Inconsistency, paraconsistency and ω-inconsistency

In this paper I'll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I'll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω-inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ω-consistent, all conceptual concerns don't apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I'll explore if it's possible to have an inconsistent, but ω-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.Fil: Da Re, Bruno. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentin

Inconsistency and the dilemma of intuitionistic research in generative syntax

The paper is a contribution to the current debate on linguistic data and evidence. It raises two questions: (a) What kinds of inconsistency do emerge in generative syntax? (b) How are these kinds of inconsistency to be evaluated with respect to the workability of the syntactic theory at issue? As a first step, a system of paraconsistent logic is introduced which distinguishes between weak and strong inconsistency. While weak inconsistency is harmless, strong inconsistency is destructive. Second, a case study demonstrates that in generative syntax weak inconsistency may be a useful tool of problem solving. Third, two further case studies show that intuition as a data source triggers the emergence of strong inconsistency in generative syntax. Finally, this results in a methodological dilemma with far-reaching consequences

Towards Large-scale Inconsistency Measurement

We investigate the problem of inconsistency measurement on large knowledge bases by considering stream-based inconsistency measurement, i.e., we investigate inconsistency measures that cannot consider a knowledge base as a whole but process it within a stream. For that, we present, first, a novel inconsistency measure that is apt to be applied to the streaming case and, second, stream-based approximations for the new and some existing inconsistency measures. We conduct an extensive empirical analysis on the behavior of these inconsistency measures on large knowledge bases, in terms of runtime, accuracy, and scalability. We conclude that for two of these measures, the approximation of the new inconsistency measure and an approximation of the contension inconsistency measure, large-scale inconsistency measurement is feasible.Comment: International Workshop on Reactive Concepts in Knowledge Representation (ReactKnow 2014), co-located with the 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014). Proceedings of the International Workshop on Reactive Concepts in Knowledge Representation (ReactKnow 2014), pages 63-70, technical report, ISSN 1430-3701, Leipzig University, 2014. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-15056

On Axiomatization of Inconsistency Indicators for Pairwise Comparisons

We examine the notion of inconsistency in pairwise comparisons and propose an axiomatization which is independent of any method of approximation or the inconsistency indicator definition (e.g., Analytic Hierarchy Process, AHP). It has been proven that the eigenvalue-based inconsistency (proposed as a part of AHP) is incorrect.Comment: Enhanced text, with 21 pages and 3 figures, proves that arbitrarily inaccurate pairwise matrices are considered acceptable by theories with a inconsistency based on the principal eigenvalue (e.g., AHP). CPC (corner pairwise comparisons) matrix is the crucial part of this study as it invalidates any eigenvalue-based inconsistency. All comments are highly appreciate

Inconsistency in serial choice decision and motor reaction times dissociate in younger and older adults

Intraindividual variability (inconsistency) in reaction time (RT) latencies was investigated in a group of younger (M = 25.46 years) and older (M = 69.29 years) men. Both groups performed 300 trials in 2-, 4-, and 8-choice RT conditions where RTs for decision and motor components of the task were recorded separately. A dissociation was evident in that inconsistency was greater in older adults for decision RTs when task demands relating to the number of choices and fatigue arising from time-on-task were high. For younger persons, a weak trend toward greater inconsistency in motor RTs was evident. The results are consistent with accounts suggesting that inconsistency in neurobiological mechanisms increases with age, and that attentional lapses or fluctuations in executive control contribute to RT inconsistency