Shared perception is different from individual perception: a new look on context dependency

Human perception is based on unconscious inference, where sensory input integrates with prior information. This phenomenon, known as context dependency, helps in facing the uncertainty of the external world with predictions built upon previous experience. On the other hand, human perceptual processes are inherently shaped by social interactions. However, how the mechanisms of context dependency are affected is to date unknown. If using previous experience - priors - is beneficial in individual settings, it could represent a problem in social scenarios where other agents might not have the same priors, causing a perceptual misalignment on the shared environment. The present study addresses this question. We studied context dependency in an interactive setting with a humanoid robot iCub that acted as a stimuli demonstrator. Participants reproduced the lengths shown by the robot in two conditions: one with iCub behaving socially and another with iCub acting as a mechanical arm. The different behavior of the robot significantly affected the use of prior in perception. Moreover, the social robot positively impacted perceptual performances by enhancing accuracy and reducing participants overall perceptual errors. Finally, the observed phenomenon has been modelled following a Bayesian approach to deepen and explore a new concept of shared perception.Comment: 14 pages, 9 figures, 1 table. IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems, 202

Believe It or Not: Examining the Case for Intuitive Logic and Effortful Beliefs

The overall objective of this thesis was to test the Default Interventionist (DI) account of belief-bias in human reasoning using the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (2011). DI accounts focus on how our prior beliefs are the intuitive output that bias our reasoning process (Evans, 2006), whilst judgments based on logical validity require effortful processing. However, recent research has suggested that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as previous accounts claim. In order to investigate whether belief based judgments are resource demanding we instructed participants to reason on the basis of both the validity and believability of a conclusion whilst simultaneously engaging in a secondary task (Experiment 1 - 5). We used both a within and between subjects design (Experiment 5) examining both simple and complex arguments (Experiment 4 – 9). We also analysed the effect of incorporating additional instructional conditions (Experiment 7 – 9) and tested the relationships between various individual differences (ID) measures under belief and logic instruction (Experiment 4, 5, 7, 8, & 9). In line with Handley et al.’s findings we found that belief based judgments were more prone to error and that the logical structure of a problem interfered with judging the believability of its conclusion, contrary to the DI account of reasoning. However, logical outputs sometimes took longer to complete and were more affected by random number generation (RNG) (Experiment 5). To reconcile these findings we examined the role of Working Memory (WM) and Inhibition in Experiments 7 – 9 and found, contrary to Experiment 5, belief judgments were more demanding of executive resources and correlated with ID measures of WM and inhibition. Given that belief based judgments resulted in more errors and were more impacted on by the validity of an argument the behavioural data does not fit with the DI account of reasoning. Consequently, we propose that there are two routes to a logical solution and present an alternative Parallel Competitive model to explain the data. We conjecture that when instructed to reason on the basis of belief an automatic logical output completes and provides the reasoner with an intuitive logical cue which requires inhibiting in order for the belief based response to be generated. This creates a Type 1/Type 2 conflict, explaining the impact of logic on belief based judgments. When explicitly instructed to reason logically, it takes deliberate Type 2 processing to arrive at the logical solution. The engagement in Type 2 processing in order to produce an explicit logical output is impacted on by demanding secondary tasks (RNG) and any task that interferes with the integration of premise information (Experiments 8 and 9) leading to increased latencies. However the relatively simple nature of the problems means that accuracy is less affected. We conclude that the type of instructions provided along with the complexity of the problem and the inhibitory demands of the task all play key roles in determining the difficulty and time course of logical and belief based responses

Advances in Human-Robot Interaction

Rapid advances in the field of robotics have made it possible to use robots not just in industrial automation but also in entertainment, rehabilitation, and home service. Since robots will likely affect many aspects of human existence, fundamental questions of human-robot interaction must be formulated and, if at all possible, resolved. Some of these questions are addressed in this collection of papers by leading HRI researchers

Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool.

