40 research outputs found
Key Homomorphic PRFs and Their Applications
A pseudorandom function F : K x X -> Y is said to be key homomorphic if given F(k1, x) and F(k2, x) there is an efficient algorithm to compute F(k1 xor k2, x), where xor denotes a group
operation on k1 and k2 such as xor. Key homomorphic PRFs are natural objects to study and have a number of interesting applications: they can simplify the process of rotating encryption keys for encrypted data stored in the cloud, they give one round distributed PRFs, and they can be the basis of a symmetric-key proxy re-encryption scheme. Until now all known constructions
for key homomorphic PRFs were only proven secure in the random oracle model. We construct the first provably secure key homomorphic PRFs in the standard model. Our main construction
is based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem. In the proof of security we need a variant of LWE where query points are non-uniform and we show that this variant is as hard as the standard LWE. We also construct key homomorphic PRFs based on the decision linear assumption in groups with an l-linear map. We leave as an open problem the question of constructing standard model key homomorphic PRFs from more general assumptions
Finding Safety in Numbers with Secure Allegation Escrows
For fear of retribution, the victim of a crime may be willing to report it
only if other victims of the same perpetrator also step forward. Common
examples include 1) identifying oneself as the victim of sexual harassment,
especially by a person in a position of authority or 2) accusing an influential
politician, an authoritarian government, or ones own employer of corruption. To
handle such situations, legal literature has proposed the concept of an
allegation escrow: a neutral third-party that collects allegations anonymously,
matches them against each other, and de-anonymizes allegers only after
de-anonymity thresholds (in terms of number of co-allegers), pre-specified by
the allegers, are reached.
An allegation escrow can be realized as a single trusted third party;
however, this party must be trusted to keep the identity of the alleger and
content of the allegation private. To address this problem, this paper
introduces Secure Allegation Escrows (SAE, pronounced "say"). A SAE is a group
of parties with independent interests and motives, acting jointly as an escrow
for collecting allegations from individuals, matching the allegations, and
de-anonymizing the allegations when designated thresholds are reached. By
design, SAEs provide a very strong property: No less than a majority of parties
constituting a SAE can de-anonymize or disclose the content of an allegation
without a sufficient number of matching allegations (even in collusion with any
number of other allegers). Once a sufficient number of matching allegations
exist, the join escrow discloses the allegation with the allegers' identities.
We describe how SAEs can be constructed using a novel authentication protocol
and a novel allegation matching and bucketing algorithm, provide formal proofs
of the security of our constructions, and evaluate a prototype implementation,
demonstrating feasibility in practice.Comment: To appear in NDSS 2020. New version includes improvements to writing
and proof. The protocol is unchange
A Low-Round Distributed PRF from Lattices and its Application to Distributed Key Management
We initiate the study of lattice-based pseudo-random functions (PRFs) for use in multi-party computation protocols, motivated by their application to distributed key management. We show that the LWE-based PRF of Boneh et al. (CRYPTO\u2713) can be turned into a distributed PRF protocol that runs in only 8 online rounds, improving over the state-of-the-art by an order of magnitude. The resulting protocol can be used as a method for distributed key derivation and reduces the amount of managed key material in distributed key management systems from linear in the number of users to constant. Finally, we support our findings by implementing and evaluating our protocol using the MP-SPDZ framework (CCS\u2720)
Statically Aggregate Verifiable Random Functions and Application to E-Lottery
Cohen, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan (TCC\u2715) introduced the concept of aggregate pseudo-random functions (PRFs), which allow efficiently computing the aggregate of PRF values over exponential-sized sets. In this paper, we explore the aggregation augmentation on verifiable random function (VRFs), introduced by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan (FOCS\u2799), as well as its application to e-lottery schemes. We introduce the notion of static aggregate verifiable random functions (Agg-VRFs), which perform aggregation for VRFs in a static setting. Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) we define static aggregate VRFs, which allow the efficient aggregation of VRF values and the corresponding proofs over super-polynomially large sets; (2) we present a static Agg-VRF construction over bit-fixing sets with respect to product aggregation based on the q-decisional Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption; (3) we test the performance of our static Agg-VRFs instantiation in comparison to a standard (non-aggregate) VRF in terms of costing time for the aggregation and verification processes, which shows that Agg-VRFs lower considerably the timing of verification of big sets; and (4) by employing Agg-VRFs, we propose an improved e-lottery scheme based on the framework of Chow et al.\u27s VRF-based e-lottery proposal (ICCSA\u2705). We evaluate the performance of Chow et al.\u27s e-lottery scheme and our improved scheme, and the latter shows a significant improvement in the efficiency of generating the winning number and the player verification
Pentimento: Data Remanence in Cloud FPGAs
Cloud FPGAs strike an alluring balance between computational efficiency,
energy efficiency, and cost. It is the flexibility of the FPGA architecture
that enables these benefits, but that very same flexibility that exposes new
security vulnerabilities. We show that a remote attacker can recover "FPGA
pentimenti" - long-removed secret data belonging to a prior user of a cloud
FPGA. The sensitive data constituting an FPGA pentimento is an analog imprint
from bias temperature instability (BTI) effects on the underlying transistors.
