Arena: A General Evaluation Platform and Building Toolkit for Multi-Agent Intelligence

Learning agents that are not only capable of taking tests, but also innovating is becoming a hot topic in AI. One of the most promising paths towards this vision is multi-agent learning, where agents act as the environment for each other, and improving each agent means proposing new problems for others. However, existing evaluation platforms are either not compatible with multi-agent settings, or limited to a specific game. That is, there is not yet a general evaluation platform for research on multi-agent intelligence. To this end, we introduce Arena, a general evaluation platform for multi-agent intelligence with 35 games of diverse logics and representations. Furthermore, multi-agent intelligence is still at the stage where many problems remain unexplored. Therefore, we provide a building toolkit for researchers to easily invent and build novel multi-agent problems from the provided game set based on a GUI-configurable social tree and five basic multi-agent reward schemes. Finally, we provide Python implementations of five state-of-the-art deep multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines. Along with the baseline implementations, we release a set of 100 best agents/teams that we can train with different training schemes for each game, as the base for evaluating agents with population performance. As such, the research community can perform comparisons under a stable and uniform standard. All the implementations and accompanied tutorials have been open-sourced for the community at https://sites.google.com/view/arena-unity/

Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Nets: Emergence of Human-level Coordination in Learning to Play StarCraft Combat Games

Many artificial intelligence (AI) applications often require multiple intelligent agents to work in a collaborative effort. Efficient learning for intra-agent communication and coordination is an indispensable step towards general AI. In this paper, we take StarCraft combat game as a case study, where the task is to coordinate multiple agents as a team to defeat their enemies. To maintain a scalable yet effective communication protocol, we introduce a Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Network (BiCNet ['bIknet]) with a vectorised extension of actor-critic formulation. We show that BiCNet can handle different types of combats with arbitrary numbers of AI agents for both sides. Our analysis demonstrates that without any supervisions such as human demonstrations or labelled data, BiCNet could learn various types of advanced coordination strategies that have been commonly used by experienced game players. In our experiments, we evaluate our approach against multiple baselines under different scenarios; it shows state-of-the-art performance, and possesses potential values for large-scale real-world applications.Comment: 10 pages, 10 figures. Previously as title: "Multiagent Bidirectionally-Coordinated Nets for Learning to Play StarCraft Combat Games", Mar 201

Collaboration in Social Networks

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks

Gaming techniques and the product development process : commonalities and cross-applications

The use of computer-based tools is now firmly embedded within the product development process, providing a wide range of uses from visualisation to analysis. However, the specialisation required to make effective use of these tools has led to the compartmentalisation of expertise in design teams, resulting in communication problems between individual members. This paper therefore considers how computer gaming techniques and strategies could be used to enhance communication and group design activities throughout the product design process