Why equality? On justifying liberal egalitarianism

The debate over the nature of egalitarianism has come to dominate political philosophy. As ever more sophisticated attempts are made to describe the principles of an egalitarian distribution or to specify the good or goods that should be distributed equally, little is said about the fundamental basis of equality. In virtue of what should people be regarded as equal? Egalitarians have tended to dismiss this question of fundamental equality. In the first part of the paper I will examine some of these strategies of marginalisation and assess whether the issue of fundamental equality matters. Jeremy Waldron has criticised this strategy of avoidance in his recent book God, Locke and equality. He argues that Locke's turn to a theistic grounding for fundamental equality provides a better approach to the problem than the approach taken by contemporary liberals such as John Rawls. I will examine Waldron's critique of Rawls and show that it is wanting. I will conclude by suggesting that Rawls's approach to the issue has a bearing on the way in which equality should be understood as a political value. This argument for the primacy of a political conception of egalitarianism has a bearing on the interconnection between core liberal values and the idea of the state that has been emphasised by Rawls, Dworkin and Nagel

Criticizing Inequality? How Ideals of Equality Do - and Do Not - Contribute to the De-Legitimation of Inequality in Contemporary Germany

Social inequality in modern societies requires legitimation. Yet, while ideals of equality are ascribed a central role in philosophical and public debates about inequality and social justice, less is known about how ordinary people draw on principles of equality in criticizing and justifying social inequalities in the current era of a "crisis of equality." From the perspective of the sociology of critique, this article asks how different social classes refer to beliefs about equality of outcomes and opportunity when criticizing and justifying inequality in contemporary Germany. Based on qualitative interviews with respondents from upper and lower social classes, I show that the ideal of equality is inherently ambivalent and contested: On the one hand, respondents across classes reject the idea of equalizing outcomes but criticize unequal opportunities. However, only upper-class respondents demand greater state intervention to bring about equality of opportunity, indicating that this ideal does not serve as a normative point of reference for the lower classes. At the same time, due to its individualist undertones, the ideal of equality of opportunity also contains a legitimizing potential. Paradoxically, then, ideals of equality appear to contribute little to the de-legitimation of inequality in contemporary Germany

Corrupt and Unequal, Both

Rick Hasen has presented the issue of money in politics as if we have to make a choice: it is either a problem of equality or it is a problem of corruption. Hasen’s long and influential career in this field has been a long and patient struggle to convince those on the corruption side of the fight (we liberals, at least, and, in an important sense, we egalitarians too) to resist the temptation to try to pass—by rendering equality arguments as corruption arguments, and to just come out of the closet. Hasen had famously declared that the corruption argument supporting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce was a fake and that the only basis for justifying the ban on corporate spending in Austin was equality, not corruption. And the U.S. Supreme Court famously (in our circles at least) agreed, in the process of striking down the ban on corporate spending in Austin and everywhere else. Thus, Hasen argues, it is a fool’s errand to fake the corruption argument. We need instead, Hasen has constantly counseled, a bit of egalitarian pride. Be true to ourselves, Hasen tells us, and give up the pretense of corruption talk

Corrupt and Unequal, Both

Rick Hasen has presented the issue of money in politics as if we have to make a choice: it is either a problem of equality or it is a problem of corruption. Hasen’s long and influential career in this field has been a long and patient struggle to convince those on the corruption side of the fight (we liberals, at least, and, in an important sense, we egalitarians too) to resist the temptation to try to pass—by rendering equality arguments as corruption arguments, and to just come out of the closet. Hasen had famously declared that the corruption argument supporting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce was a fake and that the only basis for justifying the ban on corporate spending in Austin was equality, not corruption. And the U.S. Supreme Court famously (in our circles at least) agreed, in the process of striking down the ban on corporate spending in Austin and everywhere else. Thus, Hasen argues, it is a fool’s errand to fake the corruption argument. We need instead, Hasen has constantly counseled, a bit of egalitarian pride. Be true to ourselves, Hasen tells us, and give up the pretense of corruption talk

Türkiye’s Gender Equality Policies: A Case of Europeanization or (De)-Europeanization?

