Commercial Integrity, Roles And Object-orientation

This thesis presents a study of realizing commercial security, as defined in the Clark and Wilson Model (CW87), using Object-Oriented (O-O) concepts.;Role-based security is implied in the Clark and Wilson model in which specified operations are grouped to compose roles. This approach to protection is suitable for applications involving large numbers of users with overlapping user requirements and/or where there is a large number of objects. It presents a flexible (hence adaptive) means for enforcing differing ranges of security policies. It enforces the principle of least privilege, hence minimizing the risk of Trojan horse attacks.;Consequently, in part, this work focuses on role-based protection, formalizes the role concept and proposes a model for role organization and administration. This model, intended to ease access rights administration, is defined by a set of properties. Algorithms for role administration are presented. These guarantee the properties of the role organization model. Role-based protection is also studied with respect to traditional protection schemes. One aspect of this enquiry focuses on information flow analysis in role-based security systems; the other addresses the realization of mandatory access control using role-based protection. This involves the imposition of acyclic information flows and rules that ensure secrecy. It demonstrates the strength of the role-based protection approach.;A role is a named collection of responsibilities and functions which we term privileges. Execution of one or more privileges of a role facilitates access to information available via the role. Access to information is realized both via user authorization to the role and the role\u27s privilege list. A role exists as a separate entity from the role-holder and/or the role administrator. In determining role organization, role relationships are used based on privilege sharing. This results in an acyclic role graph with roles being nodes and edges being role relationships. These relationships help us infer those privileges of a role that are implicitly defined. Analysis of this model indicates that it can simulate lattice-like models, hierarchical structures and privilege graphs.;Principles from the O-O paradigm are utilized to impose segmented access to object information. This approach uses methods to window an object\u27s interface to facilitate segmented access to object data through different roles, and hence different users. By defining these methods to suit the intended functionality and associating them with specific roles, we in effect distribute the object interface to different roles and users. An object model is proposed as the basis of O-O executions. Further, in order to impose the well-formed transaction (WFTs) requirement, a transaction model is proposed that imposes transactional properties on method executions. By use of transaction scripts we can design executions to realize desirable outcomes.;Separation of duty is another major requirement in the Clark and Wilson model. It requires object history for its enforcement. Our proposal ensures that objects track their history. Moreover, every execution on an object utilizes the object history to determine access and updates the history with any attempted access. (Abstract shortened by UMI.

An Approach for Managing Access to Personal Information Using Ontology-Based Chains

The importance of electronic healthcare has caused numerous changes in both substantive and procedural aspects of healthcare processes. These changes have produced new challenges to patient privacy and information secrecy. Traditional privacy policies cannot respond to rapidly increased privacy needs of patients in electronic healthcare. Technically enforceable privacy policies are needed in order to protect patient privacy in modern healthcare with its cross organisational information sharing and decision making. This thesis proposes a personal information flow model that specifies a limited number of acts on this type of information. Ontology classified Chains of these acts can be used instead of the "intended/business purposes" used in privacy access control to seamlessly imbuing current healthcare applications and their supporting infrastructure with security and privacy functionality. In this thesis, we first introduce an integrated basic architecture, design principles, and implementation techniques for privacy-preserving data mining systems. We then discuss the key methods of privacypreserving data mining systems which include four main methods: Role based access control (RBAC), Hippocratic database, Chain method and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). We found out that the traditional methods suffer from two main problems: complexity of privacy policy design and the lack of context flexibility that is needed while working in critical situations such as the one we find in hospitals. We present and compare strategies for realising these methods. Theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation show that our new method can generate accurate data mining models and safe data access management while protecting the privacy of the data being mined. The experiments followed comparative kind of experiments, to show the ease of the design first and then follow real scenarios to show the context flexibility in saving personal information privacy of our investigated method

Language-based Enforcement of User-defined Security Policies (As Applied to Multi-tier Web Programs)

