Robust Virtual Implementation

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtu­ally implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function. This definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable payoff types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation.Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz­ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function: this definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation.Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

Robust Virtual Implementation

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function — mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes — can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function. This definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable payoff types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation

Geodesic Merging

We pursue an account of merging through the use of geodesic semantics, the semantics based on the length of the shortest path on a graph. This approach has been fruitful in other areas of belief change such as revision and update. To this end, we introduce three binary merging operators of propositions defined on the graph of their valuations and we characterize them with a finite set of postulates. We also consider a revision operator defined in the extended language of pairs of propositions. This extension allows us to express all merging operators through the set of revision postulates

Trust as a precursor to belief revision

Belief revision is concerned with incorporating new information into a pre-existing set of beliefs. When the new information comes from another agent, we must first determine if that agent should be trusted. In this paper, we define trust as a pre-processing step before revision. We emphasize that trust in an agent is often restricted to a particular domain of expertise. We demonstrate that this form of trust can be captured by associating a state partition with each agent, then relativizing all reports to this partition before revising. We position the resulting family of trust-sensitive revision operators within the class of selective revision operators of Ferme and Hansson, and we prove a representation result that characterizes the class of trust-sensitive revision operators in terms of a set of postulates. We also show that trust-sensitive revision is manipulable, in the sense that agents can sometimes have incentive to pass on misleading information

Jump-Diffusions in Hilbert Spaces: Existence, Stability and Numerics

By means of an original approach, called "method of the moving frame", we establish existence, uniqueness and stability results for mild and weak solutions of stochastic partial differential equations (SPDEs) with path dependent coefficients driven by an infinite dimensional Wiener process and a compensated Poisson random measure. Our approach is based on a time-dependent coordinate transform, which reduces a wide class of SPDEs to a class of simpler SDE problems. We try to present the most general results, which we can obtain in our setting, within a self-contained framework to demonstrate our approach in all details. Also several numerical approaches to SPDEs in the spirit of this setting are presented.Comment: fully revised and extended versio

A mathematical and computational review of Hartree-Fock SCF methods in Quantum Chemistry

We present here a review of the fundamental topics of Hartree-Fock theory in Quantum Chemistry. From the molecular Hamiltonian, using and discussing the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, we arrive to the Hartree and Hartree-Fock equations for the electronic problem. Special emphasis is placed in the most relevant mathematical aspects of the theoretical derivation of the final equations, as well as in the results regarding the existence and uniqueness of their solutions. All Hartree-Fock versions with different spin restrictions are systematically extracted from the general case, thus providing a unifying framework. Then, the discretization of the one-electron orbitals space is reviewed and the Roothaan-Hall formalism introduced. This leads to a exposition of the basic underlying concepts related to the construction and selection of Gaussian basis sets, focusing in algorithmic efficiency issues. Finally, we close the review with a section in which the most relevant modern developments (specially those related to the design of linear-scaling methods) are commented and linked to the issues discussed. The whole work is intentionally introductory and rather self-contained, so that it may be useful for non experts that aim to use quantum chemical methods in interdisciplinary applications. Moreover, much material that is found scattered in the literature has been put together here to facilitate comprehension and to serve as a handy reference.Comment: 64 pages, 3 figures, tMPH2e.cls style file, doublesp, mathbbol and subeqn package