Many people report a form of internal language known as inner speech (IS). This review examines recent growth of research interest in the phenomenon, which has broadly supported a theoretical model in which IS is a functional language process that can confer benefits for cognition in a range of domains. A key insight to have emerged in recent years is that IS is an embodied experience characterized by varied subjective qualities, which can be usefully modeled in artificial systems and whose neural signals have the potential to be decoded through advancing brain-computer interface technologies. Challenges for future research include understanding individual differences in IS and mapping form to function across IS subtypes

Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics:a Critical Review

Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions

Frame Problems, Fodor's Challenge, and Practical Reason

By bringing the frame problem to bear on psychology, Fodor argues that the interesting activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling. Following exegesis of the frame problem and Fodor's claims, I argue that underlying Fodor's argument is an unsatisfiable normative principle of rationality that in turn commits him to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our minds. I argue that the descriptive claim is false and that we should reject the normative principle in favor of one that is at least in principle satisfiable. From this it follows, I argue, that we have no reason for thinking the activities of our minds to be, as a matter of principle, unmodelable. Drawing upon Baars' Global Workspace theory, I next outline an alternative framework that provides a means by which the set of engineering challenges raised by Fodor might be met. Having sketched this alternative, I turn next to consider some of the frame problems arising in practical reason and decision-making. Following discussion of the nature of emotion and its influence on practical reason and decision-making, I argue that consideration of emotion provides one means by which we might contend with some of the frame problem instances that arise in that domain

How Many Minds Do We Need? Toward A One-System Account of Human Reasoning

To explain data from the reasoning and decision-making literature, dual-process theorists claim that human reasoning is divided: Type-1 processes are fast, automatic, associative, and evolutionarily old, while Type-2 processes are slow, effortful, rule-based, and evolutionarily new. Philosophers have used this distinction to their own philosophic ends in moral reasoning, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. I criticize dual-process theory on conceptual and empirical grounds and propose an alternative cognitive architecture for human reasoning. In chapter 1, I identify and clarify the key elements of dual-process and dual-system theory. Then, in chapter 2, I undercut an inference to the best explanation for dual-process theory by offering a one-system alternative. I argue that a single reasoning system can accomplish the explanatory work done by positing two distinct processes or systems. In chapter 3, I argue that a one-system account of human reasoning is empirically testable—it is incompatible with there being contradictory beliefs that are produced by simultaneously occurring reasoning processes. I further argue, contra Sloman (1996), that we do not have evidence for such beliefs. Next, in chapter 4, I argue that the properties used to distinguish Type-1 from Type-2 processes cross-cut each other (e.g. there are evolutionarily new processes that are effortless). The upshot is that even if human reasoning were divided, it would not parse neatly into two tidy categories: ‘Type-1’ and ‘Type-2.’ Finally, in chapter 5, I fill in the details of my own one-system alternative. I argue that there is one reasoning system that can operate in many modes: consciously or unconsciously, automatically or controlled, and inductively or deductively. In contrast to the dual-process theorists, these properties do not cluster. For each property pair (e.g. automatic/controlled), and for a single instance of a task, the reasoning system will operate in a definitive mode. The reasoning system is like a mixing board: it has several switches and slides, one for each property pair. As subjects work through problems, they can alter the switches and slides—they can, perhaps unconsciously, change the process they use to complete the problem

