20 research outputs found
Monitoring the reliability of integrated circuits protection against Trojans: encoding and decoding of combinational structures
Π ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π½Π° ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΊ ΠΠΠ€-Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Ρ, ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΡ), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π² Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΠΎΡ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ° ΠΏΠ°ΠΌΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°Π³ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°. ΠΡΠΎΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ Π² Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°. ΠΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½Π°Ρ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Ρ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ° ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΡ, Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ±Π΅Π³Π°Ρ ΠΊ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ Π½Π° Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π²Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π²ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
. The paper discusses the features and reliability of logical coding of combinational circuits. An algorithm for cracking the code of combinational circuits is proposed, based on the description of encoded structure by the resolution function and reducing the problem to SAT CNF. The initial data for decoding the structure of a digital device is the structural implementation of encoded circuit, obtained, for example, by reverse engineering (prototype design), as well as an activated physical sample of an integrated circuit, when into protected from unauthorized access memory the correct key value is loaded. This sample can be used as a black box model.
The main idea of breaking a key is to solve a problem without research on a large interval of values of input and
output variables
ΠΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Ρ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΡΡ Π΅ΠΌ ΠΎΡ ΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²: ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡ
Integrated circuits, systems on a chip are the key links in various industrial systems and state defense systems. The emergence of counterfeit integrated circuits, problems of piracy, overproduction, unauthorized interference in the design of microcircuit, hardware Trojans require the development of methods and means of their timely detection. Trojans can be introduced into the integrated circuits structure both on the development stage and during the production process, including the stages of specification, design, verification and manufacturing. The inclusion of additional elements in the integrated circuits structure jeopardizes the functional suitability and reliability of the system as a whole. For the purpose of hardware protection of projects, the methods of hardware coding are currently used.The paper discusses the features and reliability of logical coding of combinational circuits. An algorithm for cracking the code of combinational circuits is proposed, based on the description of encoded structure by the resolution function and reducing the problem to SAT CNF. The initial data for decoding the structure of a digital device is the structural implementation of encoded circuit, obtained, for example, by reverse engineering (prototype design), as well as an activated physical sample of an integrated circuit, when into protected from unauthorized access memory the correct key value is loaded. This sample can be used as a black box model. The main idea of breaking a key is to solve a problem without research on a large interval of values of input and output variables.ΠΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ ΠΈ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Π½Π° ΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΠ°Π»Π»Π΅ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΠΌΠΈ Π·Π²Π΅Π½ΡΡΠΌΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΠΌΡΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΠΎΠ½ΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π³ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΡΠ²Π°. ΠΠΎΡΠ²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ, ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΠΈΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠ²Π°, ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²Π°, Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ΅ Π²ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΎ Π² ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡ ΠΌΠΈΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠΎΡΠ½Ρ ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ² ΠΈΡ
ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΅Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±Π½Π°ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ. Π’ΡΠΎΡΠ½Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΡΡ Π±ΡΡΡ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ΅Π½Ρ Π² ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΈ Π² ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²Π° Π½Π° ΡΡΠ°ΠΏΠ°Ρ
ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ, ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, Π²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΈΠ·Π³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ. ΠΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π² ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ»Π΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΡΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ ΡΠ³ΡΠΎΠ·Ρ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ³ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ Π² ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΎΠΌ. Π‘ ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡ Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠ² Π² Π½Π°ΡΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π΅ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ.Π ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π½Π° ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΊ ΠΠΠ€-Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Ρ, ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΡ), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π² Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΠΎΡ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ° ΠΏΠ°ΠΌΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°Π³ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°. ΠΡΠΎΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ Π² Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°. ΠΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½Π°Ρ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Ρ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ° ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΡ, Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ±Π΅Π³Π°Ρ ΠΊ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ Π½Π° Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π²Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π²ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
Attacking Logic Locked Circuits Using Reinforcement Learning
Logic Locking is an emerging form of hardware obfuscation that is intended to be a solution to many of the trust issues associated with the modern globalized IC supply chain. By inserting extra key-gates into a circuit, the functionality of the circuit can be locked until the correct order of bits or βkeyβ is applied to the key gates. To assess the strength of new logic locking techniques, we propose a new attack that uses deep reinforcement learning. This attack aims to test logic locking as well as evaluate reinforcement learning as a possible attack against logic locking. By using a deep Q-learning neural network, Q-values can be approximated and the model can be trained much faster than using traditional Q-learning. By allowing the model to change a single bit in the key each timestep, simulations of the circuit with the key produced can be run and the outputs can be compared to that of the unlocked version of the circuit, called an oracle. A reward is calculated based on how many bits of the locked circuit are correct and is used to reinforce the learning of the model. During the training phases of the model, the relationship between a highly correct key and how correct the outputs are for some random inputs is not strong, causing the model to struggle to learn quickly
Prevention of hardware attacks in the design and manufacture of integrated circuits
Π Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π½Π° ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΊ ΠΠΠ€-Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΡ), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π² Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΠΎΡ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ° ΠΏΠ°ΠΌΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°Π³ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΠ»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°. ΠΡΠΎΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π² Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°. ΠΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½Π°Ρ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Ρ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ° ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΡ, Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ±Π΅Π³Π°Ρ ΠΊ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ Π½Π° Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π²Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΈ Π²ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
. The features and reliability of logical coding of combinational circuits are considered. An algorithm for cracking the code of combinational schemes is proposed, based on the description of the encoded structure by the resolution function and reducing the problem to KNF-feasibility. The initial data for decoding the structure of a digital device is the structural implementation of the encoded circuit obtained by reverse engineering (prototyping), as well as an activated physical sample of an integrated circuit, in whose memory the correct key value is loaded, protected from unauthorized access. This sample is used as a black box model. The main idea of cracking a key is to solve the problem without resorting to research on a large range of values of input and output variables
Determining security key the hardware for digital devices
Π Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π°Π΄Π΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΡΠ΅Π΄Π»Π°Π³Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠΎΠ΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠ±ΠΈΠ½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π½Π° ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ ΠΊ ΠΠΠ€-Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π»Ρ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½Π°Ρ, Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Ρ, ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ (ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΏΡ), Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°ΠΊΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π³ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡ
Π΅ΠΌΡ, Π² Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΡ ΠΎΡ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏΠ° ΠΏΠ°ΠΌΡΡΡ ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°Π³ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π»ΠΈΠ½Π½ΠΎΠ΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°. ΠΡΠΎΡ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·Π΅Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ Π² Π²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°. ΠΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½Π°Ρ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Ρ Π²Π·Π»ΠΎΠΌΠ° ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ° ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎΠ±Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΡ, Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ±Π΅Π³Π°Ρ ΠΊ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ Π½Π° Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π²Ρ
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