On the Optimality of Reserve Requirements

An implicit rationale for a bank reserve requirement is that a central monetary authority is in a unique position (as "social planner) to impose a "socially superior" outcome to that yielded by a free banking system. We illustrate how this can be true in the context of a simple economy modeled to mimic certain basic characteristics of a monetary economy with banks and agents who trade with one another. Banks exist in our model because by pooling liquidation risks they provide liquidity otherwise unavailable to depositors, which, in turn, provides the incentive - for using deposit claims as the medium of exchange.

Protecting Rights, Preventing Windfalls: A Model for Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens

This Article examines the conflict between state law which permits the creation of security interests in a debtor\u27s after-acquired property--or floating liens --and federal bankruptcy law\u27s potential cutoff of many of those security interests. This conflict arises in virtually every bankruptcy case. However, because of ambiguous statutory language and a failure of the jurisprudence conceptual center. This Article argues that using a model of a debtor in liquidation to analyze the cutoff of floating liens would balance the underlying policy considerations and make judicial outcomes more predictable

Stock markets, growth, and policy

This paper shows how stock markets can accelerate growth and how policy can affect that growth either directly (by altering investment incentives) or indirectly (by changing the incentives underlying the creation of financial contracts). To help explain the role of financial markets in economic development, an endogenous growth model in which a stock market emerges to allocate risk was constructed. The model explores how the stock market alters investment incentives in ways that change steady-state growth rates. This paper demonstrates that stock markets can accelerate growth by: (a) facilitating the ability to trade ownership of firms without disrupting the productive processes occurring within firms; and (b) allowing agents to diversify portfolios across firms.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Growth

Banking: a mechanism design approach

The authors study banking using the tools of mechanism design, without a priori assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Given preferences, technologies, and certain frictions - including limited commitment and imperfect monitoring - they describe the set of incentive feasible allocations and interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that resemble banks. The bankers in the authors' model endogenously accept deposits, and their liabilities help others in making payments. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of feasible allocations would be inferior. The authors discuss how many and which agents play the role of bankers. For example, they show agents who are more connected to the market are better suited for this role since they have more to lose by reneging on obligations. The authors discuss some banking history and compare it with the predictions of their theory.Banks and banking

Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity

This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.Deposit insurance ; Liquidity (Economics)

Liquidity crunch in the interbank market: is it credit or liquidity risk, or both?

The interplay between liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market is analyzed. Banks are hit by idiosyncratic random liquidity shocks. The market may also be hit by a bad news at a future date, implying the insolvency of some participants and creating a lemon problem; this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. Anticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some illiquid assets. Then banks currently short of liquidity may prefer to borrow short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007- 2009 liquidity crunch affecting the money market at the international level: (i) high spreads between interest rates at different maturities; (ii) "flight to overnight" in traded volumes; (iii) ineffectiveness of open market operations, leading the central banks to introduce some relevant innovations into their operational framework.Global financial crisis, Money market, Liquidity, Central banking.

Financial structures and economic development

The author constructs a model that captures the two-way nature of the relationship between financial and economic development - and allows societies at different levels of economic development and with different policies to choose different financial services. In this model, various types of financial contracts and institutions arise in response to the economic environment. Incentives for financial structures to emerge are generated by liquidity and productivity risk, the costs of gathering information and mobilizing resources, and the costs of financial transactions. The emergence and development of financial arrangements in response to the economic environment can alter investment decisions and per capita growth rates - while the level of per capita income helps determine the types of financial services a particular society chooses to develop and use. The author not only reconciles more empirical regularities than past theoretical studies have done, but highlights the role of public policies on financial activities. Policy has important implications for the rate of economic growth, the level of financial development, and the types of institutions providing financial services. The model also predicts that per capita growth rates should be related to the types of financial services provided by the financial sector. Thus, the most common empirical measure of financial development may not appropriately capture fundamental features of financial development.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Governance Indicators

Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation

This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.incomplete financial contracting, cross-border financial services, multinational banking, liquidity allocation, capital regulation

Liquidity Shortages and Monetary Policy

The paper models the interaction between risk taking in the financial sector and central bank policy. It shows that in the absence of central bank intervention, the incentive of financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states may result in excessively low liquidity in bad states. In the prevailing mixed-strategy equilibrium, depositors are worse off than if banks would coordinate on more liquid investment. It is shown that public provision of liquidity improves the allocation, even though it encourages more risk taking (less liquid investment) by private banks

Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crisis and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses and intra- and inter-country income inequality, in the non-cooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, no burden sharing and free-riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare.bailout, contagion, financial crisis, international institutional arrangements