Neural synchrony in cortical networks : history, concept and current status

Following the discovery of context-dependent synchronization of oscillatory neuronal responses in the visual system, the role of neural synchrony in cortical networks has been expanded to provide a general mechanism for the coordination of distributed neural activity patterns. In the current paper, we present an update of the status of this hypothesis through summarizing recent results from our laboratory that suggest important new insights regarding the mechanisms, function and relevance of this phenomenon. In the first part, we present recent results derived from animal experiments and mathematical simulations that provide novel explanations and mechanisms for zero and nero-zero phase lag synchronization. In the second part, we shall discuss the role of neural synchrony for expectancy during perceptual organization and its role in conscious experience. This will be followed by evidence that indicates that in addition to supporting conscious cognition, neural synchrony is abnormal in major brain disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders. We conclude this paper with suggestions for further research as well as with critical issues that need to be addressed in future studies

Neural synchrony in cortical networks : history, concept and current status

Following the discovery of context-dependent synchronization of oscillatory neuronal responses in the visual system, the role of neural synchrony in cortical networks has been expanded to provide a general mechanism for the coordination of distributed neural activity patterns. In the current paper, we present an update of the status of this hypothesis through summarizing recent results from our laboratory that suggest important new insights regarding the mechanisms, function and relevance of this phenomenon. In the first part, we present recent results derived from animal experiments and mathematical simulations that provide novel explanations and mechanisms for zero and nero-zero phase lag synchronization. In the second part, we shall discuss the role of neural synchrony for expectancy during perceptual organization and its role in conscious experience. This will be followed by evidence that indicates that in addition to supporting conscious cognition, neural synchrony is abnormal in major brain disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders. We conclude this paper with suggestions for further research as well as with critical issues that need to be addressed in future studies

Smell's puzzling discrepancy: Gifted discrimination, yet pitiful identification

Mind &Language, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 90-114, February 2020

Robust Transient Dynamics and Brain Functions

In the last few decades several concepts of dynamical systems theory (DST) have guided psychologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists to rethink about sensory motor behavior and embodied cognition. A critical step in the progress of DST application to the brain (supported by modern methods of brain imaging and multi-electrode recording techniques) has been the transfer of its initial success in motor behavior to mental function, i.e., perception, emotion, and cognition. Open questions from research in genetics, ecology, brain sciences, etc., have changed DST itself and lead to the discovery of a new dynamical phenomenon, i.e., reproducible and robust transients that are at the same time sensitive to informational signals. The goal of this review is to describe a new mathematical framework – heteroclinic sequential dynamics – to understand self-organized activity in the brain that can explain certain aspects of robust itinerant behavior. Specifically, we discuss a hierarchy of coarse-grain models of mental dynamics in the form of kinetic equations of modes. These modes compete for resources at three levels: (i) within the same modality, (ii) among different modalities from the same family (like perception), and (iii) among modalities from different families (like emotion and cognition). The analysis of the conditions for robustness, i.e., the structural stability of transient (sequential) dynamics, give us the possibility to explain phenomena like the finite capacity of our sequential working memory – a vital cognitive function –, and to find specific dynamical signatures – different kinds of instabilities – of several brain functions and mental diseases

It's about Time

The purpose of this review/opinion paper is to argue that human cognitive neuroscience has focused too little attention on how the brain may use time and time-based coding schemes to represent, process, and transfer information within and across brain regions. Instead, the majority of cognitive neuroscience studies rest on the assumption of functional localization. Although the functional localization approach has brought us a long way towards a basic characterization of brain functional organization, there are methodological and theoretical limitations of this approach. Further advances in our understanding of neurocognitive function may come from examining how the brain performs computations and forms transient functional neural networks using the rich multi-dimensional information available in time. This approach rests on the assumption that information is coded precisely in time but distributed in space; therefore, measures of rapid neuroelectrophysiological dynamics may provide insights into brain function that cannot be revealed using localization-based approaches and assumptions. Space is not an irrelevant dimension for brain organization; rather, a more complete understanding of how brain dynamics lead to behavior dynamics must incorporate how the brain uses time-based coding and processing schemes

SOVEREIGN: An Autonomous Neural System for Incrementally Learning Planned Action Sequences to Navigate Towards a Rewarded Goal

How do reactive and planned behaviors interact in real time? How are sequences of such behaviors released at appropriate times during autonomous navigation to realize valued goals? Controllers for both animals and mobile robots, or animats, need reactive mechanisms for exploration, and learned plans to reach goal objects once an environment becomes familiar. The SOVEREIGN (Self-Organizing, Vision, Expectation, Recognition, Emotion, Intelligent, Goaloriented Navigation) animat model embodies these capabilities, and is tested in a 3D virtual reality environment. SOVEREIGN includes several interacting subsystems which model complementary properties of cortical What and Where processing streams and which clarify similarities between mechanisms for navigation and arm movement control. As the animat explores an environment, visual inputs are processed by networks that are sensitive to visual form and motion in the What and Where streams, respectively. Position-invariant and sizeinvariant recognition categories are learned by real-time incremental learning in the What stream. Estimates of target position relative to the animat are computed in the Where stream, and can activate approach movements toward the target. Motion cues from animat locomotion can elicit head-orienting movements to bring a new target into view. Approach and orienting movements are alternately performed during animat navigation. Cumulative estimates of each movement are derived from interacting proprioceptive and visual cues. Movement sequences are stored within a motor working memory. Sequences of visual categories are stored in a sensory working memory. These working memories trigger learning of sensory and motor sequence categories, or plans, which together control planned movements. Predictively effective chunk combinations are selectively enhanced via reinforcement learning when the animat is rewarded. Selected planning chunks effect a gradual transition from variable reactive exploratory movements to efficient goal-oriented planned movement sequences. Volitional signals gate interactions between model subsystems and the release of overt behaviors. The model can control different motor sequences under different motivational states and learns more efficient sequences to rewarded goals as exploration proceeds.Riverside Reserach Institute; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (N00014-92-J-4015); Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-92-J-0225); National Science Foundation (IRI 90-24877, SBE-0345378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-92-J-1309, N00014-91-J-4100, N00014-01-1-0624, N00014-01-1-0624); Pacific Sierra Research (PSR 91-6075-2

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways