722 research outputs found
Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting
We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general
framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify
convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler
(the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played).
Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for
acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show
that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges
for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b)
Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under
arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some}
path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation
between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby
settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute
another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper:
Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010;
Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201
Plurality Voting under Uncertainty
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social
choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational
approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of
voters.
In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by
suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For
a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence
and convergence results in the Plurality voting system.
In this paper, we extend the model in multiple directions, considering voters
with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more
permissive notion of best-response. We prove that a voting equilibrium exists
even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative
setting is guaranteed to converge.
We also analyze an alternative behavior where voters try to minimize their
worst-case regret. We show that the two behaviors coincide in the simple
setting of Meir et al., but not in the general case.Comment: The full version of a paper from AAAI'15 (to appear
On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods
In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the
actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by
proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map
from the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties.
ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM
class is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven by
showing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiation
methods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Pareto
efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few of
them. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus we
find necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalent
to actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the
efficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence
actually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong and
weak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback
which is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one,
so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharing
the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is a
drawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain in
a particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actual
inefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that to
falsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informed
about the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which
constrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the
preferences of each single agent are well modeled
Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of
anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and
worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic
manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return
alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it
is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we
differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine
iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove
that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this
negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium
winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in
expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to
increase due to strategic manipulation.Comment: 21 pages, 5 figures, in NeurIPS 202
A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover,
the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the
voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in
practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better
understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However,
these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and
the information on which they base their vote.
We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters'
bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information.
We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance},
where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning
probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates'
scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting
equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of
possible states.
We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad
class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which
states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where
voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly
converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker
convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided.
Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real
preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging
equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they
replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's
law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner
compared to truthful voting
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