementation of
QARMAv2. By strategically introducing six random nibble faults into the input of
the -th and -th backward rounds within the -round QARMAv2-64,
our attack achieves a significant reduction in the secret key space, diminishing it
from the expansive to a significantly more smaller set of size . Additionally,
when targeting QARMAv2-128-128, it demands the introduction of six random nibble
faults to effectively reduce the secret key space from to a remarkably reduced
. To conclude, we also explore the potential extension of our methods to conduct
DFA on various other iterations and adaptations of the QARMAv2 cryptographic
scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first instance of a differential
fault attack targeting the QARMAv2 tweakable block cipher family, signifying an
important direction in cryptographic analysis