The Two Methods of Economics

A Teoria Econômica Emprega Dois Métodos: o Método Hipotético-Dedutivo, Utilizado Principalmente Pelos Economistas Neoclássicos, e o Método Histórico-Dedutivo, Adotado Pelos Economistas Clássicos e Keynesianos. Ambos são Legítimos, Mas, Desde que a Economia é Substantiva, não uma Ciência Metodológica, Onde o Objeto é o Sistema Econômico, o Método Histórico-Dedutivo é o Mais Apropriado. o Método Hipotético-Dedutivo Permite que o Economista Desenvolva Ferramentas para Analisar o Sistema Econômico, Mas Falha ao Analisar o Sistema como um Todo. em Contrapartida, o Método Histórico-Dedutivo Parte da Observação Empírica da Realidade e da Busca por Regularidades e Tendências. é um Método Empírico, Apropriado para as Ciências Substantivas que Tratam de Sistemas Abertos, como é o Caso da Economia.

Agent-Based Modeling of the El Farol Bar Problem

In this paper, we study the self-coordination problem as demonstrated by the well-known El Farol problem (Arthur, 1994), which has later become what is known as the minority game in the econophysics community. While the El Farol problem or the minority game has been studied for almost two decades, existing studies are mostly only concerned with efficiency. The equality issue, however, has been largely neglected. In this paper, we build an agent-based model to study both efficiency and equality and ask whether a decentralized society can ever possibly self-coordinate a result with the highest efficiency while also maintaining the highest degree of equality. Our agent-based model shows the possibility of achieving this social optimum. The two key determinants to make this happen are social preferences and social networks. Hence, not only doe institutions (networks) matter, but individual characteristics (preferences) also matter. The latter are open to human-subject experiments for further examination.El Farol Bar problem, Social Preferences, Social Networks, Self-Organization, Emergence of Coordination.

Modeling the Use of Nonrenewable Resources Using a Genetic Algorithm

This paper shows, how a genetic algorithm (GA) can be used to model an economic process: the interaction of profit-maximizing oil-exploration firms that compete with each other for a limited amount of oil. After a brief introduction to the concept of multi-agent-modeling in economics, a GA-based resource-economic model is developed. Several model runs based on different economic policy assumptions are presented and discussed in order to show how the GA-model can be used to gain insight into the dynamic properties of economic systems. The remainder outlines deficiencies of GA-based multi-agent approaches and sketches how the present model can be improved.

From Wald to Savage: homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician

Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. A rational agent in an economic model is one who maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes’s rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is far from trivial and of great historiographic importance. The story begins with Abraham Wald’s behaviorist approach to statistics and culminates with Leonard J. Savage’s elaboration of subjective expected utility theory in his 1954 classic The Foundations of Statistics. It is the latter’s acknowledged fiasco to achieve its planned goal, the reinterpretation of traditional inferential techniques along subjectivist and behaviorist lines, which raises the puzzle of how a failed project in statistics could turn into such a tremendous hit in economics. A couple of tentative answers are also offered, involving the role of the consistency requirement in neoclassical analysis and the impact of the postwar transformation of US business schools.Savage, Wald, rational behavior, Bayesian decision theory, subjective probability, minimax rule, statistical decision functions, neoclassical economics

Multi-Agent Spiral Software Engineering: A Lakatosian Approach

This paper presents an epistemological approach for the development and validation of an original agent oriented software development methodology (see [Wautelet05a, Wautelet05b]). Agent orientation has been widely presented as a new modeling, design and programming paradigm that could be adopted to build systems mark to the determinant advantages it offers. This will be exposed and put into perspective in the paper through the Lakatosian approach. Spiral development (see [Boehm00a]) has become popular, especially through object-oriented software project development since it allows efficient software project management, continuous organizational modeling and requirements acquisition, early implementation, continuous testing and modularity, etc. The iterative nature of this requirements engineering process will be studied here through Herbert Simon's bounded rationality principle and Popper's knowledge growth principle but nuanced by Lakatos falsification principle criticism

What's a face worth: Noneconomic factors in game playing

Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present evidence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be explained