Strategic Issues, Problems and Challenges in Inductive Theorem Proving

Abstract(Automated) Inductive Theorem Proving (ITP) is a challenging field in automated reasoning and theorem proving. Typically, (Automated) Theorem Proving (TP) refers to methods, techniques and tools for automatically proving general (most often first-order) theorems. Nowadays, the field of TP has reached a certain degree of maturity and powerful TP systems are widely available and used. The situation with ITP is strikingly different, in the sense that proving inductive theorems in an essentially automatic way still is a very challenging task, even for the most advanced existing ITP systems. Both in general TP and in ITP, strategies for guiding the proof search process are of fundamental importance, in automated as well as in interactive or mixed settings. In the paper we will analyze and discuss the most important strategic and proof search issues in ITP, compare ITP with TP, and argue why ITP is in a sense much more challenging. More generally, we will systematically isolate, investigate and classify the main problems and challenges in ITP w.r.t. automation, on different levels and from different points of views. Finally, based on this analysis we will present some theses about the state of the art in the field, possible criteria for what could be considered as substantial progress, and promising lines of research for the future, towards (more) automated ITP

Automated Reasoning

This volume, LNAI 13385, constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning, IJCAR 2022, held in Haifa, Israel, in August 2022. The 32 full research papers and 9 short papers presented together with two invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 85 submissions. The papers focus on the following topics: Satisfiability, SMT Solving,Arithmetic; Calculi and Orderings; Knowledge Representation and Jutsification; Choices, Invariance, Substitutions and Formalization; Modal Logics; Proofs System and Proofs Search; Evolution, Termination and Decision Prolems. This is an open access book

Parikh and Wittgenstein

A survey of Parikh’s philosophical appropriations of Wittgensteinian themes, placed into historical context against the backdrop of Turing’s famous paper, “On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (Turing in Proc Lond Math Soc 2(42): 230–265, 1936/1937) and its connections with Wittgenstein and the foundations of mathematics. Characterizing Parikh’s contributions to the interaction between logic and philosophy at its foundations, we argue that his work gives the lie to recent presentations of Wittgenstein’s so-called metaphilosophy (e.g., Horwich in Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) as a kind of “dead end” quietism. From early work on the idea of a feasibility in arithmetic (Parikh in J Symb Log 36(3):494–508, 1971) and vagueness (Parikh in Logic, language and method. Reidel, Boston, pp 241–261, 1983) to his more recent program in social software (Parikh in Advances in modal logic, vol 2. CSLI Publications, Stanford, pp 381–400, 2001a), Parikh’s work encompasses and touches upon many foundational issues in epistemology, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, and value theory. But it expresses a unified philosophical point of view. In his most recent work, questions about public and private languages, opportunity spaces, strategic voting, non-monotonic inference and knowledge in literature provide a remarkable series of suggestions about how to present issues of fundamental importance in theoretical computer science as serious philosophical issues

The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines

Automated Analysis in Generic Groups

This thesis studies automated methods for analyzing hardness assumptions in generic group models, following ideas of symbolic cryptography. We define a broad class of generic and symbolic group models for different settings---symmetric or asymmetric (leveled) k-linear groups - and prove \u27\u27computational soundness\u27\u27 theorems for the symbolic models. Based on this result, we formulate a master theorem that relates the hardness of an assumption to solving problems in polynomial algebra. We systematically analyze these problems identifying different classes of assumptions and obtain decidability and undecidability results. Then, we develop automated procedures for verifying the conditions of our master theorems, and thus the validity of hardness assumptions in generic group models. The concrete outcome is an automated tool, the Generic Group Analyzer, which takes as input the statement of an assumption, and outputs either a proof of its generic hardness or shows an algebraic attack against the assumption. Structure-preserving signatures are signature schemes defined over bilinear groups in which messages, public keys and signatures are group elements, and the verification algorithm consists of evaluating \u27\u27pairing-product equations\u27\u27. Recent work on structure-preserving signatures studies optimality of these schemes in terms of the number of group elements needed in the verification key and the signature, and the number of pairing-product equations in the verification algorithm. While the size of keys and signatures is crucial for many applications, another aspect of performance is the time it takes to verify a signature. The most expensive operation during verification is the computation of pairings. However, the concrete number of pairings is not captured by the number of pairing-product equations considered in earlier work. We consider the question of what is the minimal number of pairing computations needed to verify structure-preserving signatures. We build an automated tool to search for structure-preserving signatures matching a template. Through exhaustive search we conjecture lower bounds for the number of pairings required in the Type~II setting and prove our conjecture to be true. Finally, our tool exhibits examples of structure-preserving signatures matching the lower bounds, which proves tightness of our bounds, as well as improves on previously known structure-preserving signature schemes

Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 Michael Starks 3rd Edition

This collection of articles and reviews are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy and dictatorship appears inevitable. Since philosophy proper is essentially the same as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior), and philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. Although I separate the book into sections on philosophy and psychology, religion, biology, the ‘hard sciences’ and politics/sociology/economics, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problems as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s future. I hope that these essays will help to separate the philosophical issues of language use from the scientific factual issues, and in some small way hinder the collapse of civilization, or at least make it clear why it is doomed. Those wishing to read my other writings may see Talking Monkeys 2nd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Stucture of Human Behavior (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

COSMICAH 2005: workshop on verification of COncurrent Systems with dynaMIC Allocated Heaps (a Satellite event of ICALP 2005) - Informal Proceedings

Lisboa Portugal, 10 July 200