Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

Douglas W. Diamond
Theodore O. Yntema Professor
of Finance
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago

Philip H. Dybvig
Boatmen's Bancshares Professor
of Banking and Finance
John M. Olin School of Business
Washington University in St. Louis

Abstract

This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.

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This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.

Bank runs are a common feature of the extreme crises that have played a prominent role in monetary history. During a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail. In fact, the sudden withdrawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss and to fail. During a panic with many bank failures, there is a disruption of the monetary system and a reduction in production.

Institutions in place since the Great Depression have successfully prevented bank runs in the United States since the 1930s. Nonetheless, current deregulation and the dire financial condition of savings and loan associations make bank runs and institutions to prevent them a current policy issue, as shown by recent aborted runs. Internationally, Eurodollar deposits tend to be uninsured and are therefore subject to runs, and this is true in the United States as well for deposits above the insured amount.) It is good that deregulation will leave banking more competitive, but policymakers must ensure that banks will not be left vulnerable to runs.

Through careful description and analysis, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide substantial insight into the properties of past bank runs in the United States. Existing theoretical analysis has neglected to explain why bank contracts are less stable than other types of financial contracts or to investigate the strategic decisions that depositors face. The model we present has an explicit economic role for banks to perform: the transformation of illiquid claims (bank assets) into liquid claims (demand deposits). The analyses of Patinkin (1965, chap. 5), Tobin (1965), and Niehans (1978) provide insights into characterizing the liquidity of assets. This article gives the first explicit analysis of the demand for liquidity and the transformation service provided by banks. Uninsured demand deposit contracts are able to provide liquidity, but leave banks vulnerable to runs. This vulnerability occurs because there are multiple equilibria with differing levels of confidence.

Our model demonstrates three important points. First, banks issuing demand deposits can improve on a competitive market by providing better risk-sharing among people who need to consume at different random times. Second, the demand deposit contract providing this improvement has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in which all depositors panic and withdraw immediately, including even those who would prefer to leave their deposits in if they were not concerned about the bank failing. Third, bank runs cause real economic problems because even healthy banks can fail, causing the recall of loans and the termination of productive investment. In addition, our model provides a suitable framework for analyzing the devices traditionally used to stop or prevent bank runs, namely, suspension of convertibility and demand deposit insurance (which works similarly to a central bank serving as lender of last resort).

The illiquidity of assets enters our model through the economy’s riskless production activity. The technology provides low levels of output per unit of input if operated for a single period, but high levels of output if operated for two periods. The analysis would be the same if the asset were illiquid because of selling costs: one receives a low return if unexpectedly forced to liquidate early. In fact, this illiquidity is a property of the financial assets in the economy in our model, even though they are traded in competitive markets with no transaction costs. Agents will be concerned about the cost of being forced into early liquidation of these assets and will write contracts which reflect this cost. Investors face private risks which are not directly insurable because they are not publicly verifiable. Under optimal risk-sharing, this private risk implies that agents have different time patterns of return in different private information states and that agents want to allocate wealth unequally across private information states. Because only the agent ever observes the private information state, it is impossible to write insurance contracts in which the payoff depends directly on private information without an explicit mechanism for information flow. Therefore, simple competitive markets cannot provide this liquidity insurance.

Banks are able to transform illiquid assets by offering liabilities with a different, smoother pattern of returns over time than the illiquid assets offer. These contracts have multiple equilibria. If confidence is maintained, there can be efficient risk-sharing, because in that equilibrium a withdrawal will indicate that a depositor should withdraw under optimal risk-sharing. If agents panic, there is a bank run and incentives are distorted. In that equilibrium, everyone rushes in to withdraw their deposits before the bank gives out all of its assets. The bank must liquidate all its assets, even if not all depositors withdraw, because liquidated assets are sold at a loss.

Illiquidity of assets provides the rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs. An important property of our model of banks and bank runs is that runs are costly and reduce social welfare by interrupting production (when loans are called) and by destroying optimal risk-sharing among depositors. Runs in many banks would cause economywide economic problems. This is consistent with the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) observation of large costs imposed on the U.S. economy by the bank runs in the 1930s, although Friedman and Schwartz assert that the real damage from bank runs occurred through the money supply.

Another contrast with our view of how bank runs do economic damage is discussed by Fisher (1911, p. 64) and Bryant (1980). In this view, a run occurs because the bank’s assets, which are liquid but risky, no longer cover the nominally fixed liability (demand deposits), so depositors withdraw quickly to cut their losses. The real losses are indirect, through the loss of collateral caused by falling prices. In contrast, a bank run in our model is caused by a shift in expectations, which could depend on almost anything, consistent with the apparently irrational observed behavior of people running on banks.