Embodied approaches to learning programming

This thesis explores observable representations of embodied learning, such as physicality, gestures and the use of conceptual metaphors among students in primary computing education. To understand the influence of more physically interactive forms of interface, I compared the use of two user interfaces – a Tangible User Interface (TUI) and Graphical User Interface (GUI) – to foster programming skills in primary school students aged between six and seven. The first phase of this thesis, Studies 1 and 2, adopted a between-subjects design to examine the impact of interface type on several variables including enjoyment, attitudes, learning outcomes, and frequency of gestures, as well as the effect of gender on each variable. Both Study 1 and 2 examined the relationship between student gestures and learning outcomes. Study 1 examined the effect of physicality as an input by asking students to use a block-based programming environment to control a physical robot (PR) to solve six activities (two complex, four simple) where the students used either a TUI-PR or a GUI-PR. The use of a GUI-PR was associated with improved learning outcomes, but the TUI-PR led to a greater attitudinal improvement toward computing. No difference was identified in the number of gestures used by participants in the TUI-PR and GUI-PR groups, but a statistically significant difference was identified between the mean learning gains in programming of high-frequency gesturers and low-frequency gesturers, with the top quartile showing significantly greater learning gains. Study 2 further examined the effect of physicality as both an input and an output by comparing two block-based programming environments: first, a TUI-PR consisting of physical, hand-manipulated blocks to control a physical robot; and second, a GUI-SR, which involve using touchscreen-operable programming blocks to control an on-screen robot (SR) to solve four simple activities. No difference was observed between the TUI-PR and GUI-PR in terms of learning outcomes, but the GUI-PR was associated with attitudinal improvement toward computing. Additionally, no difference was observed in the number of gestures used by participants in the TUI-PR and GUI-SR groups and no relationship was identified between the frequency of gestures and learning gains. In both studies, no difference was found in terms of the level of enjoyment or by gender across all the measures. The results also demonstrated that children used a range of gestures to represent the concept of iteration including pointing, literal representational gestures and metaphorical representational gestures. In Study 3, we addressed a gap in the current theoretical understanding of computing education by drawing on embodied cognition theory. Using methodological tools from cognitive linguistics and gesture research, an analysis of how primary school students used spontaneous co-speech gestures when responding to interview questions and describing programming concepts was conducted. The findings show representational patterns in these gestures, thereby suggesting the potential of this methodological approach to provide a deeper understanding of the nature of learners’ cognition in the domain of computing education. This work that contributes to two main areas: first, the field of interaction design, particularly relating to the importance of physicality in programming environments for children; and second, current understandings of the importance of gestures and conceptual metaphors in CS education in primary school. This thesis presents an in-depth comparison of the use of a TUI and GUI to teach programming skills to primary school students. In particular, the findings indicate that a GUI-SR is suitable for children’s learning and is associated with greater attitudinal improvement than a TUI. This thesis also investigated the potential relationship between increased embodiment in the interface and output device (e.g., physicality) and increased use of embodied representations (e.g., gestures) that showed no relationship across Studies 1 and 2. This research describes children’s use of spontaneous gestures when solving programming problems and explaining programming concepts. Additionally, regarding the use of spontaneous gestures, this research demonstrates how investigating children’s gestures may help to characterise children’s conceptions in primary computing, possibly allowing the identification of misconceptions and assisting the identification of productive educational strategies. This research has also provided evidence indicating that children use spontaneous hand gestures to demonstrate abstract computational concepts, even in the absence of relevant stimuli (i.e., written code); this reflects how gestures may indicate the embodiment of the children’s computing notions. Furthermore, this research presents tentative evidence of cultural influences on embodied conceptualisations. The findings suggest that the direction of a culture’s written language (i.e., right-to-left or left-to-right) influences the direction and use of conceptual metaphors in CS. Finally, this research identified a positive relationship between the mean learning gains of high-frequency gesturers and low-frequency gesturers on tasks with varying problem difficulties. This work represents the first step toward understanding children’s embodied descriptions of programming and the potential role of gestures in supporting their learning. This was a worthwhile area of research because, although the analysis of children’s gestures has already proven valuable in illuminating knowledge acquisition and conceptual development in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields such as mathematics itself, the area of computing education is currently underexplored

Hope College Abstracts: 12th Annual Celebration of Undergraduate Research and Creative Performance

The 12th Annual Celebration of Undergraduate Research and Creative Performance was held on April 12, 2013 in the Richard and Helen DeVos Fieldhouse at Hope College. It featured over 300 student-faculty collaborative research projects. This book of abstracts is a record reflective of those projects between the 2012-2013 academic year