What science can teach us about “Enhanced Interrogation”

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Truth and falsehood for non-representationalists: Gorgias on the normativity of language

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness

Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception

Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic of intentional action. This masking takes roughly the following form: when we are deceiving ourselves about what we are intentionally doing, we don't think about our action because it's painful to do so

Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an Affirmative Duty on Licensors to Enforce Their Corporate Social Responsibility Codes

Modern consumers are increasingly interested in seeing the brands they love commit to corporate social responsibility (CSR), including fair labor practices and environmental sustainability throughout their supply chains. Many corporations capitalize on this demand through branding strategies that highlight their commitment to CSR. Branding of CSR can include publishing codes of conduct on corporate websites, incorporating a value of doing good while doing well in print and video advertisements, or even publicly partnering with nonprofit organizations. The Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statute in the United States, articulates federal laws pertaining to branding and advertising, and is rooted in a significant policy interest to keep consumers informed and to prevent consumer deception. Two doctrines of law that stem from the Lanham Act substantiate this policy consideration: the naked licensing doctrine, which imposes an affirmative duty on trademark licensors to supervise their licensees’ quality control standards, and false advertising law, which prevents corporations from espousing false or misleading advertising in connection with their trademarks or brands. An analysis of each of these bodies of law, along with the overall policy underpinnings of the Lanham Act, poses the concern that corporations who incorporate CSR into their branding strategies run the risk of deceiving consumers if in reality they do not supervise their supply chain sufficiently to ensure the truth of their public CSR statements. This Note analyzes the naked licensing doctrine and false advertising laws, and proposes an affirmative duty on corporations to monitor and enforce their CSR codes, in compliance with the Lanham Act

Kantian Nonideal Theory and Nuclear Proliferation

Recent revelations of Iran’s hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment programs have once again incited western fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons’ capability. Their fears seem motivated by more than the concern for compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, they seem strongly connected to the western moral assumptions about what kind of government or people can be trusted with a nuclear arsenal. In this paper, I critically examine the western assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear proliferation from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to give it unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. In contrast to the uses of Kant that were prominent during the Cold War, I advance and apply a sketch of a Kantian nonideal theory that specifies the conditions (although strict conditions) under which nuclear proliferation for states like Iran is morally permissible even though the NPT forbids it

SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN CHINESE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: DENIAL AND ENHANCEMENT?

This study examined the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) with one-, two-, three-, and four-dimensional models and tested the BIDR's discriminant validity with personality variables. A confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis of responses from 600 Chinese university students (314 men, 282 women, 4 missing; M age = 20.0 yr.) provided results indicating that the four-factor model fit the data best; i.e., self-deception and impression management split into denial and enhancement. The Denial and Enhancement subscales with personality variables show significant differences, confirming the four-factor model. The cultural differences as a possible reason for the split were discussed

Sex By Deception

In this paper I will use sex by deception as a case study for highlighting some of the most tricky concepts around sexuality and moral psychology, including rape, consensual sex, sexual rights, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, and disrespectful sex. I begin with a discussion of morally wrong sex as rooted in the breach of five sexual liberty rights that are derived from our fundamental human liberty rights: sexual self-possession, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, sexual dignity and sexual privacy. I then argue (against the standard interpretation) that experimental findings in moral psychology show that the principle of respect for persons—a principle that grounds our human liberty rights—drives our intuitive moral judgments. In light of this discussion, I examine a puzzle about sex by deception—a puzzle which at first may seem to compel us to define 'rape' strictly in terms of force rather than sexual autonomy. I proceed by presenting an argument against the view that, as a rule, sex by deception undermines consent—a position held by prominent thinkers such as Philippe Patry (2001), Onora O’Neill (2003), Rubenfeld (2012), Tom Dougherty (2013a, 2013b), Joyce M. Short (2013), and Danielle Bromwich and Joseph Millum (2013, 2018). As we will see, sex following deception to increase your chances does not always constitute rape. Lying about your age, education, job, family background, marital status, or interest in a relationship, for example, does not make your sex partner incapable of consenting, which is to say that sex by deception need not be rape. I even go so far as to say that sex with another person that is facilitated by withholding information about having a venereal disease shouldn't be classified as rape. Although sex by deception doesn't compromise consent, it nonetheless violates the principle of respect for persons, not by vitiating sexual autonomy and compromising consent, but by failing to respect other sexual rights, such as our rights to sexual dignity, individuality, and privacy