We analyze bank contracts that can prevent runs and examine their optimality. We show that there is a feasible
contract that allows banks both to prevent runs and to provide optimal risk-sharing by converting illiquid assets. The contract corresponds to suspension of convertibility of deposits (to currency), a weapon banks have historically used against runs. Under other conditions, the best contract that banks can offer (roughly, the suspension-of-convertibility contract) does not achieve optimal risk-sharing. However, in this more general case, there is a contract which achieves the unconstrained optimum when government deposit insurance is available. Deposit insurance is shown to be able to rule out runs without reducing the ability of banks to transform assets. What is crucial is that deposit insurance frees the asset liquidation policy from strict dependence on the volume of withdrawals. Other institutions such as the discount window (the government acting as lender of last resort) can serve a similar function; however, we do not model this here. The taxation authority of the government makes it a natural provider of the insurance, although there may be a competitive fringe of private insurance.

Government deposit insurance can improve on the best allocations that private markets provide. Most of the existing literature on deposit insurance assumes away any real service from deposit insurance, concentrating instead on the question of pricing the insurance, taking as given the likelihood of failure. (See, for example, Merton 1977, 1978; Kareken and Wallace 1978; Dothan and Williams 1980.)

Our results have far-reaching policy implications, because they imply that the real damage from bank runs is primarily from the direct damage occurring when production is interrupted by the recalling of loans. This implies that much of the economic damage in the Great Depression was caused directly by bank runs. A study by Bernanke (1983) supports our thesis; it shows that the number of bank runs is a better predictor of economic distress than the money supply.

The Bank's Role in Providing Liquidity

Banks have issued demand deposits throughout their history, and economists have long had the intuition that demand deposits are a vehicle through which banks fulfill their role of turning illiquid claims into liquid claims. In this role, banks can be viewed as providing insurance that allows agents to consume when they need to most. Our simple model shows that asymmetric information lies at the root of liquidity demand, a point not explicitly noted in the previous literature.

The model has three periods ($T = 0, 1, 2$) and a single homogeneous good. The productive technology yields $R > 1$ units of output in period 2 for each unit of input in period 0. If production is interrupted in period 1, the salvage value is just the initial investment. Therefore, the productive technology is represented by

\[
\begin{align*}
T = 0 & & T = 1 & & T = 2 \\
(1) & & -1 & & 0 & & R
\end{align*}
\]

where the choice between $(0, R)$ and $(1, 0)$ is made in period 1. (Of course, constant returns to scale imply that a fraction can be done in each option.)

One interpretation of the technology is that long-term capital investments are somewhat irreversible, which appears to be a reasonable characterization. The results would be reinforced (or can be alternatively motivated) by any type of transaction cost associated with selling a bank's assets before maturity. See Diamond 1984 for a model of the costly monitoring of loan contracts by banks, which implies such a cost.

All consumers are identical as of period 0. Each faces a privately observed, uninsurable risk of being of type 1 or of type 2. In period 1, each agent's type is determined and conditional on which type each agent is, that is, $\theta$. Later sections will allow this identical position of each agent at period 1 plus what the agent obtains at period 1, or $c_1 + c_2$. In terms of this publicly observed variable $c_j$, the discussion above implies that each agent $j$ has a state-dependent utility function (with the state private information), which we assume has the form

\[
(2) \quad U(c_1, c_2; \theta) = \begin{cases} 
  u(c_1) & \text{if } j \text{ is of type 1 in state } \theta \\
  \rho u(c_1 + c_2) & \text{if } j \text{ is of type 2 in state } \theta
\end{cases}
\]

where $1 \geq \rho > R^{-1}$ and $u : R_{++} \rightarrow R$ is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave and satisfies Inada conditions $u'(0) = \infty$ and $u'(\infty) = 0$. Also, we assume that the relative risk-aversion coefficient $-cu''(c) \div u'(c) > 1$ everywhere. Agents maximize expected utility, $E[u(c_1, c_2; \theta)]$, conditional on their information (if any).

A fraction $t \in (0, 1)$ of the continuum of agents are of type 1, and conditional on $t$, each agent has an equal and independent chance of being of type 1. Later sections will allow $t$ to be random (in which case, at period 1, consumers know their own types but not $t$), but for now we take $t$ to be constant.

