Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations of Greenhouse Gas Offsets

Explains the role of carbon offsets in providing flexibility and containing costs in a cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Recommends rigorous quantification, verification, and enforcement criteria to ensure the caps' integrity

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement

The role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector and smallholders to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation: Evidence from Indonesia

While developing countries around the world are preparing to implement REDD+, there is a debate on the possible role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector and smallholder stakeholders in reducing emissions. Drawing on a case of Indonesia, an early leader on REDD+, this paper investigates the role of fiscal instruments in encouraging the private sector to reduce forest-based emissions and the implications for improving the forest sector governance. In particular the study highlights the perspectives of a range of forest sector stakeholders on the role of fiscal instruments that contribute either positively or negatively to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia. The study comprised a review of the existing instruments in Indonesia, as well as surveys and interviews. An online survey and structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with a range of forest sector stakeholders, including government, civil society, academia, and palm oil concession holders. Findings indicate that there is a range of formal and informal fiscal instruments at the various jurisdictional levels, and a variety of incentives and disincentives. More emphasis on cross-sectoral co-ordination, alternatives to commodities such as palm oil, and continued land reform, is required

Flexible Global Carbon Pricing: A Backward-Compatible Upgrade for the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol’s approach of assigning emission targets, or “caps,” promises certainty that it cannot deliver, because it exacerbates problems with international cooperation and commitment. Global carbon pricing addresses these problems and, with less risk and more reward, can generate and sustain stronger policies. This paper proposes a system, “flexible global carbon pricing,” designed to replace the Kyoto Protocol. It provides backward-compatibility with the Kyoto Protocol by allowing un-modified cap and trade as one form of national carbon pricing. Instead of many national “caps,” the proposal sets a global target price for carbon and specifies a pair of incentives. A Pricing Incentive rewards nations that set their carbon price higher than the global target and penalizes nations that underachieve. These rewards and penalties sum to zero by design. The strength of the Pricing Incentive is adjusted automatically so that the global average carbon price converges to the global target price. A Clean Development Incentive (CDI), free from the gaming problems that plague the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism, encourages full participation by low-emission countries. An example, based on a $20 price target, causes transfers from the United States of only seven cents per capita per day. Nevertheless, India’s CDI receipts cover its compliance costs. The example shows that low costs can be guaranteed.Kyoto protocol,cap and trade,flexible global carbon pricing,international cooperation

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement

Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment

Developing countries reject meaningful emission targets (recent intensity caps are no exception), while many industrialized countries insist that developing countries accept them. This impasse has prevented the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for greenhouse gas emissions. This paper presents a solution to this dilemma—allow countries to commit to a binding global carbon-price target. This commitment could be met by cap and trade, a carbon tax, or any combination. This would allow developing countries to accept the same carbon price as the most advanced countries instead of accepting a cap that is as low as U.S. emissions in the 1800s. And it would allow the U.S. and the E.U. to keep their cap and trade schemes. The paper defines a carbon-price target, and shows how compliance could be induced using both carrots and sticks. We also demonstrate that carbon pricing can be guaranteed to be inexpensive under a carbon-price target. A Green Fund is suggested that reinforces rather than subverts cooperation on global carbon pricing. The combined cost of a $30/ton price target and the Green Fund is only 23 cents per person per day for the United States and is negative for India. Together, these advantages should greatly increase the chance that developing countries will commit to a substantial carbon price, and this should increase the chance of cap and trade passing the U.S. Senate. Such a policy would also reduce the world oil price. For China and the United States, this savings might well cover the full cost of the proposed initial climate agreement.Climate change, carbon pricing, cap and trade, carbon auctions

The legal framework for Australia's Carbon Pricing Mechanism: a critique

As part of the Australian Government’s Clean Energy Plan, the Government has attempted to harness the legal innovation of the tradeable emissions unit, within a capped carbon trading system, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such an approach promises to send a price signal to the market which will influence emitting behaviours and reduce our emissions in a cost-effective manner. However, if the carbon trading scheme is to successfully achieve cost-effective emissions reductions then the carbon market must be supported by an appropriate legal framework. This paper will consider the key features of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, including the Carbon Farming Initiative, and critique whether it has all the hallmarks of an effective legal framework to reduce Australia’s net greenhouse gas emissions. The likely future of the trading scheme, following the 2013 elections, will also be addressed