The Risk of Unexploded Ordnance on Construction Sites in London

Greater London, among many large cities, was subject to bombing by the German military in both the World Wars and was the target of many air raids during the Second World War (WW2). This was particularly the case during the Blitz, September 1940 – May 1941, when over 28,000 high explosive bombs and parachute mines were dropped on London. Post war research conducted in 1949 estimated that approximately 12,750 t of bombs, including V1 and V2 rockets, were dropped on London. The night of 16th – 17th April 1941 was one of the worst bombing raids, when 446 t of bombs were dropped on London and over 58 t did not detonate. Unexploded bombs remain buried underground today, as they were unidentified at the time or abandoned owing to difficulties in recovering them. Uncharted bombs continue to pose a potentially significant hazard for developments around London. This paper considers the probability of discovering unexploded ordnance (UXO), particularly WW2 ordnance, during intrusive groundworks in London. The prevalence of unexploded ordnance has been assessed using data obtained from governmental organisations to estimate the likelihood of discovery in London

Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, MTI Report WP 09-02

This report provides data on terrorist attacks against public surface transportation targets and serious crimes committed against such targets throughout the world. The data are drawn from the MTI database of attacks on public surface transportation, which is expanded and updated as information becomes available. This analysis is based on the database as of February 20, 2010. Data include the frequency and lethality with which trains, buses, and road and highway targets are attacked; the relationship between fatalities and attacks against those targets; and the relationship between injuries and attacks against them. The report presents some preliminary observations drawn from the data that can help stakeholder governments, transit managers, and employee to focus on the ways the most frequent and/or most lethal attacks are carried out as they consider measures to prevent or mitigate attacks that may be considered likely to happen in the United State

Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad, MTI Report 04-05

Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for terrorist acts. Today, transit security is widely viewed as an important public policy issue and is a high priority at most large transit systems and at smaller systems operating in large metropolitan areas. Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security by (1) reviewing and synthesizing nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism; (2) conducting detailed case studies of transit systems in London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C.; (3) interviewing federal officials here in the United States responsible for overseeing transit security and transit industry representatives both here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning; and (4) surveying 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States. Our major findings include: (1) the threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal—most major attacks in the developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities; (2) this asymmetry of risk does not square with fiscal politics that seek to spread security funding among many jurisdictions; (3) transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers; (4) coordination and cooperation between security and transit agencies is improving, but far from complete; (5) enlisting passengers in surveillance has benefits, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit; (6) the role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is waxing; and (7) given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related person and property crimes

An Analysis of Selected Clusters of Fires in Florida (1996 - 2018)

Hidden within the day-to-day routine responses of fire departments are possible multiple fires set by individuals in a small area with an unusual frequency. These fires may be the initial announcement of an emerging serial offender who is declaring a wound, an intolerable life situation, or is triggered by unknown events. This study sought to predict incendiary fires within a known cluster by using observable variables, both prior to and after the cluster event. This was done to further our understanding of the characteristics of clusters of intentionally lit fires. This was accomplished by examining the Florida Fire Information Reports (FFIRS) from the Florida State Fire Marshal’s Division and the Augmented Criminal Information (ACISS) reports provided by the Florida Division of Investigative and Forensic Services, Bureau of Fire, Arson and Explosives Investigation from 1996 to 2018. The study surveyed 1,260,369 records from which 45 clusters comprised of 1216 individual fire events were used

Modeling the formation of attentive publics in social media: the case of Donald Trump

Previous research has shown the importance of Donald Trump’s Twitter activity, and that of his Twitter following, in spreading his message during the primary and general election campaigns of 2015–2016. However, we know little about how the publics who followed Trump and amplified his messages took shape. We take this case as an opportunity to theorize and test questions about the assembly of what we call “attentive publics” in social media. We situate our study in the context of current discussions of audience formation, attention flow, and hybridity in the United States’ political media system. From this we derive propositions concerning how attentive publics aggregate around a particular object, in this case Trump himself, which we test using time series modeling. We also present an exploration of the possible role of automated accounts in these processes. Our results reiterate the media hybridity described by others, while emphasizing the importance of news media coverage in building social media attentive publics.Accepted manuscrip

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, June 30, 1946

https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_ebooks/1000/thumbnail.jp

Norwegian People\u27s Aid Weapons Policy

As a field-based organization working in conflict areas and specializing in operations that address weapons and ammunition, NPA has proven that it is well placed to contribute to processes to develop and strengthen international policies, rules, and norms to better protect civilians and the environment from unacceptable harm. Building on the experience of our contributions to the global movements that successfully banned antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions, NPA will continue to have a strong voice on other unresolved or emerging weapons-related issues that call for an international response. Some of the weapons issues for which an NPA policy is set out in this document are threats that NPA works to address on a daily basis through our operations and advocacy. Others are issues where NPA currently is involved to a lesser or less continuous degree; where we stand ready to act if the weapons in question are used in an area where we implement operations; or where we only support the efforts of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but have found it beneficial to clearly formulate NPA’s views. Additional issues of concern other than those mentioned in this document may be taken up where a pressing need is identified and where NPA can make a difference. On the basis of this policy, the collective advocacy efforts of NPA’s head office and our external offices will be tailored to promote greater understanding of specific weapons-related challenges and concrete steps that can be taken to address them, and to influence policy and practice within the UN and other institutions and ultimately within states