To complete the model, we give each consumer an endowment of one unit in period 0 (and none at other times). We consider first the competitive solution where agents hold the assets directly, and in each period there is a competitive market in claims on future goods. Constant returns to scale imply that prices are determined: the period 0 price of period 1 consumption is one, and the period 0 and period 1 prices of period 2 consumption are $R^{-1}$. This is because agents can write only contingent contracts, since there is no public information on which to condition. Contracting in period $T = 0$, all agents (who are then identical) will establish the same trades and will invest their endowments in the production technology. Given this identical position of each agent at $T = 0$, there will be trade in claims on goods for consumption at $T = 1$ and at $T = 2$. Each has access to the same technology, and each can choose any positive linear combination of $c_1 = \ldots
1 and \( c_2 = R \). Each agent’s production set is proportional to the aggregate set, and for there to be positive production of both \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \), the period \( T = 1 \) price of \( c_2 \) must be \( R^{-1} \). Given these prices, there is never any trade, and agents can do no better or worse than if they produced only for their own consumption. Let \( c_1' \) be consumption in period \( k \) of an agent who is of type \( i \). Then the agents choose \( c_1' = 1 \), \( c_1' = c_2' = 0 \), and \( c_2' = R \), since type 1s always interrupt production but type 2s never do.

By comparison, if types were publicly observable as of period 1, it would be possible to write optimal insurance contracts that give the ex ante (as of period 0) optimal sharing of output between type 1 and type 2 agents. The optimal consumption \( \{c_2'\} \) satisfies

\[
(3) \quad c_1^{2*} = c_1^* = 0
\]

(which says, those who can, delay consumption),

\[
(4) \quad u'(c_1^{2*}) = \rho Ru'(c_2^{2*})
\]

(which says, marginal utility is in line with marginal productivity), and

\[
(5) \quad \alpha c_1^* + [(1-\alpha)c_2^{2*}/R] = 1
\]

(which is the resource constraint). By assumption, \( \rho R > 1 \), and since relative risk aversion always exceeds utility, equations (3)-(5) imply that the optimal consumption levels satisfy \( c_1^{2*} > 1 \) and \( c_2^{2*} < R^{-1} \). Therefore, there is room for improvement on the competitive outcome \( (c_1^* = 1 \) and \( c_2^* = R \). Also, note that \( c_2^* > c_1^* \) by equation (4), since \( \rho R > 1 \).

The optimal insurance contract just described would allow agents to insure against the unlucky outcome of being a type 1 agent. This contract is not available in the simple contingent-claims market. Also, the lack of observability of agents’ types rules out a complete market of Arrow-Debreu state-contingent claims, because this market would require claims that depend on the nonverifiable private information. Fortunately, it is potentially possible to achieve the optimal insurance contract, since the optimal contract satisfies the self-selection constraints. We argue that banks can provide this insurance: by providing liquidity, banks guarantee a reasonable return when the investor cashes in before maturity, as is required for optimal risk-sharing. To illustrate how banks provide this insurance, we first examine the traditional demand deposit contract, which is of particular interest because of its ubiquitous use by banks. Studying the demand deposit contract in our framework also indicates why banks are susceptible to runs.

In our model, the demand deposit contract gives each agent withdrawing in period 1 a fixed claim of \( r_1 \) per unit deposited in period 0. Withdrawal tenders are served sequentially in random order until the bank runs out of assets. This approach allows us to capture the flavor of continuous time (in which depositors deposit and withdraw at different random times) in a discrete model. Note that the demand deposit contract satisfies a sequential service constraint, which specifies that a bank’s payoff to any agent can depend only on the agent’s place in line and not on future information about agents later in line.

We are assuming throughout this article that the bank is mutually owned (a mutual) and liquidated in period 2, so that agents not withdrawing in period 1 get a pro rata share of the bank’s assets in period 2. Let \( V_1 \) be the period 1 payoff per unit of deposit withdrawn, which depends on one’s place in line at \( T = 1 \), and let \( V_2 \) be the period 2 payoff per unit of deposit not withdrawn at \( T = 2 \), which depends on total withdrawals at \( T = 1 \). These are given by

\[
(6) \quad V_1(f, r_1) = \begin{cases} 
  r_1 & \text{if } f < r_1^{-1} \\
  0 & \text{if } f \geq r_1^{-1} 
\end{cases}
\]

and

\[
(7) \quad V_2(f, r_1) = \max\{R(1-r_1)/f(1-f), 0\}
\]

where \( f_j \) is the quantity of withdrawers’ deposits serviced before agent \( j \) and \( f \) is the total quantity of demand deposits withdrawn, both as fractions of total demand deposits. Let \( w_j \) be the fraction of agent \( j \)’s deposits that the agent attempts to withdraw at \( T = 1 \). The consumption from deposit proceeds, per unit of deposit of a type 1 agent, is thus given by \( w_j V_1(f_j, r_1) \), while the total consumption from deposit proceeds, per unit of deposit of a type 2 agent, is given by \( w_j V_1(f_j, r_1) + (1-w_j)V_2(f, r_1) \).

