3,613 research outputs found

    Understanding collaboration in volunteer computing systems

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    Volunteer computing is a paradigm in which devices participating in a distributed environment share part of their resources to help others perform their activities. The effectiveness of this computing paradigm depends on the collaboration attitude adopted by the participating devices. Unfortunately for software designers it is not clear how to contribute with local resources to the shared environment without compromising resources that could then be required by the contributors. Therefore, many designers adopt a conservative position when defining the collaboration strategy to be embedded in volunteer computing applications. This position produces an underutilization of the devices’ local resources and reduces the effectiveness of these solutions. This article presents a study that helps designers understand the impact of adopting a particular collaboration attitude to contribute with local resources to the distributed shared environment. The study considers five collaboration strategies, which are analyzed in computing environments with both, abundance and scarcity of resources. The obtained results indicate that collaboration strategies based on effort-based incentives work better than those using contribution-based incentives. These results also show that the use of effort-based incentives does not jeopardize the availability of local resources for the local needs.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

    Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

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    Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field

    A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

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    User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

    Federating smart cluster energy grids for peer-to-peer energy sharing and trading

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    With the rapid growth in clean distributed energy resources involving micro-generation and flexible loads, users can actively manage their own energy and have the capability to enter in a market of energy services as prosumers while reducing their carbon footprint. The coordination between these distributed energy resources is essential in order to ensure fair trading and equality in resource sharing among a community of prosumers. Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks can provide the underlying mechanisms for supporting such coordination and offer incentives to prosumers to participate in the energy market. In particular, the federation of energy clusters with P2P networks has the potential to unlock access to energy resources and lead to the development of new energy services in a fast-growing sharing energy economy. In this paper, we present the formation and federation of smart energy clusters using P2P networks with a view to decentralise energy markets and enable access and use of clean energy resources. We implement a P2P framework to support the federation of energy clusters and study the interaction of consumers and producers in a market of energy resources and services. We demonstrate how energy exchanges and energy costs in a federation are influenced by the energy demand, the size of energy clusters and energy types. We conduct our modelling and analysis based on a real fish industry case study in Milford Haven, South Wales, as part of the EU H2020 INTERREG piSCES project
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