Managing Ethnic Conflict in Darfur: An Analysis of Third-Party Interventions

Persistent ethnic conflict in Darfur has been met by third-party interventions with varying degrees of success. This paper seeks to isolate different methods of intervention in order to understand what types are effective in reducing the number of people affected by violence caused by ethnic conflict. Each intervention is separated into three categories based on their nature: humanitarian, militaristic, and diplomatic. These actions are then juxtaposed with data from medical journals that describe the effects of violence, including death by violence, death by disease, and child mortality rates. The success of an intervention is measured by its ability to reduce the number of people negatively affected by the violence. This analysis suggests that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while humanitarian and diplomatic interventions produce ambiguous results. The results are significant in their ability to shed light on effective methods by which to alleviate one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century

National Security Space Launch

The United States Space Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy. The policy assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) started the EELV program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite. In March 2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) potential use of reusable launch vehicles. As of August 2019, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years, beginning in 2022. This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically. Finally, the paper will examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process.No embargoAcademic Major: EnglishAcademic Major: International Studie

Russia's soft and sharp power in southeast Europe — the Russian hybrid influence operation in Montenegro

This is a chapter published in a conference publication that was written within the framework of the project “Reality Check Series: Sources, Tools, and Impact of External Non-EU-Engagement in Southeast Europe.” The project was led by the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (SOG) with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office (Stability Pact for Southeast Europe sponsored by Germany).Whether its role is described as spoiler or opportunist, the Kremlin strategy in the Balkans is to drag its rivals’ involvement down to a level that would make countries of the region subjects to Moscow’s interference. Not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, burdened with endemic corruption, suffering from a democratic deficit, ethnic tensions, and protracted bilateral disputes, the Western Balkans’ countries are an ideal target for Russia. Preventive operations often seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance. The coup attempt in Montenegro, in October 2016, is a good example of the Russian hybrid influence operations in the Balkans. The goal of Moscow was to prevent NATO membership of the country. To prove it, this work focuses on Moscow’s attempts to influence Montenegro prior to the coup attempt.The paper argues that the coup plot in Montenegro is the culmination of more than a two-years long hybrid influence operation. This includes a) Russian attempts to influence Montenegro through economic means; b) Moscow’s effort to establish a lasting naval (military) presence in Montenegro; c) The intensive media campaign; d) Deepening Russia’s influence on pro-Russian Serbian nationalists in Montenegro and open political and financial support for their activities. When overt means of influence appear to have been inefficient, a covert operation looks like a viable option. That’s what happened in Montenegro.Accepted manuscrip

How Ethnic and Religious Nationalism Threaten the Bosnian State

When the wars ceased in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, as in the aftermath of other past conflicts in the Balkans, ethnic and religious divisions prevailed. Bosnia Herzegovina is perhaps the most vulnerable of the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia, partially due to the manner it was established. Ethnic cleansing and discord have marred Bosnia while the three principal ethnoreligious entities continue to struggle to maintain their distinct identity within the context of a convoluted political system wrestling against domestic and international intrigue. Ethnoreligious nationalism threatens to further rupture the Bosnian state and create a renewed state of violence that ultimately endangers this nation’s future

Aligning Community Colleges to Their Local Labor Markets

Examines ways to better align community college curricula with employer needs, including analyzing online job ads to gather data on occupation and skill demands; examples of use of labor market information; and the potential and limitations of such data

Issue 13: Syrian Refugee Resettlement and the Role of Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) in Ontario, Canada

During the peak of the Syrian refugee “crisis” in 2015 and early 2016, the Canadian Federal Government responded with a push to drastically increase the number of Syrian refugees it planned to resettle. The resulting Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative (SRRI) put to the test Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs), a form of place-based policy that had been in place since 2008 where communities collaborate in the support, development and execution of local immigration and refugee resettlement plans. This issue of Policy Points discusses a study of three LIPs (Hamilton, Ottawa, and Waterloo Region) and their response to the SRRI. The research provides three policy insights relevant to refugee and immigrant community resettlement. Bringing the community into the fold through multi stakeholder tables such as LIPs can coordinate local responses to the resettlement of refugees (policy insight 1). LIPs must be embedded in the local community and include leaders and personnel able to build and enhance local stakeholder networks (policy insight 2). Finally, it is key to involve LIPs in communication channels during mass resettlement events (policy insight 3). Policy action under points 2 and 3 will in turn enable LIPs to effectively support refugee resettlement at the local level. The experience of the three Ontario LIPs in this study is relevant to existing and potential new LIPs, but it also offers a unique place-based policy approach to engaging local communities in resettlement at other locations and scales

Unemployment Insurance: Legislative Issues in the 116th Congress

The unemployment insurance (UI) system has two primary objectives: (1) to provide temporary, partial wage replacement for involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) to stabilize the economy during recessions. In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed worker

Overcoming the gridlock in EMU decision-making. CEPS Policy Insights No 2020-03 / March 2020

The completion of EMU, and banking union as its critical component, requires that certain taboos in the policy debate are brought out in the open. First, the Commission must stop pretending that Italian public debt is sustainable under current policies and shift from politically motivated forbearance to serious implementation of the SGP and notably its debt rule. Second, it is necessary to acknowledge that crisis management by the ESM is crippled as long as its financial assistance can only be granted after the country in need is close to losing market access and, in addition, this threatens the financial stability of the entire euro area. The already-existing alternative to assist a country that is not respecting the SGP is to utilise the enhanced conditional credit line (ECCL) introduced by the ESM reform, approved by the European Council and awaiting national ratifications, in order to agree on a full-fledged adjustment programme before any euro area member (Italy) comes to the brink again – without any preventive conditions on the sustainability of public debt. And, third, the completion of the banking union requires a reduction of banks’ home sovereign portfolios, that can be incentivised by the introduction of mild concentration charges. However, the system will not work without simultaneously offering the banks and financial investors in general a true European safe asset, fully guaranteed by its member states. Our proposal is that such a safe asset could be offered by the ESM, which would purchase in exchange the sovereigns held by the ESCB as a result of the quantitative easing asset purchase programme. The risk of losses on these sovereigns would continue to lie with the national central banks, thus avoiding the transfer of new risks to the ESM