Over the last 35 years, researchers have proposed many different forms of security policies to control how information is managed by software, e.g., multi-level information flow policies, role-based or history-based access control, data provenance management etc. A large body of work in programming language design and analysis has aimed to ensure that particular kinds of security policies are properly enforced by an application. However, these approaches typically fix the style of security policy and overall security goal, e.g., information flow policies with a goal of noninterference. This limits the programmer's ability to combine policy styles and to apply customized enforcement techniques while still being assured the system is secure. This dissertation presents a series of programming-language calculi each intended to verify the enforcement of a range of user-defined security policies. Rather than ``bake in'' the semantics of a particular model of security policy, our languages are parameterized by a programmer-provided specification of the policy and enforcement mechanism (in the form of code). Our approach relies on a novel combination of dependent types to correctly associate security policies with the objects they govern, and affine types to account for policy or program operations that include side effects. We have shown that our type systems are expressive enough to verify the enforcement of various forms of access control, provenance, information flow, and automata-based policies. Additionally, our approach facilitates straightforward proofs that programs implementing a particular policy achieve their high-level security goals. We have proved our languages sound and we have proved relevant security properties for each of the policies we have explored. To our knowledge, no prior framework enables the enforcement of such a wide variety of security policies with an equally high level of assurance. To evaluate the practicality of our solution, we have implemented one of our type systems as part of the Links web-programming language; we call the resulting language SELinks. We report on our experience using SELinks to build two substantial applications, a wiki and an on-line store, equipped with a combination of access control and provenance policies. In general, we have found the mechanisms SELinks provides to be both sufficient and relatively easy to use for many common policies, and that the modular separation of user-defined policy code permitted some reuse between the two applications

Securing the software-defined networking control plane by using control and data dependency techniques