**Equilibrium Decisions**

The demand deposit contract can achieve the full-information optimal risk-sharing as an equilibrium. (By equilibrium, we will always refer to pure strategy Nash equilibrium—and for now we will assume that all agents are required to deposit initially.) This occurs when \( r_1 = c_1^* \), that is, when the fixed payment per dollar of deposits withdrawn at \( T = 1 \) is equal to the optimal consumption of a type 1 agent given full information. If this contract is in place, it is an equilibrium for type 1 agents to withdraw at \( T = 1 \) and for type 2 agents to wait, provided this is what is anticipated. This good equilibrium achieves optimal risk-sharing.

Another equilibrium (a bank run) has all agents panicking and trying to withdraw their deposits at \( T = 1 \): if this is anticipated, all agents will prefer to withdraw at \( T = 1 \). This is because the face value of deposits is larger than the liquidation value of the bank’s assets.

It is precisely the transformation of illiquid claims into liquid claims that is responsible both for the liquidity service provided by banks and for their susceptibility to runs. For all \( r_1 > 1 \), runs are an equilibrium. If \( r_1 = 1 \), a bank would not be susceptible to runs because \( V_1(f_j, 1) < V_2(f, 1) \) for all values of \( 0 \leq f \leq f \), but if \( r_1 = 1 \), the bank simply mimics direct holding of the assets, and the bank is therefore no improvement on simple competitive-claims markets. A demand deposit contract which is not subject to runs provides no liquidity services.

The bank run equilibrium provides allocations that are worse for all agents than they would have obtained without the bank (trading in the competitive-claims market). In the bank run equilibrium, everyone receives a risky return that has a mean of one. Holding assets directly provides a riskless return that is at least one (and equal to \( R > 1 \) if an agent becomes a type 2). Bank runs ruin the risk-sharing between agents and take a toll on the efficiency of production because all production is interrupted at \( T = 1 \), when it is optimal for some to continue until \( T = 2 \).

If we take the position that outcomes must match anticipations, the inferiority of bank runs seems to rule out
observed runs, since no one would deposit anticipating a run. However, agents will choose to deposit at least some of their wealth in the bank even if they anticipate a positive probability of a run, provided that the probability is small enough, because the good equilibrium dominates holding assets directly. This could happen if the selection between the bank run equilibrium and the good equilibrium depended on some commonly observed random variable in the economy. This could be a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative government forecast, or even sunspots. (Analysis of this point in a general setting is given in Azariadis 1981 and Cass and Shell 1983.) The observed variable need not convey anything fundamental about the bank’s condition. The problem is that once agents have deposited, anything that causes them to anticipate a run will lead to a run. This implies that banks with pure demand deposit contracts will be very concerned about maintaining confidence because they realize that the good equilibrium is very fragile.

The pure demand deposit contract is feasible, and we have seen that it can attract deposits even if the perceived probability of a run is positive. This explains why the contract has actually been used by banks in spite of the danger of runs. Next, we examine a closely related contract that can help to eliminate the problem of runs.

**Improving on Demand Deposits: Suspension of Convertibility**

The pure demand deposit contract has a good equilibrium that achieves the full-information optimum when \( t \) is not stochastic. However, in its bank run equilibrium, the pure demand deposit contract is worse than direct ownership of assets. It is illuminating to begin the analysis of optimal bank contracts by demonstrating that there is a simple variation on the demand deposit contract which gives banks a defense against runs: suspension of allowing withdrawal of deposits, referred to as suspension of convertibility (of deposits to cash). Our results are consistent with the claim by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that in the 1930s, the newly organized Federal Reserve Board may have made runs worse by preventing banks from suspending convertibility: the total week-long banking “holiday” that followed was more severe than any of the previous suspensions.

