Pengaruh Information Asymmetry Dan Budget Participation Terhadap Managerial Performance Dengan Goal Commitment Sebagai Variabel Intervening

Abstract

Performance manager in a corporation it is important to determine the success of our goals and objectives that have been set by the central management. The executive manager at the branch office is required to achieve the objectives and targets, therefore they must have a commitment to the goals to be achieved by the company. This study empirically investigate the antecedents, mediation, and the outcome variable of budget participation in branch distribution companies, sales of vehicles (cars). The branch company received the targets set by the management of the center has information that will be different with the real in the enterprise branch, the so-called information asymmetry. The research proposes that the asymmetry of information between supervisors and subordinates created the need for the achievement of the performance manager mediated by goal commitment. Besides the participation of the budget to achieve the performance manager is also mediated by goal commitment.Based on a questionnaire survey of 98 managers at the branch office distribution company Toyota brand vehicles in Jakarta and Bandung. The data were analyzed using structure equation modeling (SEM) of analysis of Partial Least Squere (PLS), SmartPLS program). We found that budgetary participation has a significant positive effect on the achievement of the performance of managers with goal commitment mediated by the manager. This contrasts with the results of the information asymmetry that is not a positive influence on the performance of managers whose goal commitment is mediated by the manager. With the goal of the commitment of the branch manager it will increase the performance of the manager itself so that it will achieve its goals set forth by the central management. This research will be beneficial for the company in general and for organizations in developing countries in particular realize that the budget does not increase the participation of managerial performance in the absence of a strong commitment to the company's