Software-defined networking (SDN) fundamentally changes how network and security practitioners design, implement, and manage their networks. SDN decouples the decision-making about traffic forwarding (i.e., the control plane) from the traffic being forwarded (i.e., the data plane). SDN also allows for network applications, or apps, to programmatically control network forwarding behavior and policy through a logically centralized control plane orchestrated by a set of SDN controllers. As a result of logical centralization, SDN controllers act as network operating systems in the coordination of shared data plane resources and comprehensive security policy implementation. SDN can support network security through the provision of security services and the assurances of policy enforcement. However, SDN’s programmability means that a network’s security considerations are different from those of traditional networks. For instance, an adversary who manipulates the programmable control plane can leverage significant control over the data plane’s behavior. In this dissertation, we demonstrate that the security posture of SDN can be enhanced using control and data dependency techniques that track information flow and enable understanding of application composability, control and data plane decoupling, and control plane insight. We support that statement through investigation of the various ways in which an attacker can use control flow and data flow dependencies to influence the SDN control plane under different threat models. We systematically explore and evaluate the SDN security posture through a combination of runtime, pre-runtime, and post-runtime contributions in both attack development and defense designs. We begin with the development a conceptual accountability framework for SDN. We analyze the extent to which various entities within SDN are accountable to each other, what they are accountable for, mechanisms for assurance about accountability, standards by which accountability is judged, and the consequences of breaching accountability. We discover significant research gaps in SDN’s accountability that impact SDN’s security posture. In particular, the results of applying the accountability framework showed that more control plane attribution is necessary at different layers of abstraction, and that insight motivated the remaining work in this dissertation. Next, we explore the influence of apps in the SDN control plane’s secure operation. We find that existing access control protections that limit what apps can do, such as role-based access controls, prove to be insufficient for preventing malicious apps from damaging control plane operations. The reason is SDN’s reliance on shared network state. We analyze SDN’s shared state model to discover that benign apps can be tricked into acting as “confused deputies”; malicious apps can poison the state used by benign apps, and that leads the benign apps to make decisions that negatively affect the network. That violates an implicit (but unenforced) integrity policy that governs the network’s security. Because of the strong interdependencies among apps that result from SDN’s shared state model, we show that apps can be easily co-opted as “gadgets,” and that allows an attacker who minimally controls one app to make changes to the network state beyond his or her originally granted permissions. We use a data provenance approach to track the lineage of the network state objects by assigning attribution to the set of processes and agents responsible for each control plane object. We design the ProvSDN tool to track API requests from apps as they access the shared network state’s objects, and to check requests against a predefined integrity policy to ensure that low-integrity apps cannot poison high-integrity apps. ProvSDN acts as both a reference monitor and an information flow control enforcement mechanism. Motivated by the strong inter-app dependencies, we investigate whether implicit data plane dependencies affect the control plane’s secure operation too. We find that data plane hosts typically have an outsized effect on the generation of the network state in reactive-based control plane designs. We also find that SDN’s event-based design, and the apps that subscribe to events, can induce dependencies that originate in the data plane and that eventually change forwarding behaviors. That combination gives attackers that are residing on data plane hosts significant opportunities to influence control plane decisions without having to compromise the SDN controller or apps. We design the EventScope tool to automatically identify where such vulnerabilities occur. EventScope clusters apps’ event usage to decide in which cases unhandled events should be handled, statically analyzes controller and app code to understand how events affect control plane execution, and identifies valid control flow paths in which a data plane attacker can reach vulnerable code to cause unintended data plane changes. We use EventScope to discover 14 new vulnerabilities, and we develop exploits that show how such vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to bypass an intended network (i.e., data plane) access control policy. This research direction is critical for SDN security evaluation because such vulnerabilities could be induced by host-based malware campaigns. Finally, although there are classes of vulnerabilities that can be removed prior to deployment, it is inevitable that other classes of attacks will occur that cannot be accounted for ahead of time. In those cases, a network or security practitioner would need to have the right amount of after-the-fact insight to diagnose the root causes of such attacks without being inundated with too much informa- tion. Challenges remain in 1) the modeling of apps and objects, which can lead to overestimation or underestimation of causal dependencies; and 2) the omission of a data plane model that causally links control and data plane activities. We design the PicoSDN tool to mitigate causal dependency modeling challenges, to account for a data plane model through the use of the data plane topology to link activities in the provenance graph, and to account for network semantics to appropriately query and summarize the control plane’s history. We show how prior work can hinder investigations and analysis in SDN-based attacks and demonstrate how PicoSDN can track SDN control plane attacks.Ope

Common Representation of Information Flows for Dynamic Coalitions

We propose a formal foundation for reasoning about access control policies within a Dynamic Coalition, defining an abstraction over existing access control models and providing mechanisms for translation of those models into information-flow domain. The abstracted information-flow domain model, called a Common Representation, can then be used for defining a way to control the evolution of Dynamic Coalitions with respect to information flow

Information Flow Model for Commercial Security

Information flow in Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a well-known difficult problem. This paper formalizes the fundamental concepts and establishes a theory of information flow security. A DAC system is information flow secure (IFS), if any data never flows into the hands of owner’s enemies (explicitly denial access list.

The role of intelligent systems in delivering the smart grid

The development of "smart" or "intelligent" energy networks has been proposed by both EPRI's IntelliGrid initiative and the European SmartGrids Technology Platform as a key step in meeting our future energy needs. A central challenge in delivering the energy networks of the future is the judicious selection and development of an appropriate set of technologies and techniques which will form "a toolbox of proven technical solutions". This paper considers functionality required to deliver key parts of the Smart Grid vision of future energy networks. The role of intelligent systems in providing these networks with the requisite decision-making functionality is discussed. In addition to that functionality, the paper considers the role of intelligent systems, in particular multi-agent systems, in providing flexible and extensible architectures for deploying intelligence within the Smart Grid. Beyond exploiting intelligent systems as architectural elements of the Smart Grid, with the purpose of meeting a set of engineering requirements, the role of intelligent systems as a tool for understanding what those requirements are in the first instance, is also briefly discussed