If banks can suspend convertibility when withdrawals are too numerous at \( T = 1 \), anticipation of this policy prevents runs by removing the incentive of type 2 agents to withdraw early. The following contract is identical to the pure demand deposit contract described in equations (6) and (7), except that it states that agents will receive nothing at \( T = 1 \) if they attempt to withdraw at \( T = 1 \) after a fraction \( \hat{f} < r_1^{-1} \) of all deposits have already been withdrawn. Note that we redefine \( V_f(\cdot) \) and \( V_2(\cdot) \):

\[
V_1(f, r_1) = \begin{cases} 
  r_1 & \text{if } f \leq \hat{f} \\
  0 & \text{if } f > \hat{f}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
V_2(f, r_1) = \max \{(1-f r_1)R/(1-f), (1-\hat{r}_1)R/(1-\hat{f})\}
\]

where the expression for \( V_2 \) assumes that \( 1 - \hat{r}_1 > 0 \).

Convertibility is suspended when \( f = \hat{f} \), and then no one else in line is allowed to withdraw at \( T = 1 \). To demonstrate that this contract can achieve the optimal allocation, let \( r_1 = c_{1^*}^{t} \), and choose any \( \hat{f} \in \{t, (R-r_1)/(R-1)\} \). Given this contract, no type 2 agent will withdraw at \( T = 1 \) because no matter what the agent anticipates about others’ withdrawals, the agent receives higher proceeds by waiting until \( T = 2 \) to withdraw; that is, for all \( f \) and \( f_j \leq f \), \( V_2(f) > V_1(f) \). All of the type 1s will withdraw everything in period 1 because period 2 consumption is worthless to them. Therefore, there is a unique Nash equilibrium which has \( f = t \). In fact, this is a dominant strategy equilibrium, because each agent will choose the equilibrium action even if it is anticipated that other agents will choose nonequilibrium or even irrational actions. This makes this contract very stable. This equilibrium is essentially the good demand deposit equilibrium that achieves optimal risk-sharing.

A policy of suspension of convertibility at \( \hat{f} \) guarantees that it will never be profitable to participate in a bank run because the liquidation of the bank’s assets is terminated while type 2s still have an incentive not to withdraw. This contract works perfectly only in the case where the normal volume of withdrawals, \( t \), is known and not stochastic. The more general case, where \( t \) can vary, is analyzed next.

**Optimal Contracts With Stochastic Withdrawals**

The suspension-of-convertibility contract achieves optimal risk-sharing when \( t \) is known ex ante because suspension never occurs in equilibrium, and the bank can follow the optimal asset liquidation policy. This is possible because the bank knows exactly how many withdrawals will occur when confidence is maintained. We now allow the fraction of type 1s to be an unobserved random variable, \( \tilde{t} \). We consider a general class of bank contracts where payments to those who withdraw at \( T = 1 \) are any function of \( f_j \) and payments to those who withdraw at \( T = 2 \) are any function of \( \tilde{f} \). Analyzing this general class will show the shortcomings of suspension of convertibility.

The full-information optimal risk-sharing is the same as before, except that in equations (3)–(5), the actual realization of \( \tilde{t} = t \) is used in place of the fixed \( t \). Since no single agent has information crucial to learning the value of \( t \), the arguments of footnote 2 still show that optimal risk-sharing is consistent with self-selection, so there must be some mechanism which has optimal risk-sharing as a Nash equilibrium. We now explore whether banks (which are subject to the constraint of sequential service) can do this too.

From equations (3)–(5), we obtain full-information optimal consumption levels, given the realization of \( \tilde{t} = t \), of \( c_{1^*}^{t} \) and \( c_{2^*}^{t} \). Recall that \( c_{1^*}^{t} \) and \( c_{2^*}^{t} \) are equal to 0. At the optimum, consumption is equal for all agents of a given type and depends on the realization of \( t \). This implies a unique optimal asset liquidation policy given \( \tilde{t} = t \). This turns out to imply that uninsured bank deposit contracts cannot achieve optimal risk-sharing.

**PROPOSITION 1.** Bank contracts (which must obey the sequential service constraint) cannot achieve optimal risk-sharing when \( t \) is stochastic and has a nondegenerate distribution.

