1,313 research outputs found
Induction without Probabilities
A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there
Neural Unpredictability, the Interpretation of Quantum Theory, and the Mind-Body Problem
It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states
of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of
correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature
of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for
our individual future observations given our individual present and previous
observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that
unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming
from small-scale uncertainties in molecular motions, may overwhelm, by many
orders of magnitude, many conventionally recognized sources of observed
``quantum'' uncertainty. Some possible ways of avoiding the problems are
considered but found wanting. It is proposed that a complete understanding of
the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates
requires the introduction of mathematical definitions and indeed of new
physical laws.Comment: 27 pages, plain TeX, v2: missing reference inserted, related papers
from http://www.poco.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd101
Special Divine Action and Natural Science
A number of modern theologians have concluded that the rise of natural science makes it necessary to give up the idea that God acts in particular ways to affect the course of events in the world. I reply to this claim, taking up the challenge to explain what might be meant by a ”special’ act of God. There are several ways to conceive of such acts, including the possibility that God might determine what is left determinable in the structures of nature, e.g., at the quantum level. I address objections to this view, and consider metaphysical puzzles that it presents
Econometric reduction theory and philosophy
Econometric reduction theory provides a comprehensive probabilistic framework for the
analysis and classification of the reductions (simplifications) associated with empirical
econometric models. However, the available approaches to econometric reduction theory are
unable to satisfactory accommodate a commonplace theory of social reality, namely that the
course of history is indeterministic, that history does not repeat itself and that the future depends
on the past. Using concepts from philosophy this paper proposes a solution to these
shortcomings, which in addition permits new reductions, interpretations and definitions
Free will, determinism and the “problem” of structure and agency in the social sciences
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.The so-called "problem" of structure and agency is clearly related to the philosophical problem of free will and determinism, yet the central philosophical issues are not well understood by theorists of structure and agency in the social sciences. In this article I draw a map of the available stances on the metaphysics of free will and determinism. With the aid of this map the problem of structure and agency will be seen to dissolve. The problem of structure and agency is sustained by a failure to distinguish between metaphysical and empirical senses of the relation between social structure and individual agency. The ramifications of this distinction are illustrated via a case study of competing explanations of perpetrator behavior in Christopher Browning's and Daniel Goldhagen's studies of the German Order Police in the Holocaust
The Many Problems of Special Divine Action
Special divine action is an integral part of the Christian worldview. In fact, the plausibility of the Christian worldview depends on and is grounded in the putative reality, and therefore possibility, of special divine action. Without special divine action, Scripture does not make sense, and without Scripture, Christianity neither. However, the possibility of special divine action is highly contested in almost every field of human enquiry. In what follows, I briefly suggest a minimal definition of special divine action and show its indispensability for the internal plausibility of Christian faith. I then argue against the very possibility of special divine action. I end by way of identifying ways in which Christian theologians can respond to the arguments in order to justify the possibility of special divine action. It turns out that special divine action neither contradicts science nor metaphysics
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