25,160 research outputs found

    KEMNAD: A Knowledge Engineering Methodology for Negotiating Agent Development

    Get PDF
    Automated negotiation is widely applied in various domains. However, the development of such systems is a complex knowledge and software engineering task. So, a methodology there will be helpful. Unfortunately, none of existing methodologies can offer sufficient, detailed support for such system development. To remove this limitation, this paper develops a new methodology made up of: (1) a generic framework (architectural pattern) for the main task, and (2) a library of modular and reusable design pattern (templates) of subtasks. Thus, it is much easier to build a negotiating agent by assembling these standardised components rather than reinventing the wheel each time. Moreover, since these patterns are identified from a wide variety of existing negotiating agents(especially high impact ones), they can also improve the quality of the final systems developed. In addition, our methodology reveals what types of domain knowledge need to be input into the negotiating agents. This in turn provides a basis for developing techniques to acquire the domain knowledge from human users. This is important because negotiation agents act faithfully on the behalf of their human users and thus the relevant domain knowledge must be acquired from the human users. Finally, our methodology is validated with one high impact system

    On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods

    Full text link
    In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map from the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties. ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM class is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven by showing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiation methods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Pareto efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few of them. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus we find necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalent to actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the efficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence actually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong and weak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback which is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one, so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharing the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is a drawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain in a particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actual inefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that to falsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informed about the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which constrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the preferences of each single agent are well modeled

    A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

    Get PDF
    The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

    Preference erosion and the developing countries exports to the EU: a dynamic panel gravity approach

    Get PDF
    Since 2004 there has been a sharp decrease in border protection for the EU rice industry. Because the EU grants trade preferences to a considerable number of rice exporting developing countries, the reform implied preference erosion as well. By addressing the impact of preference erosion on developing countries rice exports to the EU, this paper contributes two original insights to the literature: first, by proposing a new empirical approach to compute the preference margin when tariff rate quotas are in force which is based on the assumption of the existence of fixed costs and economies of scale in international trade; second, by estimating the trade elasticities of preferences by means of a dynamic panel gravity equation to deal with the issues of endogeneity of preferences and persistency in bilateral trade flows. The results show that the way preference margins are calculated matters significantly when assessing the existence and extent of their erosion and the values of trade elasticities. Finally, the estimations highlight the fact that the impact of preferences is still very strong for some of the countries concerned.Trade Preferences, Gravity Equation, Tariff Rate Quotas, EU Rice Policy, GMM, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, F13, Q17, F14,

    Theorizing EU trade politics

    Get PDF
    This special issue aims to take the first step towards an inter-paradigmatic debate in the study of European Union trade politics

    Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

    Get PDF
    This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

    Private Options to Use Public Goods Exploiting Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits

    Get PDF
    We develop and apply a new method for estimating the economic benefits of an environmental amenity. The method fits within the household production framework (Becker 1965), and is based upon the notion of estimating the derived demand for a privately traded option to utilize a freely-available public good. In particular, the demand for state fishing licenses is used to infer the benefits of recreational fishing. Using panel data on state fishing license sales and prices for the continental United States over a fifteen-year period, combined with data on substitute prices and demographic variables, a license demand function is estimated with instrumental variable procedures to allow for the potential endogeneity of administered prices. The econometric results lead to estimates of the benefits of a fishing license, and subsequently to the expected benefits of a recreational fishing day. In contrast with previous studies, which have utilized travel cost or hypothetical market methods, our approach provides estimates that are directly comparable across geographic areas. Further, our results suggest that the benefits of recreational fishing days are generally less than previously estimated.Private Options, Public Goods, Environmental Benefits
    corecore