7,940 research outputs found

    Learning requirements for stealth attacks

    Full text link
    The learning data requirements are analyzed for the construction of stealth attacks in state estimation. In particular, the training data set is used to compute a sample covariance matrix that results in a random matrix with a Wishart distribution. The ergodic attack performance is defined as the average attack performance obtained by taking the expectation with respect to the distribution of the training data set. The impact of the training data size on the ergodic attack performance is characterized by proposing an upper bound for the performance. Simulations on the IEEE 30-Bus test system show that the proposed bound is tight in practical settings.Comment: International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing 201

    Take Off to Superiority: The Evolution & Impact of U.S. Aircraft in War

    Get PDF
    Military aviation has become a staple in the way wars are fought, and ultimately, won. This research paper takes a look at the ways that aviation has evolved and impacted wars across the U.S. history timeline. With a brief introduction of early flight and the modern concept of an aircraft, this article then delves into World Wars I and II, along with the Cold, Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars. The current War on Terrorism is then investigated, and finally, a look toward the future. Topics covered include the newest aircraft of each era, technological advancements, and how strategy and war planning was changed with these evolutions

    Trainwreck: A damaging adversarial attack on image classifiers

    Full text link
    Adversarial attacks are an important security concern for computer vision (CV), as they enable malicious attackers to reliably manipulate CV models. Existing attacks aim to elicit an output desired by the attacker, but keep the model fully intact on clean data. With CV models becoming increasingly valuable assets in applied practice, a new attack vector is emerging: disrupting the models as a form of economic sabotage. This paper opens up the exploration of damaging adversarial attacks (DAAs) that seek to damage the target model and maximize the total cost incurred by the damage. As a pioneer DAA, this paper proposes Trainwreck, a train-time attack that poisons the training data of image classifiers to degrade their performance. Trainwreck conflates the data of similar classes using stealthy (ϵ8/255\epsilon \leq 8/255) class-pair universal perturbations computed using a surrogate model. Trainwreck is a black-box, transferable attack: it requires no knowledge of the target model's architecture, and a single poisoned dataset degrades the performance of any model trained on it. The experimental evaluation on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 demonstrates that Trainwreck is indeed an effective attack across various model architectures including EfficientNetV2, ResNeXt-101, and a finetuned ViT-L-16. The strength of the attack can be customized by the poison rate parameter. Finally, data redundancy with file hashing and/or pixel difference are identified as a reliable defense technique against Trainwreck or similar DAAs. The code is available at https://github.com/JanZahalka/trainwreck

    OnionBots: Subverting Privacy Infrastructure for Cyber Attacks

    Full text link
    Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets, ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets. OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement, OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

    The Feasibility and Inevitability of Stealth Attacks

    Get PDF
    We develop and study new adversarial perturbations that enable an attacker to gain control over decisions in generic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems including deep learning neural networks. In contrast to adversarial data modification, the attack mechanism we consider here involves alterations to the AI system itself. Such a stealth attack could be conducted by a mischievous, corrupt or disgruntled member of a software development team. It could also be made by those wishing to exploit a "democratization of AI" agenda, where network architectures and trained parameter sets are shared publicly. Building on work by [Tyukin et al., International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2020], we develop a range of new implementable attack strategies with accompanying analysis, showing that with high probability a stealth attack can be made transparent, in the sense that system performance is unchanged on a fixed validation set which is unknown to the attacker, while evoking any desired output on a trigger input of interest. The attacker only needs to have estimates of the size of the validation set and the spread of the AI's relevant latent space. In the case of deep learning neural networks, we show that a one neuron attack is possible - a modification to the weights and bias associated with a single neuron - revealing a vulnerability arising from over-parameterization. We illustrate these concepts in a realistic setting. Guided by the theory and computational results, we also propose strategies to guard against stealth attacks

    Wide-Area Situation Awareness based on a Secure Interconnection between Cyber-Physical Control Systems

    Get PDF
    Posteriormente, examinamos e identificamos los requisitos especiales que limitan el diseño y la operación de una arquitectura de interoperabilidad segura para los SSC (particularmente los SCCF) del smart grid. Nos enfocamos en modelar requisitos no funcionales que dan forma a esta infraestructura, siguiendo la metodología NFR para extraer requisitos esenciales, técnicas para la satisfacción de los requisitos y métricas para nuestro modelo arquitectural. Estudiamos los servicios necesarios para la interoperabilidad segura de los SSC del SG revisando en profundidad los mecanismos de seguridad, desde los servicios básicos hasta los procedimientos avanzados capaces de hacer frente a las amenazas sofisticadas contra los sistemas de control, como son los sistemas de detección, protección y respuesta ante intrusiones. Nuestro análisis se divide en diferentes áreas: prevención, consciencia y reacción, y restauración; las cuales general un modelo de seguridad robusto para la protección de los sistemas críticos. Proporcionamos el diseño para un modelo arquitectural para la interoperabilidad segura y la interconexión de los SCCF del smart grid. Este escenario contempla la interconectividad de una federación de proveedores de energía del SG, que interactúan a través de la plataforma de interoperabilidad segura para gestionar y controlar sus infraestructuras de forma cooperativa. La plataforma tiene en cuenta las características inherentes y los nuevos servicios y tecnologías que acompañan al movimiento de la Industria 4.0. Por último, presentamos una prueba de concepto de nuestro modelo arquitectural, el cual ayuda a validar el diseño propuesto a través de experimentaciones. Creamos un conjunto de casos de validación que prueban algunas de las funcionalidades principales ofrecidas por la arquitectura diseñada para la interoperabilidad segura, proporcionando información sobre su rendimiento y capacidades.Las infraestructuras críticas (IICC) modernas son vastos sistemas altamente complejos, que precisan del uso de las tecnologías de la información para gestionar, controlar y monitorizar el funcionamiento de estas infraestructuras. Debido a sus funciones esenciales, la protección y seguridad de las infraestructuras críticas y, por tanto, de sus sistemas de control, se ha convertido en una tarea prioritaria para las diversas instituciones gubernamentales y académicas a nivel mundial. La interoperabilidad de las IICC, en especial de sus sistemas de control (SSC), se convierte en una característica clave para que estos sistemas sean capaces de coordinarse y realizar tareas de control y seguridad de forma cooperativa. El objetivo de esta tesis se centra, por tanto, en proporcionar herramientas para la interoperabilidad segura de los diferentes SSC, especialmente los sistemas de control ciber-físicos (SCCF), de forma que se potencie la intercomunicación y coordinación entre ellos para crear un entorno en el que las diversas infraestructuras puedan realizar tareas de control y seguridad cooperativas, creando una plataforma de interoperabilidad segura capaz de dar servicio a diversas IICC, en un entorno de consciencia situacional (del inglés situational awareness) de alto espectro o área (wide-area). Para ello, en primer lugar, revisamos las amenazas de carácter más sofisticado que amenazan la operación de los sistemas críticos, particularmente enfocándonos en los ciberataques camuflados (del inglés stealth) que amenazan los sistemas de control de infraestructuras críticas como el smart grid. Enfocamos nuestra investigación al análisis y comprensión de este nuevo tipo de ataques que aparece contra los sistemas críticos, y a las posibles contramedidas y herramientas para mitigar los efectos de estos ataques
    corecore