5,117 research outputs found
Benevolent characteristics promote cooperative behaviour among humans
Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly
observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments
with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they
should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own
individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects:
some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting
cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this
heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We
have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as
a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else
beyond one's own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous
Prisoner's dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity
aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of
people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with
cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and
cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour
makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think
malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more
Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift
game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent
theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for
individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the
social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through
so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies
have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the
loss of diversity in strategy. Here we analyze continuous snowdrift games with
quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions
are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of
those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one
species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the
continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different
cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this
implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can
facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could
cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.Comment: 30 pages, 3 tables, 5 figure
To Each According to His Need? Variability in the Responses to Inequity in Nonhuman Primates
While it is well established that humans respond to inequity, it remains unclear the extent to which this behavior occurs in our nonhuman primate relatives. By comparing a variety of species, spanning from New World and Old World monkeys to great apes, scientists can begin to answer questions about how the response to inequity evolved, what the function of this response is, and why and how different contexts shape it. In particular, research across nonhuman primate species suggests that the response is quite variable across species, contexts and individuals. In this paper, we aim to review these differences in an attempt to identify and better understand the patterns that emerge from the existing data with the goal of developing directions for future research. To begin, we address the importance of considering socio-ecological factors in nonhuman primates in order to better understand and predict expected patterns of cooperation and aversion to inequity in different species, following which we provide a detailed analysis of the patterns uncovered by these comparisons. Ultimately, we use this synthesis to propose new ideas for research to better understand this response and, hence, the evolution of our own responses to inequity
Experimental economics: science or what?
Do we want experimental economics to evolve into a genuine
science? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in
warning that we are at risk of losing the respect of other scientific disciplines if
we continue to accept the wide claims about human behavior that are currently
being advanced without examining either the data from which the claims are
supposedly derived or the methodology employed in analyzing the data
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research
On the Explanatory Value of Inequity Aversion Theory
In a number of papers on their theory of Inequity Aversion, E. Fehr and K. Schmidt have claimed that the theory explains the behavior in many experiments. By virtue of having an infinite number of parameters the theory can predict a wide range of outcomes, from the competitive to the cooperative. Its prediction depends on values of these parameters. Fehr & Schmidt provide no explicit methodological plan for their project and as a result they repeatedly make logical and methodological errors. We look at the methodology of their explanations and find that no connection has been established between the experimental data and the behavior predicted by the theory. We conclude that the theory of inequity aversion has no explanatory value beyond its trivial capacity to predict a broad range of outcomes as a function of its parameters
Endogenous Social Preferences, Heterogeneity and Cooperation
We set up an analytical framework focusing on the problem of interaction over time when economic agents are characterized by various types of distributional social preferences. We develop an evolutionary approach in which individual preferences are endogenous and account for the evolution of cooperation when all the players are initially entirely selfish. In particular, within motivationally heterogeneous agents embedded in a social network, we adopt a variant of the indirect evolutionary approach, where material payoffs play a critical role, and assume that a coevolutionary process occurs in which subjective preferences gradually evolve due to a key mechanism involving behavioral choices, relational intensity and degree of social openness. The simulations we carried out led to strongly consistent results with regard to the evolution of player types, the dynamics of material payoffs, the creation of significant interpersonal relationships among agents and the frequency of cooperation. In the long run, cooperation turns out to be the strategic choice that obtains the best performances, in terms of material payoffs, and "nice guys", far from finishing last, succeed in coming out ahead.Behavioral Economics; Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Evolution; Heterogeneous Social Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach
Unionism and peer-referencing
This study assesses the âfair-wage-effortâ hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.EPICURUS, a project supported by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme âImproving Human Potentialâ (contract number: HPSE-CT-2002-00143
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