openGender equality policies have been at the basis of the European Union since the Treaty of Rome. It is obvious that the EU gives its attention to gender equality policies and under the Europeanization of countries, gender equality policies have also gone under the process of Europeanization. The thesis analyzes the Europeanization and (de)-Europeanization processes of gender equality policies in Türkiye under the AKP government and the contribution of these processes to the survival of the governing party. Thus, the evolution processes of gender equality policies since AKP’s coming to power and the domestic and external drivers of the change in gender equality policies and their interaction with each other are studied. It employs a qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews. There are three hypotheses to be investigated. The first one is (de)-Europeanization of gender equality policies employed by AKP in order to please conservative groups and therefore it triggers a process of de-Europeanization. The second hypothesis is EU’s soft law approach reinforces conservative governments’ lack of commitment toward gender equality. And the last one is the AKP contributes to the (de)-Europeanization justifying the non-compliance with some EU gender equality standards, based on their religion [Islam] “has defined a position for women: motherhood” that also helps to ostracise women by portraying them as delicate, weak, and powerless and limiting their role to motherhood. It is expected to show the changes that the country has undergone related to gender equality.Gender equality policies have been at the basis of the European Union since the Treaty of Rome. It is obvious that the EU gives its attention to gender equality policies and under the Europeanization of countries, gender equality policies have also gone under the process of Europeanization. The thesis analyzes the Europeanization and (de)-Europeanization processes of gender equality policies in Türkiye under the AKP government and the contribution of these processes to the survival of the governing party. Thus, the evolution processes of gender equality policies since AKP’s coming to power and the domestic and external drivers of the change in gender equality policies and their interaction with each other are studied. It employs a qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews. There are three hypotheses to be investigated. The first one is (de)-Europeanization of gender equality policies employed by AKP in order to please conservative groups and therefore it triggers a process of de-Europeanization. The second hypothesis is EU’s soft law approach reinforces conservative governments’ lack of commitment toward gender equality. And the last one is the AKP contributes to the (de)-Europeanization justifying the non-compliance with some EU gender equality standards, based on their religion [Islam] “has defined a position for women: motherhood” that also helps to ostracise women by portraying them as delicate, weak, and powerless and limiting their role to motherhood. It is expected to show the changes that the country has undergone related to gender equality

Is Liberalism Disingenuous? Truth and Lies in Political Liberalism

Rawlsian political liberalism famously requires a prohibition on truth. This has led to the charge that liberalism embraces non-cognitivism, according to which political claims have the moral status of emotions or expressions of preference. This result would render liberalism a non-starter for liberatory politics, a conclusion that political liberals themselves disavow. This conflict between what liberalism claims and what liberalism does has led critics to charge that the theory is disingenuous and functions as political ideology. In this paper, I explore one way that this charge unfolds: critics charge that liberalism utilizes an individualistic and identity-insensitive social ontology, which in turn yields epistemic deficiencies that render it incapable of detecting oppression. The theory’s claim to freestandingness then shields it from necessary critique. I argue that this objection relies on constructing a conflict between liberalism’s professed non-cognitivism and its actual cognitivist commitments. By demonstrating that Rawlsian political liberalism explicitly endorses substantive moral truths, and that the method of avoidance applies only to public justification for coercive state action, I show that the theory is openly and foundationally cognitivist, and thus that the charge of disingenuousness does not stick

Children’s Act Evaluation and Emotion Attribution Reasoning Regarding Different Moral Transgressions

This study investigated patterns of reasoning regarding different types of moral transgressions and different measures of moral development in children 6–8 years of age (N = 130). The findings documented different patterns of reasoning for each measure and for transgressions including different moral principles. Children distinguished between their understanding of their emotional response to a transgression and the moral violation that has occurred, using much more moral reasoning when justifying act evaluations and much more self-interest reasoning when justifying emotion attributions. Children also differentiated between different types of moral violations—that is, transgressions including different moral principles. Stories about others’ welfare elicited reasoning related to others’ welfare, stories about fairness elicited reasoning related to equality/rights/fairness, and a multifaceted story elicited both types of moral reasoning

Justifying Resistance to Immigration Law: The Case of Mere Noncompliance

Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? Receiving states also typically enact laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of immigration restrictions. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of noncompliance with immigration law, focusing on the case of nonviolent – or mere – noncompliance. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo’s view, I argue that the injustice of an immigration law is insufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. I further argue that a constitutional democracy’s regimes of law regulating immigration and requiring its citizens’ participation in implementing these regulations have legitimate authority. Nevertheless, when a particular immigration law is egregiously unjust, its legitimacy is defeated