1,414 research outputs found
Auction-based Bandwidth Allocation Mechanisms for Wireless Future Internet
An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utilization of
(wireless) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of QoS -
Future Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving towards
an "integrated" wireless network access model that enables users to enjoy
mobility, seamless access and high quality of service in an all-IP network on
an "Anytime, Anywhere" basis. The term "integrated" is used to denote that the
Future Internet wireless "last mile" is expected to comprise multiple
heterogeneous geographically coexisting wireless networks, each having
different capacity and coverage radius. The efficient management of the
wireless access network resources is crucial due to their scarcity that renders
wireless access a potential bottleneck for the provision of high quality
services. In this paper we propose an auction mechanism for allocating the
bandwidth of such a network so that efficiency is attained, i.e. social welfare
is maximized. In particular, we propose an incentive-compatible, efficient
auction-based mechanism of low computational complexity. We define a repeated
game to address user utilities and incentives issues. Subsequently, we extend
this mechanism so that it can also accommodate multicast sessions. We also
analyze the computational complexity and message overhead of the proposed
mechanism. We then show how user bids can be replaced from weights generated by
the network and transform the auction to a cooperative mechanism capable of
prioritizing certain classes of services and emulating DiffServ and time-of-day
pricing schemes. The theoretical analysis is complemented by simulations that
assess the proposed mechanisms properties and performance. We finally provide
some concluding remarks and directions for future research
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Breaking the Economic Barrier of Caching in Cellular Networks: Incentives and Contracts
In this paper, a novel approach for providing incentives for caching in small
cell networks (SCNs) is proposed based on the economics framework of contract
theory. In this model, a mobile network operator (MNO) designs contracts that
will be offered to a number of content providers (CPs) to motivate them to
cache their content at the MNO's small base stations (SBSs). A practical model
in which information about the traffic generated by the CPs' users is not known
to the MNO is considered. Under such asymmetric information, the incentive
contract between the MNO and each CP is properly designed so as to determine
the amount of allocated storage to the CP and the charged price by the MNO. The
contracts are derived by the MNO in a way to maximize the global benefit of the
CPs and prevent them from using their private information to manipulate the
outcome of the caching process. For this interdependent contract model, the
closed-form expressions of the price and the allocated storage space to each CP
are derived. This proposed mechanism is shown to satisfy the sufficient and
necessary conditions for the feasibility of a contract. Moreover, it is shown
that the proposed pricing model is budget balanced, enabling the MNO to cover
all the caching expenses via the prices charged to the CPs. Simulation results
show that none of the CPs will have an incentive to choose a contract designed
for CPs with different traffic loads.Comment: Accepted for publication at Globecom 201
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