Proposition 1 holds for all equilibria of uninsured bank contracts of the general form \( V_1(\tilde{f}) \) and \( V_2(\tilde{f}) \), where these can be any functions. It obviously remains true that uninsured pure demand deposit contracts are subject to runs. Any run equilibrium does not achieve optimal risk-sharing, because both types of agents receive the same consumption. Consider the good equilibrium for any fea-
possible contract. We prove that no bank contract can attain the full-information optimal risk-sharing. The proof is straightforward, a two-part proof by contradiction. Recall that the place in line $f$ is uniformly distributed over $[0, t]$ if only type 1 agents withdraw at $T = 1$. First, suppose that the payments to those who withdraw at $T = 1$ is a nonconstant function of $f$, over feasible values of $t$: for two possible values of $i$, $t_1$ and $t_2$, the value of a period 1 withdrawal varies; that is, $V_i(t_1) \neq V_i(t_2)$. This immediately implies that there is a positive probability of different consumption levels by two type 1 agents who will withdraw at $T = 1$, and this contradicts an unconstrained optimum. Second, assume the contrary: that for all possible realizations of $i = t$, $V_i(f)$ is constant for all $f \in [0, t]$. This implies that $c_1^i(t)$ is a constant independent of the realization of $i$, while the budget constraint, equation (5), shows that $c_1^i(t)$ will vary with $t$ (unless $r_1 = 1$, which is itself inconsistent with optimal risk-sharing). Constant $c_1^i(t)$ and varying $c_2^i(t)$ contradict optimal risk-sharing, equation (4). Thus, optimal risk-sharing is inconsistent with sequential service.

Proposition 1 implies that no bank contract, including suspension of convertibility, can achieve the full-information optimum. Nonetheless, suspension can generally improve on the uninsured demand deposit contract by preventing runs. The main problem occurs when convertibility is suspended in equilibrium, that is, when the point $f$ where suspension occurs is less than the largest possible realization of $i$. In that case, some type 1 agents cannot withdraw, which is inefficient ex post. This can be desirable ex ante, however, because the threat of suspension prevents runs and allows a relatively high value of $r_1$. This result is consistent with contemporary views about suspension in the United States in the period before deposit insurance. Although suspensions served to short-circuit runs, they were “regarded as anything but a satisfactory solution by those who experienced them, which is why they produced such strong pressure for monetary and banking reform” (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 329).

The most important reform that followed was government deposit insurance. Its impact is analyzed in the next section.

**Government Deposit Insurance**

Deposit insurance provided by the government allows bank contracts that can dominate the best that can be offered without insurance and never do worse. We need to introduce deposit insurance into the analysis in a way that keeps the model closed and assures that no aggregate resource constraints are violated. Deposit insurance guarantees that the promised return will be paid to all who withdraw. If this is a guarantee of a real value, the amount that can be guaranteed is constrained: the government must impose real taxes to honor a deposit guarantee. If the deposit guarantee is nominal, the tax is the (inflation) tax on nominal assets caused by money creation. (Such taxation occurs even if no inflation results; in any case, the price level is higher than it would have been otherwise, so some nominally denominated wealth is appropriated.) Because a private insurance company is constrained by its reserves in the scale of unconditional guarantees which it can offer, we argue that deposit insurance probably ought to be governmental for this reason. Of course, the deposit guarantee could be made by a private organization with some authority to tax or create money to pay deposit insurance claims, although we would usually think of such an organization as being a branch of government. However, there can be a small competitive fringe of commercially insured deposits, limited by the amount of private collateral.

The government is assumed to be able to levy any tax that charges every agent in the economy the same amount. In particular, it can tax those agents who withdrew early in period $T = 1$, namely, those with low values of $f$. How much tax must be raised depends on how many deposits are withdrawn at $T = 1$ and what amount $r_1$ was promised to depositors. For example, if every deposit of one dollar were withdrawn at $T = 1$ (implying $f = 1$) and $r_1 = 2$ were promised, a tax of at least one per capita would need to be raised because totally liquidating the bank’s assets will raise at most one per capita at $T = 1$. As the government can impose a tax on an agent who has withdrawn, the government can base its tax on $f$, the realized total value of $T = 1$ withdrawals. This is in marked contrast to a bank, which must provide sequential service and cannot reduce the amount of a withdrawal after it has been made. This asymmetry allows a potential benefit from government intervention. The realistic sequential service constraint represents some services that a bank provides but which we do not explicitly model. With deposit insurance, we will see that imposing this constraint does not reduce social welfare.

Agents are concerned with the after-tax value of the proceeds from their withdrawals because that is the amount that they can consume. A very strong result (which may be too strong) about the optimality of deposit insurance will illuminate the more general reasons it is desirable. We argue in the conclusion that deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve discount window provide nearly identical services in the context of our model, but we confine discussion here to deposit insurance.

