A Game-theoretic Model for Regulating Freeriding in Subsidy-Based Pervasive Spectrum Sharing Markets

Cellular spectrum is a limited natural resource becoming scarcer at a worrisome rate. To satisfy users\u27 expectation from wireless data services, researchers and practitioners recognized the necessity of more utilization and pervasive sharing of the spectrum. Though scarce, spectrum is underutilized in some areas or within certain operating hours due to the lack of appropriate regulatory policies, static allocation and emerging business challenges. Thus, finding ways to improve the utilization of this resource to make sharing more pervasive is of great importance. There already exists a number of solutions to increase spectrum utilization via increased sharing. Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) enables a cellular operator to participate in spectrum sharing in many ways, such as geological database and cognitive radios, but these systems perform spectrum sharing at the secondary level (i.e., the bands are shared if and only if the primary/licensed user is idle) and it is questionable if they will be sufficient to meet the future expectations of the spectral efficiency. Along with the secondary sharing, spectrum sharing among primary users is emerging as a new domain of future mode of pervasive sharing. We call this type of spectrum sharing among primary users as pervasive spectrum sharing (PSS) . However, such spectrum sharing among primary users requires strong incentives to share and ensuring a freeriding-free cellular market. Freeriding in pervasively shared spectrum markets (be it via government subsidies/regulations or self-motivated coalitions among cellular operators) is a real techno-economic challenge to be addressed. In a PSS market, operators will share their resources with primary users of other operators and may sometimes have to block their own primary users in order to attain sharing goals. Small operators with lower quality service may freeride on large operators\u27 infrastructure in such pervasively shared markets. Even worse, since small operators\u27 users may perceive higher-than-expected service quality for a lower fee, this can cause customer loss to the large operators and motivate small operators to continue freeriding with additional earnings from the stolen customers. Thus, freeriding can drive a shared spectrum market to an unhealthy and unstable equilibrium. In this work, we model the freeriding by small operators in shared spectrum markets via a game-theoretic framework. We focus on a performance-based government incentivize scheme and aim to minimize the freeriding issue emerging in such PSS markets. We present insights from the model and discuss policy and regulatory challenges

A Game-Theoretic Framework to Regulate Freeriding in Inter-Provider Spectrum Sharing

Primary-secondary spectrum sharing is limited in terms of design space, and may not be sufficient to meet the ever-increasing demand of connectivity and high signal quality. The next step to increase spectrum sharing efficiency is to design markets where sharing takes place among primary providers rather than leaving it to the limited case where the primary licensee is idle. Attaining contractual spectrum sharing among primary providers, a.k.a. co-primary or inter-provider sharing, involves additional costs for the users, e.g., roaming fee. Co-primary spectrum sharing without additional charge to the users poses two major challenges: a) regulatory approaches must be introduced to incentivize providers to share spectrum resources, and b) small providers in co-primary spectrum sharing markets may freeride on large providers’ networks as the customers of the small providers may be using the spectrum and infrastructure resources of large providers. Such freeriding opportunities must be minimized to realize the benefits of primary-level sharing. We consider a subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) market to facilitate co-primary spectrum sharing where providers are explicitly incentivized to share spectrum resources. We focus on minimizing freeriding in SBSS markets and introduce a game-theoretic model to regulate the freeriding. We use the model to explore operational regimes with minimal freeriding

Incentivizing Transparency: Agricultural Benefit Corporations to Improve Consumer Trust

In the face of inadequate, often abysmal agricultural practices and laws that enable them, producers who provide the social good of transparency should receive a benefit. Amidst the debate that all benefit corporations should qualify for special tax treatment, this Comment proposes the development of a federal benefit corporation class offering special tax treatment to worthy agricultural producers. By reallocating current agricultural subsidies, Congress can feasibly correct the agricultural industry’s failure to adequately inform consumers

