Pengaruh Information Asymmetry Dan Budget Participation Terhadap Managerial Performance Dengan Goal Commitment Sebagai Variabel Intervening

Performance manager in a corporation it is important to determine the success of our goals and objectives that have been set by the central management. The executive manager at the branch office is required to achieve the objectives and targets, therefore they must have a commitment to the goals to be achieved by the company. This study empirically investigate the antecedents, mediation, and the outcome variable of budget participation in branch distribution companies, sales of vehicles (cars). The branch company received the targets set by the management of the center has information that will be different with the real in the enterprise branch, the so-called information asymmetry. The research proposes that the asymmetry of information between supervisors and subordinates created the need for the achievement of the performance manager mediated by goal commitment. Besides the participation of the budget to achieve the performance manager is also mediated by goal commitment.Based on a questionnaire survey of 98 managers at the branch office distribution company Toyota brand vehicles in Jakarta and Bandung. The data were analyzed using structure equation modeling (SEM) of analysis of Partial Least Squere (PLS), SmartPLS program). We found that budgetary participation has a significant positive effect on the achievement of the performance of managers with goal commitment mediated by the manager. This contrasts with the results of the information asymmetry that is not a positive influence on the performance of managers whose goal commitment is mediated by the manager. With the goal of the commitment of the branch manager it will increase the performance of the manager itself so that it will achieve its goals set forth by the central management. This research will be beneficial for the company in general and for organizations in developing countries in particular realize that the budget does not increase the participation of managerial performance in the absence of a strong commitment to the company's

Moderation of Information Asymmetry, Self Esteem to the Effect of Participatory Budgeting on Budgetary Slack Government of South Sulawesi Province

Suspected budgetary participation is not always linear effect on budgetary slack. This is because the information asymmetry factor, and self esteem. This study aims to determine whether the asymmetry of information and self-esteem able to moderate Effect of participatory budgeting and budgetary slack. The number of samples in the study were 100 echelons SKPD South Sulawesi Provincial Government selected based on purposive sampling method. The data analysis technique used is moderation regression analysis (MRA). The results obtained are variable participatory budgeting has a positive effect on budgetary slack. Variable self esteem weaken the influence of participatory budgeting in the budgetary slack, while strengthening the influence of information asymmetry variable participatory budgeting in the budgetary slack

Jargon alert : Information asymmetry

Related links: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/region_focus/2010/q4/jargon_alert_weblinks.cfmEconomics

Information Asymmetry: Evidence From Iran Listed Companies

Inherent in the International and indigenous accounting standards is managerial discretion in the application of accounting methods, preparation of financial reports and disclosures. Extent literature indicates that almost all companies are engaged in some type of earnings management (Healy, 1985; Perry & Williams, 1994; Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Jordon, Clark, & Pate, 2008). A crucial question posed for accounting research is to identify the environmental conditions under which managerial discretion (i.e. accounting choices) are exercised. Using empirical analysis this paper investigates one of the fundamental conditions of earnings management, information asymmetry between managers and investors. When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders including investors do not have sufficient resources, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor managers\u27 actions, which gives rise to earnings management. Empirical results show that the level of information asymmetry index which is the combination of five important Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) relevant proxies (volume of trade, stock price variation, P/E ratio, number of trading days and firm age) has a positive statistically significant effect on the extent of earnings management practiced by companies listed on the TSE

Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry

Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry Faheem Farooq, Depts. of Biology and Chemistry, Jay Bisen, Manaeil Hasan, and Akhil Patel, with Dr. Jan Rychtar, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics, and Dr. Dewey T. Taylor, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals - Owner and Intruder - and model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. Owner is in a possession of a valuable resource when it spots Intruder. Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder has to decide whether to fight with the Owner. The individuals may value the resource differently and we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We find that it is typically beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. However, we identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better. We also show that an individual may or may not benefit from their opponent knowing less. Finally, we consider the same kind of interactions but with the reversed order of decisions. We find that typically the individual initiating the interaction has an advantage. However, when individuals know only their own valuation and not the valuations to their opponents, it is sometimes better when the opponent initiates.https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/uresposters/1298/thumbnail.jp

Electricity Market Equilibrium under Information Asymmetry

We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the probability distribution of this uncertainty is not identical at the day-ahead stage. We show a high sensitivity of the equilibrium solution to the level of information asymmetry and demonstrate economic, operational, and computational value for the system stemming from potential information sharing

Can Information Asymmetry Cause Stratification?

The empirical literature has found evidence of locational sorting of workers by wage or skill. We show that such sorting can be driven by asymmetric information in the labor market, specifically when firms do not know if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types and two regions, workers of different skill levels are offered separating contracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable, whereas sorting of worker types into different regions in equilibrium remains stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from firms, in the region to which workers are perturbed, offering attractive contracts to low skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.Adverse Selection; Stratification

Can information asymmetry cause agglomeration?

The modern literature on city formation and development, for example the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations differ by type. This kind of agglomeration can be driven by asymmetric information in the labor market, specifically when firms do not know if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types and two regions, workers of different skill levels are offered separating contracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable, whereas sorting of worker types into different regions in equilibrium remains stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from firms, in the region to which workers are perturbed, offering attractive contracts to low skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.Adverse Selection; Agglomeration

Can information asymmetry cause agglomeration?

The modern literature on city formation and development, for example the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations differ by type. This kind of agglomeration can be driven by asymmetric information in the labor market, specifically when firms do not know if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types and two regions, workers of different skill levels are offered separating contracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable, whereas sorting of worker types into different regions in equilibrium remains stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from firms, in the region to which workers are perturbed, offering attractive contracts to low skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.Adverse Selection; Agglomeration