143 research outputs found
Interdomain routing and games
We present a game-theoretic model that captures many of the intricacies of \emph{interdomain routing} in today's Internet. In this model, the strategic agents are source nodes located on a network, who aim to send traffic to a unique destination node. The interaction between the agents is dynamic and complex -- asynchronous, sequential, and based on partial information. Best-reply dynamics in this model capture crucial aspects of the only interdomain routing protocol de facto, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). We study complexity and incentive-related issues in this model. Our main results are showing that in realistic and well-studied settings, BGP is incentive-compatible. I.e., not only does myopic behaviour of all players \emph{converge} to a ``stable'' routing outcome, but no player has motivation to unilaterally deviate from the protocol. Moreover, we show that even \emph{coalitions} of players of \emph{any} size cannot improve their routing outcomes by collaborating. Unlike the vast majority of works in mechanism design, our results do not require any monetary transfers (to or by the agents).Interdomain Routing; Network Games; BGP protocol;
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or \emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity (Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol} (BGP). ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}. Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds, then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by \emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size. Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of ASes if the two other constraints hold.Networks; Ex post Nash; Routing; rational manipulation; Border Gateway Protocol; Dispute Wheel
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Using Redundancy to Improve Robustness of Distributed Mechanism Implementations
This paper introduces computation compatibility and communication compatibility as requirements for a distributed mechanism implementation. Just as payments are used to create incentive compatible mechanisms, some technique must be used to create computation/communication compatible mechanisms. This paper explores computation redundancy and communication redundancy as two such techniques. This paper uses interdomain routing as an example domain, and considers where redundancy can succeed and fail in addressing cheating with respect to computation and communication.Engineering and Applied Science
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Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes
It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational nodes, so that no node will choose to deviate. Given a strategyproof centralized mechanism, and given a network of nodes modeled as having rational-manipulation faults, we provide a proof technique to establish the incentive-, communication-, and algorithm-compatibility properties that guarantee that participating nodes are faithful to a suggested specification. As a case study, we apply our methods to extend the strategyproof interdomain routing mechanism proposed by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker (FPSS) [7], defining a faithful implementation.Engineering and Applied Science
Identifier-Based Discovery in Large-Scale Networks
The design of any network mechanism that requires collaboration among selfish agents could only benefit from accounting for the complex social and economic interactions and incentives of the agents using the design. This chapter presents a broad treatment of the main economic issues that arise in the context of identifier-based discovery on large scale networks, particularly on the Internet. An “identified” object (such as a node or service), referred to as a player, demands to be discoverable by the rest of the network on its “identifier”. A discovery scheme provides such a service to the players and incurs a cost for doing so. Providing such a service while accounting for the cost and making sure that the incentives of the players are aligned is the general economic problem that we address in this work. After introducing the identifier-based discovery problem, we present a taxonomy of discovery schemes and proposals based on their business model and we pose several questions that are becoming increasingly important as we proceed to design the inter-network of the future. An incentive model for distributed discovery in the context of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and path-vector protocols in general is then presented. We model BGP route distribution and computation using a game in which a BGP speaker advertises its prefix to its direct neighbors promising them a reward for further distributing the route deeper into the network. The neighbors do the same thing with their direct neighbors, and so on. The result of this cascaded route distribution is a globally advertised prefix and hence discoverability. We present initial results on the existence of equilibria in the game and we motivate our ongoing work
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or
\emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity
(Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of
ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain
routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol}
(BGP).
ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for
their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification
for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show
that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost
all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made
immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to
accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in
the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP
is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}.
Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds,
then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in
ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by
\emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size.
Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in
interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary
transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also
strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the
three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of
ASes if the two other constraints hold
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or
\emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity
(Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of
ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain
routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol}
(BGP).
ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for
their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification
for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show
that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost
all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made
immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to
accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in
the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP
is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}.
Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds,
then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in
ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by
\emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size.
Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in
interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary
transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also
strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the
three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of
ASes if the two other constraints hold
FAIR: Forwarding Accountability for Internet Reputability
This paper presents FAIR, a forwarding accountability mechanism that
incentivizes ISPs to apply stricter security policies to their customers. The
Autonomous System (AS) of the receiver specifies a traffic profile that the
sender AS must adhere to. Transit ASes on the path mark packets. In case of
traffic profile violations, the marked packets are used as a proof of
misbehavior.
FAIR introduces low bandwidth overhead and requires no per-packet and no
per-flow state for forwarding. We describe integration with IP and demonstrate
a software switch running on commodity hardware that can switch packets at a
line rate of 120 Gbps, and can forward 140M minimum-sized packets per second,
limited by the hardware I/O subsystem.
Moreover, this paper proposes a "suspicious bit" for packet headers - an
application that builds on top of FAIR's proofs of misbehavior and flags
packets to warn other entities in the network.Comment: 16 pages, 12 figure
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