2,004 research outputs found
Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological Considerations
This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology
Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology
Disagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-life case study of expert disagreement, where disagreement is gradually transformed into consensus. An analysis of Delphi shows that moderate conciliatory views are descriptively more adequate than rival views. However, it also casts doubt on whether the debate in social epistemology is explanatory relevant vis-à -vis real life cases of expert disagreement, where consensus replaces truth, and acceptance is more explanatorily relevant than belief
Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
Many markets have organizations that influence or try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted and rejected. Examining a dozen previously studied markets suggests that markets in which transactions are made far in advance are markets in which it is acceptable for firms to make exploding offers, and unacceptable for workers to renege on commitments they make, however early. But this evidence is only suggestive, because the markets differ in many ways other than norms concerning offers. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple environment, in which uncertainty about applicants' quality is resolved over time, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. Relaxing either of these two conditions causes matching to take place later, when more information about applicants' qualities is available, and consequently results in higher efficiency and fewer blocking pairs. This suggests that elements of market culture may play an important role in influencing market performance.
mWater prototype #3 review
mWater is a software demonstrator developed in the Agreement Technologies Project. It
is a Multi-Agent System (MAS) application that implements a market for water rights,
including the model and simulation of the water-right market itself, the basin, users, protocols,
norms and grievance situations.
mWater is motivated due to the fact that water scarcity is becoming a major concern in
most countries, not only because it threatens the economic viability of current agricultural
practices, but because it is likely to alter an already precarious balance among its different
types of use.Garrido Tejero, A.; Botti Navarro, VJ.; Giret Boggino, AS.; Alfonso Espinosa, B.; Noriega, P. (2013). mWater prototype #3 review. http://hdl.handle.net/10251/3181
Fairness, envy, guilt and greed: building equity considerations into agency theory
In this article we examine the extent to which fairness considerations are salient to senior executives, and consider the implications for agency theory, tournament theory and the design of top-management incentives. We look for patterns in a unique data set of senior executive preferences and seek explanations for these patterns using a model of fairness first advanced by Fehr and Schmidt in 1999. We propose a number of amendments to Fehr and Schmidt’s model. We challenge some of the standard tenets of agency theory and tournament theory, demonstrating why equity considerations should be taken into account. We add to the growing literature on behavioural agency theory
09121 Abstracts Collection -- Normative Multi-Agent Systems
From 15.03. to 20.03.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09121 ``Normative Multi-Agent Systems \u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general
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