The influence of film music on moral judgments of movie scenes and felt emotions

Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.Music can modulate perceptions, actions, and judgments in everyday situations. The aim of this study was to investigate a potential influence of music on moral judgments in the context of film reception. In the course of an online experiment, 252 participants were assigned to three different experimental conditions (no, positive, or negative music). Participants were requested to assess actions shown in two 2–3-minute audio-visual film excerpts with regard to their perceived moral rightness and to report induced emotions after watching the film clips. Afterwards, they were asked to complete the MFQ-30 questionnaire measuring the foundations of their moral judgments. Results revealed that in one of four cases (i.e. happiness in film excerpt 1), music had a significant effect on recipients’ emotions and also indirectly influenced their moral judgment. In three of four cases, however, the intended emotion induction through film music did not succeed, and thus a significant indirect influence of music on moral judgment was not found. Furthermore, associations between moral foundations, perceived rightness of action, and induced emotions were observed. Future lab studies are indicated to investigate potential moderating influences of the experimental environment on emotion induction through film music

Computer theorem proving in math

We give an overview of issues surrounding computer-verified theorem proving in the standard pure-mathematical context. This is based on my talk at the PQR conference (Brussels, June 2003)

An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic

I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism

Clarifying ethical intuitionism

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non-inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non-inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non- inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non- inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core claim

Uncertainty relations and possible experience

The uncertainty principle can be understood as a condition of joint indeterminacy of classes of properties in quantum theory. The mathematical expressions most closely associated with this principle have been the uncertainty relations, various inequalities exemplified by the well known expression regarding position and momentum introduced by Heisenberg. Here, recent work involving a new sort of “logical” indeterminacy principle and associated relations introduced by Pitowsky, expressable directly in terms of probabilities of outcomes of measurements of sharp quantum observables, is reviewed and its quantum nature is discussed. These novel relations are derivable from Boolean “conditions of possible experience” of the quantum realm and have been considered both as fundamentally logical and as fundamentally geometrical. This work focuses on the relationship of indeterminacy to the propositions regarding the values of discrete, sharp observables of quantum systems. Here, reasons for favoring each of these two positions are considered. Finally, with an eye toward future research related to indeterminacy relations, further novel approaches grounded in category theory and intended to capture and reconceptualize the complementarity characteristics of quantum propositions are discussed in relation to the former

To the Beat of Different Drumer....Freedom, Anarchy and Conformism in Research

In this paper I attempt to make a case for promoting the courage of rebels within the citadels of orthodoxy in academic research environments. Wicksell in Macroeconomics, Brouwer in the Foundations of Mathematics,Turing in Computability Theory, Sraffa in the Theories of Value and Distribution are, in my own fields of research, paradigmatic examples of rebels, adventurers and non-conformists of the highest calibre in scientific research within University environments. In what sense, and how, can such rebels, adventurers and nonconformists be fostered in the current University research environment dominated by the cult of picking winners? This is the motivational question lying behind the historical outlines of the work of Wicksell, Brouwer, Hilbert, Bishop, Veronese, Gödel, Turing and Sraffa that I describe in this paper. The debate between freedom in research and teaching and the naked imposition of correct thinking, on potential dissenters of the mind, is of serious concern in this age of austerity of material facilities. It is a debate that has occupied some the finest minds working at the deepest levels of foundational issues in mathematics, metamathematics and economic theory. By making some of the issues explicit, I hope it is possible to encourage dissenters to remain courageous in the face of current dogmas.Non-conformist research, macroeconomics, foundations of mathematics, intuitionism, constructivism, formalism, Hilbertís Dogma, Hilbertís Program, computability theory

The foundations of computable general equilibrium theory

general equilibrium theory,CGE models,mathematical economics,computability,constructivity

Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance and logical pluralism

Logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one adequate logic. Many authors consider Carnap as one of the forerunners of logical pluralism. More than that, they claim that Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance consists in one of the first explicit formulations a logical pluralism. Nonetheless, there is little detailed investigation to evaluate if the Principle of Tolerance necessarily implies a logical pluralism, and if so, of which kind. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Principle of Tolerance, as well as its context, and to investigate the relation between such principle and logical pluralism

Intuitionism and the Modal Logic of Vagueness

Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitionism to complain that no explanation has been given of why intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for such languages. Second, switching from classical to intuitionistic logic, while it may help with the Sorites, does not appear to offer any advantages when dealing with the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. We offer a proposal that makes strides on both issues. We argue that the intuitionist’s characteristic rejection of any third alethic value alongside true and false is best elaborated by taking the normal modal system S4M to be the sentential logic of the operator ‘it is clearly the case that’. S4M opens the way to an account of higher-order vagueness which avoids the paradoxes that have been thought to infect the notion. S4M is one of the modal counterparts of the intuitionistic sentential calculus and we use this fact to explain why IPC is the correct sentential logic to use when reasoning with vague statements. We also show that our key results go through in an intuitionistic version of S4M. Finally, we deploy our analysis to reply to Timothy Williamson’s objections to intuitionistic treatments of vagueness