Identifying the Potential for Results-Based Financing for Sanitation

Results-based financing (RBF) covers a number of financial tools in which funding is contingent on achieving specified outcomes. RBF has been used across various sectors of international development to some success and this paper explores the potential for applying it to sanitation. In doing so, the author considers the presence of misaligned incentives in the sanitation sector, and then walks us through various points along the value chain at which RBF could be employed. Design and implementation of such strategies requires careful consideration of potential challenges, including how to avoid creating perverse incentives

A Spectrum Sharing Solution for the Efficient Use of mmWave Bands in 5G Cellular Scenarios

Regulators all around the world have started identifying the portions of the spectrum that will be used for the next generation of cellular networks. A band in the mmWave spectrum will be exploited to increase the available capacity. In response to the very high expected traffic demand, a sharing mechanism may make it possible to use the spectrum more efficiently. In this work, moving within the European and Italian regulatory conditions, we propose the use of Licensed Spectrum Access (LSA) to coordinate sharing among cellular operators. Additionally, we show some preliminary results on our research activities which are focused on a dynamic spectrum sharing approach applied in simulated 5G cellular scenarios.Comment: to be published in IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (IEEE DySPAN 2018), Seoul, Korea, Oct, 201

Impacts of City-Level Parking Cash-Out and Commuter Benefits Ordinances

For many workers, the decision to drive to work is an economically rational one that minimizes their commute costs. The vast majority of employers offer free workplace parking, with few in comparison offering benefits for transit, walking, biking, or other means of commuting. In effect, employers are incentivizing a behavior that increases roadway congestion, reduces physical activity, and increases emissions. Moreover, since lower-income households are less likely to own and have access to a private vehicle than moderate and higher-income households, free parking is a financial benefit that many lower-income employees cannot access. Researchers from ICF and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) examined the city-level impacts of parking cash-out. Parking cash-out is a commuter benefits option where employers that provide free or subsidized parking at work also offer employees the option to take an equivalent cash payment, tax-free transit/vanpool benefit, or combination of cash payment and tax-free benefit instead of the parking subsidy. This webinar will present results from a study of five core parking cash-out scenarios applied across a sample of nine cities. The analysis shows substantial potential for reductions in VMT, congestion, emissions, and crashes. Further, the ordinances reflected in some scenarios offer benefits to a greater number of employees, or for a greater number of modes, compared to others. Differences in these offerings have additional implications for equity, which is critical to consider alongside transportation impacts. The work is relevant for city-level policymakers, practitioners, transportation planners, and researchers looking for effective strategies to curb VMT and emissions with safety and equity at top of mind. The topic is also timely, given the recent legislation (H.R. 8555) proposed by House Representative Earl Blumenauer (OR-District 3) that would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to stipulate that a parking benefit is not a qualified parking fringe benefit unless an employer offers employees the option to receive an equivalent cash benefit or alternative tax-exempt benefit in lieu of the parking benefit.https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/trec_seminar/1228/thumbnail.jp

Lawmakers as Job Buyers

In 2013, Washington State authorized the largest state tax incentive for private industry in U.S. history. It is not remarkable for a state legislature to use tax benefits to retain a major employer—in this case, the global aerospace manufacturer Boeing. Laws across all states and thousands of cities routinely incentivize companies such as Amazon to relocate or remain in particular areas. Notably, however, Washington did not recover any of the subsidies it authorized despite Boeing’s significant post-incentive workforce reductions. This story leads to several important questions: (1) How effective are state and local legislatures at influencing business-location decisions?; (2) Do such incentive programs actually achieve their goals of increasing and maintaining jobs?; (3) Is the public protected from imprudent spending? This Article looks specifically at the role of state and local governments in encouraging businesses to locate in their jurisdictions. In such cases, state and local lawmakers act as buyers of jobs. This Article argues for a two-step proposal to limit subnational government actions to incentivize business-location decisions. The first step involves a bidding process where companies are awarded incentives based on the lowest subsidy dollar amount required to create or retain a job of a certain quality or pay rate. The second step involves defining job metrics based on certain preconditions and recapturing incentives should a company fail to maintain or achieve a defined number of job and qualities inherent in each job. This two-step proposal has regulatory benefits and it mollifies the political concern for jurisdictions to appear competitive and the need for public financial protection