Reasoning about exceptions in ontologies: from the lexicographic closure to the skeptical closure

Reasoning about exceptions in ontologies is nowadays one of the challenges the description logics community is facing. The paper describes a preferential approach for dealing with exceptions in Description Logics, based on the rational closure. The rational closure has the merit of providing a simple and efficient approach for reasoning with exceptions, but it does not allow independent handling of the inheritance of different defeasible properties of concepts. In this work we outline a possible solution to this problem by introducing a variant of the lexicographical closure, that we call skeptical closure, which requires to construct a single base. We develop a bi-preference semantics semantics for defining a characterization of the skeptical closure

Towards Closed World Reasoning in Dynamic Open Worlds (Extended Version)

The need for integration of ontologies with nonmonotonic rules has been gaining importance in a number of areas, such as the Semantic Web. A number of researchers addressed this problem by proposing a unified semantics for hybrid knowledge bases composed of both an ontology (expressed in a fragment of first-order logic) and nonmonotonic rules. These semantics have matured over the years, but only provide solutions for the static case when knowledge does not need to evolve. In this paper we take a first step towards addressing the dynamics of hybrid knowledge bases. We focus on knowledge updates and, considering the state of the art of belief update, ontology update and rule update, we show that current solutions are only partial and difficult to combine. Then we extend the existing work on ABox updates with rules, provide a semantics for such evolving hybrid knowledge bases and study its basic properties. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that an update operator is proposed for hybrid knowledge bases.Comment: 40 pages; an extended version of the article published in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 10 (4-6): 547 - 564, July. Copyright 2010 Cambridge University Pres

Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)

We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4. Continuation of arXiv:1208.184

Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)

We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1; extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842, arXiv:1208.591

A reconstruction of the multipreference closure

The paper describes a preferential approach for dealing with exceptions in KLM preferential logics, based on the rational closure. It is well known that the rational closure does not allow an independent handling of the inheritance of different defeasible properties of concepts. Several solutions have been proposed to face this problem and the lexicographic closure is the most notable one. In this work, we consider an alternative closure construction, called the Multi Preference closure (MP-closure), that has been first considered for reasoning with exceptions in DLs. Here, we reconstruct the notion of MP-closure in the propositional case and we show that it is a natural variant of Lehmann's lexicographic closure. Abandoning Maximal Entropy (an alternative route already considered but not explored by Lehmann) leads to a construction which exploits a different lexicographic ordering w.r.t. the lexicographic closure, and determines a preferential consequence relation rather than a rational consequence relation. We show that, building on the MP-closure semantics, rationality can be recovered, at least from the semantic point of view, resulting in a rational consequence relation which is stronger than the rational closure, but incomparable with the lexicographic closure. We also show that the MP-closure is stronger than the Relevant Closure.Comment: 57 page

Sequent Calculus in the Topos of Trees

Nakano's "later" modality, inspired by G\"{o}del-L\"{o}b provability logic, has been applied in type systems and program logics to capture guarded recursion. Birkedal et al modelled this modality via the internal logic of the topos of trees. We show that the semantics of the propositional fragment of this logic can be given by linear converse-well-founded intuitionistic Kripke frames, so this logic is a marriage of the intuitionistic modal logic KM and the intermediate logic LC. We therefore call this logic $\mathrm{KM}_{\mathrm{lin}}$. We give a sound and cut-free complete sequent calculus for $\mathrm{KM}_{\mathrm{lin}}$ via a strategy that decomposes implication into its static and irreflexive components. Our calculus provides deterministic and terminating backward proof-search, yields decidability of the logic and the coNP-completeness of its validity problem. Our calculus and decision procedure can be restricted to drop linearity and hence capture KM.Comment: Extended version, with full proof details, of a paper accepted to FoSSaCS 2015 (this version edited to fix some minor typos