The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling

Introduction: The Third International Conference on Epigenetic Robotics

This paper summarizes the paper and poster contributions to the Third International Workshop on Epigenetic Robotics. The focus of this workshop is on the cross-disciplinary interaction of developmental psychology and robotics. Namely, the general goal in this area is to create robotic models of the psychological development of various behaviors. The term "epigenetic" is used in much the same sense as the term "developmental" and while we could call our topic "developmental robotics", developmental robotics can be seen as having a broader interdisciplinary emphasis. Our focus in this workshop is on the interaction of developmental psychology and robotics and we use the phrase "epigenetic robotics" to capture this focus

Computational and Robotic Models of Early Language Development: A Review

We review computational and robotics models of early language learning and development. We first explain why and how these models are used to understand better how children learn language. We argue that they provide concrete theories of language learning as a complex dynamic system, complementing traditional methods in psychology and linguistics. We review different modeling formalisms, grounded in techniques from machine learning and artificial intelligence such as Bayesian and neural network approaches. We then discuss their role in understanding several key mechanisms of language development: cross-situational statistical learning, embodiment, situated social interaction, intrinsically motivated learning, and cultural evolution. We conclude by discussing future challenges for research, including modeling of large-scale empirical data about language acquisition in real-world environments. Keywords: Early language learning, Computational and robotic models, machine learning, development, embodiment, social interaction, intrinsic motivation, self-organization, dynamical systems, complexity.Comment: to appear in International Handbook on Language Development, ed. J. Horst and J. von Koss Torkildsen, Routledg

A Cognitive Science Based Machine Learning Architecture

In an attempt to illustrate the application of cognitive science principles to hard AI problems in machine learning we propose the LIDA technology, a cognitive science based architecture capable of more human-like learning. A LIDA based software agent or cognitive robot will be capable of three fundamental, continuously active, humanlike learning mechanisms:\ud 1) perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, categories, relations, etc.,\ud 2) episodic learning of events, the what, where, and when,\ud 3) procedural learning, the learning of new actions and action sequences with which to accomplish new tasks. The paper argues for the use of modular components, each specializing in implementing individual facets of human and animal cognition, as a viable approach towards achieving general intelligence

Cortical Dynamics of Contextually-Cued Attentive Visual Learning and Search: Spatial and Object Evidence Accumulation

How do humans use predictive contextual information to facilitate visual search? How are consistently paired scenic objects and positions learned and used to more efficiently guide search in familiar scenes? For example, a certain combination of objects can define a context for a kitchen and trigger a more efficient search for a typical object, such as a sink, in that context. A neural model, ARTSCENE Search, is developed to illustrate the neural mechanisms of such memory-based contextual learning and guidance, and to explain challenging behavioral data on positive/negative, spatial/object, and local/distant global cueing effects during visual search. The model proposes how global scene layout at a first glance rapidly forms a hypothesis about the target location. This hypothesis is then incrementally refined by enhancing target-like objects in space as a scene is scanned with saccadic eye movements. The model clarifies the functional roles of neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging data in visual search for a desired goal object. In particular, the model simulates the interactive dynamics of spatial and object contextual cueing in the cortical What and Where streams starting from early visual areas through medial temporal lobe to prefrontal cortex. After learning, model dorsolateral prefrontal cortical cells (area 46) prime possible target locations in posterior parietal cortex based on goalmodulated percepts of spatial scene gist represented in parahippocampal cortex, whereas model ventral prefrontal cortical cells (area 47/12) prime possible target object representations in inferior temporal cortex based on the history of viewed objects represented in perirhinal cortex. The model hereby predicts how the cortical What and Where streams cooperate during scene perception, learning, and memory to accumulate evidence over time to drive efficient visual search of familiar scenes.CELEST, an NSF Science of Learning Center (SBE-0354378); SyNAPSE program of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (HR0011-09-3-0001, HR0011-09-C-0011

A Neural Model of How the Brain Represents and Compares Multi-Digit Numbers: Spatial and Categorical Processes

Both animals and humans are capable of representing and comparing numerical quantities, but only humans seem to have evolved multi-digit place-value number systems. This article develops a neural model, called the Spatial Number Network, or SpaN model, which predicts how these shared numerical capabilities are computed using a spatial representation of number quantities in the Where cortical processing stream, notably the Inferior Parietal Cortex. Multi-digit numerical representations that obey a place-value principle are proposed to arise through learned interactions between categorical language representations in the What cortical processing stream and the Where spatial representation. It is proposed that learned semantic categories that symbolize separate digits, as well as place markers like "tens," "hundreds," "thousands," etc., are associated through learning with the corresponding spatial locations of the Where representation, leading to a place-value number system as an emergent property of What-Where information fusion. The model quantitatively simulates error rates in quantification and numerical comparison tasks, and reaction times for number priming and numerical assessment and comparison tasks. In the Where cortical process, it is proposed that transient responses to inputs are integrated before they activate an ordered spatial map that selectively responds to the number of events in a sequence. Neural mechanisms are defined which give rise to an ordered spatial numerical map ordering and Weber law characteristics as emergent properties. The dynamics of numerical comparison are encoded in activity pattern changes within this spatial map. Such changes cause a "directional comparison wave" whose properties mimic data about numerical comparison. These model mechanisms are variants of neural mechanisms that have elsewhere been used to explain data about motion perception, attention shifts, and target tracking. Thus, the present model suggests how numerical representations may have emerged as specializations of more primitive mechanisms in the cortical Where processing stream. The model's What-Where interactions can explain human psychophysical data, such as error rates and reaction times, about multi-digit (base 10) numerical stimuli, and describe how such a competence can develop through learning. The SpaN model and its explanatory range arc compared with other models of numerical representation.Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0409); National Science Foundation (IRI-97-20333

Measuring the World: Olfaction as a Process Model of Perception

How much does stimulus input shape perception? The common-sense view is that our perceptions are representations of objects and their features and that the stimulus structures the perceptual object. The problem for this view concerns perceptual biases as responsible for distortions and the subjectivity of perceptual experience. These biases are increasingly studied as constitutive factors of brain processes in recent neuroscience. In neural network models the brain is said to cope with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus regularities on the basis of previous experiences. Drawing on this development, this chapter analyses perceptions as processes. Looking at olfaction as a model system, it argues for the need to abandon a stimulus-centred perspective, where smells are thought of as stable percepts, computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules. Perception here is presented as a measure of changing signal ratios in an environment informed by expectancy effects from top-down processes

Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism

Synthetic Semiotics: on modelling and simulating the \ud emergence of sign processes

Based on formal-theoretical principles about the \ud sign processes involved, we have built synthetic experiments \ud to investigate the emergence of communication based on \ud symbols and indexes in a distributed system of sign users, \ud following theoretical constraints from C.S.Peirce theory of \ud signs, following a Synthetic Semiotics approach. In this paper, we summarize these computational experiments and results regarding associative learning processes of symbolic sign modality and cognitive conditions in an evolutionary process for the emergence of either symbol-based or index-based communication

Language as a disruptive technology: Abstract concepts, embodiment and the flexible mind

A growing body of evidence suggests that cognition is embodied and grounded. Abstract concepts, though, remain a significant theoretical chal- lenge. A number of researchers have proposed that language makes an important contribution to our capacity to acquire and employ concepts, particularly abstract ones. In this essay, I critically examine this suggestion and ultimately defend a version of it. I argue that a successful account of how language augments cognition should emphasize its symbolic properties and incorporate a view of embodiment that recognizes the flexible, multi- modal and task-related nature of action, emotion and perception systems. On this view, language is an ontogenetically disruptive cognitive technology that expands our conceptual reach