**Proposition 2.** Demand deposit contracts with government deposit insurance achieve the unconstrained optimum as a unique Nash equilibrium (in fact, a dominant strategies equilibrium) if the government imposes an optimal tax to finance the deposit insurance.

Proposition 2 follows from the ability of tax-financed deposit insurance to duplicate the optimal consumptions $c_1^i(t) = c_1^i(t), c_2^i(t) = c_2^i(t), c_3^i(t) = 0, c_4^i(t) = 0$ from the optimal risk-sharing characterized in equations (3)–(5). Let the government impose a tax on all wealth held at the beginning of period $T = 1$, which is payable either in goods or in deposits. Let deposits be accepted for taxes at the pretax amount of goods which could be obtained if withdrawn at $T = 1$. The amount of tax that must be raised at $T = 1$ depends on the number of withdrawals and the asset liquidation policy. Consider the proportionate tax as a function of $f$: $\tau : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ given by

$$
\tau(f) = \begin{cases} 
1 - [c_1^i(f)/r_1] & \text{if } f \leq \tilde{r} \\
1 - \tilde{r}_1^{-1} & \text{if } f > \tilde{r}
\end{cases}
$$

where $\tilde{r}$ is the greatest possible realization of $\tilde{r}$.

The after-tax proceeds, per dollar of initial deposit, of a withdrawal at $T = 1$ depend on $f$ through the tax payment and are identical for all $f \leq f$. Denote these after-tax proceeds by $V_1(f)$, given by
\[
\tilde{V}_t(f) = \begin{cases} 
    c_1^*(f) & \text{if } f \leq \tilde{t} \\
    1 & \text{if } f > \tilde{t}.
\end{cases}
\]

The net payments to those who withdraw at \( T = 1 \) determine the asset liquidation policy and the after-tax value of a withdrawal at \( T = 2 \). Any tax collected in excess of that needed to meet withdrawals at \( T = 1 \) is plowed back into the bank (to minimize the fraction of assets liquidated). This implies that the after-tax proceeds, per dollar of initial deposit, of a withdrawal at \( T = 2 \), denoted by \( \tilde{V}_2(f) \), are given by

\[
\tilde{V}_2(f) = \begin{cases} 
    R[1 - \{c_1^*(f)\}] / (1-f) & \text{if } f \leq \tilde{t} \\
    R(1-f) / (1-f) & \text{if } f > \tilde{t}.
\end{cases}
\]

Notice that \( \tilde{V}_1(f) < \tilde{V}_2(f) \) for all \( f \in [0,1] \), implying that no type 2 agents will withdraw at \( T = 1 \) no matter what they expect others to do. For all \( f \in [0,1] \), \( \tilde{V}_1(f) > 0 \), implying that all type 1 agents will withdraw at \( T = 1 \). Therefore, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium is \( f = t \), the realization of \( \tilde{t} \). Evaluated at a realization \( t \),

\[
\tilde{V}_1(f = t) = c_1^*(t)
\]

and

\[
\tilde{V}_2(f = t) = [1 - t c_1^*(t)] R / (1-t) = c_2^*(t)
\]

and the optimum is achieved.

Proposition 2 highlights the key social benefit of government deposit insurance. This insurance allows the bank to follow a desirable asset liquidation policy, which can be separated from the cash-flow constraint imposed directly by withdrawals. Furthermore, deposit insurance prevents runs because, for all possible anticipated withdrawal policies of other agents, participating in a bank run never pays. As a result, no strategic issues of confidence arise. This is a general result of many deposit insurance schemes. The proposition may be too strong, since it allows the government to follow an unconstrained tax policy. If a nonoptimal tax must be imposed, then when \( t \) is stochastic, there will be some tax distortions and resource costs associated with government deposit insurance. If a sufficiently perverse tax provided the revenues for insurance, social welfare could be higher without the insurance.

Deposit insurance can be provided costlessly in the simpler case where \( t \) is nonstochastic, for the same reason that there need not be a suspension of convertibility in equilibrium. The deposit insurance guarantees that type 2 agents will never participate in a run; without runs, withdrawals are deterministic, and this feature is never used. In particular, as long as the government can impose some tax to finance the insurance, no matter how distortionary, there will be no runs and the distorting tax need never be imposed. This feature is shared by a model of adoption externalities in which a Pareto-inferior equilibrium can be averted by an insurance policy which is costless in equilibrium. (See Dybvig and Spatt 1983.) In both models, the credible promise to provide the insurance means that the promise will not need to be fulfilled. This is in contrast to privately provided deposit insurance. Because insurance companies do not have the power of taxation, they must hold reserves to make their promises credible. This illustrates a reason the government may have a natural advantage in providing deposit insurance. The role of government policy in our model focuses on providing an institution to prevent a bad equilibrium rather than a policy to move an existing equilibrium. Generally, such a policy need not cause distortion.