We demonstrate how this slight degradation can be measured using a
time-to-digital (TDC) converter when an adversary programs one into the target
cloud FPGA.
This technique allows an attacker to ascertain previously safe information on
cloud FPGAs, even after it is no longer explicitly present. Notably, it can
allow an attacker who knows a non-secret "skeleton" (the physical structure,
but not the contents) of the victim's design to (1) extract proprietary details
from an encrypted FPGA design image available on the AWS marketplace and (2)
recover data loaded at runtime by a previous user of a cloud FPGA using a known
design. Our experiments show that BTI degradation (burn-in) and recovery are
measurable and constitute a security threat to commercial cloud FPGAs.Comment: 17 Pages, 8 Figure
Key Rotation for Authenticated Encryption
A common requirement in practice is to periodically rotate the keys used to
encrypt stored data. Systems used by Amazon and Google do so using a hybrid
encryption technique which is eminently practical but has questionable
security in the face of key compromises and does not provide full key
rotation. Meanwhile, symmetric updatable encryption schemes (introduced by
Boneh et al. CRYPTO 2013) support full key rotation without performing
decryption: ciphertexts created under one key can be rotated to ciphertexts
created under a different key with the help of a re-encryption token. By
design, the tokens do not leak information about keys or plaintexts and so
can be given to storage providers without compromising security. But the
prior work of Boneh et al. addresses relatively weak confidentiality goals
and does not consider integrity at all. Moreover, as we show, a subtle issue
with their concrete scheme obviates a security proof even for confidentiality
against passive attacks.
This paper presents a systematic study of updatable Authenticated Encryption
(AE). We provide a set of security notions that strengthen those in prior
work. These notions enable us to tease out real-world security requirements
of different strengths and build schemes that satisfy them efficiently. We
show that the hybrid approach currently used in industry achieves relatively
weak forms of confidentiality and integrity, but can be modified at low cost
to meet our stronger confidentiality and integrity goals. This leads to a
practical scheme that has negligible overhead beyond conventional AE. We then
introduce re-encryption indistinguishability, a security notion that formally
captures the idea of fully refreshing keys upon rotation. We show how to
repair the scheme of Boneh et al., attaining our stronger confidentiality
notion. We also show how to extend the scheme to provide integrity, and we
prove that it meets our re- encryption indistinguishability notion. Finally,
we discuss how to instantiate our scheme efficiently using off-the-shelf
cryptographic components (AE, hashing, elliptic curves). We report on the
performance of a prototype implementation, showing that fully secure key
rotations can be performed at a throughput of approximately 116 kB/s
Indistinguishability Obfuscation: From Approximate to Exact
We show general transformations from subexponentially-secure approximate indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) where the obfuscated circuit agrees with the original circuit on a 1/2+ϵ fraction of inputs on a certain samplable distribution, into exact indistinguishability obfuscation where the obfuscated circuit and the original circuit agree on all inputs. As a step towards our results, which is of independent interest, we also obtain an approximate-to-exact transformation for functional encryption. At the core of our techniques is a method for “fooling” the obfuscator into giving us the correct answer, while preserving the indistinguishability-based security. This is achieved based on various types of secure computation protocols that can be obtained from different standard assumptions.
Put together with the recent results of Canetti, Kalai and Paneth (TCC 2015), Pass and Shelat (TCC 2016), and Mahmoody, Mohammed and Nemathaji (TCC 2016), we show how to convert indistinguishability obfuscation schemes in various ideal models into exact obfuscation schemes in the plain model.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1350619)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1414119
Cryptographic Tools for Privacy Preservation and Verifiable Randomness
Our society revolves around communication. The Internet is the biggest, cheapest and fastest digital communication channel used nowadays.Due to the continuous increase of daily communication among people worldwide, more and more data might be stolen, misused or tampered.We require to protect our communications and data by achieving privacy\ua0and\ua0confidentiality.Despite the two terms, "privacy"\ua0and "confidentiality",are often used as synonymous, in cryptography they are modelled in very different ways.Intuitively, cryptography can be seen as a tool-box in which every scheme, protocol or primitive is a tool that can be used to solve specific problems and provide specific communication security guarantees such as confidentiality. Privacy is instead not easy to describe and capture since it often depends on "which" information is available, "how"\ua0are these data used and/or "who" has access to our data.This licentiate thesis raises research questions and proposes solutions related to: the possibility of defining encryption schemes that provide both strong security and privacy guarantees; the importance of designing cryptographic protocols that are compliant with real-life privacy-laws or regulations; and the necessity of defining a post-quantum mechanism to achieve the verifiability of randomness.In more details, the thesis achievements are:(a) defining a new class of encryption schemes, by weakening the correctness property, that achieves Differential Privacy (DP), i.e., a mathematically sound definition of privacy;(b) formalizing a security model for a subset of articles in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), designing and implementing a cryptographic protocol based on the proposed GDPR-oriented security model, and;(c) proposing a methodology to compile a post-quantum interactive protocol for proving the correct computation of a pseudorandom function into a non-interactive one, yielding a post-quantum mechanism for verifiable randomness