**Conclusions and Implications**

The model serves as a useful framework for analyzing the economics of banking and associated policy issues. It is interesting that the problems of runs and the differing effects of suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance manifest themselves in a model which does not introduce currency or risky technology. This demonstrates that one of the important problems in banking is not necessarily related to those factors, although a general model will require their introduction.

We analyze an economy with a single bank. The interpretation is that it represents the financial intermediary industry and that withdrawals represent net withdrawals from the system. If many banks were introduced into the model, then there would be a role for liquidity risk-sharing among banks, and phenomena such as the federal funds market or the impact of bank-specific risk on deposit insurance could be analyzed.

The result that deposit insurance dominates contracts which the bank alone can enforce shows that there is a potential benefit from government intervention into banking markets. In contrast to common tax and subsidy schemes, the intervention we are recommending provides an institutional framework under which banks can operate smoothly, much as enforcement of contracts does more generally.

The riskless technology used in the model isolates the rationale for deposit insurance, but in addition it abstracts from the choice of bank loan portfolio risk. If the risk of bank portfolios could be selected by a bank manager, unobserved by outsiders (to some extent), then a moral hazard problem would exist. In this case there is a trade-off between optimal risk-sharing and proper incentives for portfolio choice, and introducing deposit insurance can influence the portfolio choice. The moral hazard problem has been analyzed in complete market settings where deposit insurance is redundant and can provide no social improvement. (See Kareken and Wallace 1978 and Dothan and Williams 1980.) But of course in this case there is no trade-off. Introducing risky assets and moral hazard would be an interesting extension of our model. It appears likely that some form of government deposit insurance could again be desirable but that it would be accompanied by some sort of bank regulation. Such bank regulation would serve a function similar to restrictive covenants in bond indentures. Interesting but hard to model are questions of regulator discretion which then arise.

Through its discount window, the Federal Reserve can, as a lender of last resort, provide a service similar to deposit insurance. The Fed would buy bank assets with (money creation) tax revenues at \( T = 1 \) for prices greater than the assets’ liquidating value. If the taxes and transfers were set
to be identical to what is implicit in the optimal deposit insurance, the effect would be the same. The identity of deposit insurance and discount window services occurs because the technology is riskless.

If the technology is risky, the lender of last resort can no longer be as credible as deposit insurance. If the lender of last resort were always required to bail out banks with liquidity problems, there would be perverse incentives for banks to take on risk, even if bailouts occurred only when many banks fail together. For instance, if a bailout is anticipated, all banks have an incentive to take on interest rate risk by mismatching maturities of assets and liabilities, because banks will all be bailed out together.

If the lender of last resort is not required to bail out banks unconditionally, a bank run can occur in response to changes in depositor expectations about the bank’s creditworthiness. A run can even occur in response to expectations about the general willingness of the lender of last resort to rescue failing banks, as illustrated by the unfortunate experience of the 1930s when the Federal Reserve misused its discretion and did not allow much discounting. In contrast, deposit insurance is a binding commitment which can be structured to retain punishment of the bank’s owners, board of directors, and officers in the case of a failure.

The potential for multiple equilibria when a firm’s liabilities are more liquid than its assets applies more generally, not simply to banks. Consider a firm with illiquid technology which issues very short-term bonds as a large part of its capital structure. Suppose one lender expects all other lenders to refuse to roll over their loans to the firm. Then it may be the lender’s best response to refuse to roll over its loans even if the firm would be solvent if all loans were rolled over. Such liquidity crises are similar to bank runs. The protection from creditors provided by the bankruptcy laws serves a function similar to the suspension of bankruptcy laws serves a function similar to the suspension of the right to be a monopolist.

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1When this article was originally published, Diamond was Assistant Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago and Dybvig was Assistant Professor of Finance, School of Organization and Management, Yale University.

References


The aborted runs on Hartford Federal Savings and Loan (Hartford, Conn., February 1982) and on Abilene National Bank (Abilene, Texas, July 1982) are two recent examples. The large amounts of uninsured deposits in the recently failed Penn Square Bank (Oklahoma City, July 1982) and that failure’s repercussions are another symptom of banks’ current problems.