62 research outputs found
09031 Abstracts Collection -- Symmetric Cryptography
From 11.01.09 to 16.01.09, the Seminar 09031 in
``Symmetric Cryptography \u27\u27 was held
in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
MOIM: a novel design of cryptographic hash function
A hash function usually has two main components: a compression function or
permutation function and mode of operation. In this paper, we propose a new concrete
novel design of a permutation based hash functions called MOIM. MOIM is based on
concatenating two parallel fast wide pipe constructions as a mode of operation designed
by Nandi and Paul, and presented at Indocrypt 2010 where the size of the internal state
is significantly larger than the size of the output. And the permutations functions used
in MOIM are inspired from the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl hash function which is originally
inspired from Rijndael design (AES). As a consequence there is a very strong confusion
and diffusion in MOIM. Also, we show that MOIM resists all the generic attacks and
Joux attack in two defense security levels
LNCS
HMAC and its variant NMAC are the most popular approaches to deriving a MAC (and more generally, a PRF) from a cryptographic hash function. Despite nearly two decades of research, their exact security still remains far from understood in many different contexts. Indeed, recent works have re-surfaced interest for {\em generic} attacks, i.e., attacks that treat the compression function of the underlying hash function as a black box.
Generic security can be proved in a model where the underlying compression function is modeled as a random function -- yet, to date, the question of proving tight, non-trivial bounds on the generic security of HMAC/NMAC even as a PRF remains a challenging open question.
In this paper, we ask the question of whether a small modification to HMAC and NMAC can allow us to exactly characterize the security of the resulting constructions, while only incurring little penalty with respect to efficiency. To this end, we present simple variants of NMAC and HMAC, for which we prove tight bounds on the generic PRF security, expressed in terms of numbers of construction and compression function queries necessary to break the construction. All of our constructions are obtained via a (near) {\em black-box} modification of NMAC and HMAC, which can be interpreted as an initial step of key-dependent message pre-processing.
While our focus is on PRF security, a further attractive feature of our new constructions is that they clearly defeat all recent generic attacks against properties such as state recovery and universal forgery. These exploit properties of the so-called ``functional graph'' which are not directly accessible in our new constructions
On the Security of Iterated Hashing based on Forgery-resistant Compression Functions
In this paper we re-examine the security notions suggested for hash
functions, with an emphasis on the delicate notion of second
preimage resistance. We start by showing that, in the random oracle
model, both Merkle-Damgaard and HAIFA achieve second preimage resistance beyond
the birthday bound, and actually up to the level of known generic
attacks, hence demonstrating the optimality of HAIFA in this respect.
We then try to distill a more elementary requirement out of the
compression function to get some insight on the properties it should
have to guarantee the second preimage resistance of its
iteration. We show that if the (keyed) compression function is a
secure FIL-MAC then the Merkle-Damgaard mode of iteration (or HAIFA) still
maintains the same level of second preimage resistance. We conclude
by showing that this ``new\u27\u27 assumption (or security notion)
implies the recently introduced
Preimage-Awareness while ensuring all other classical security
notions for hash functions
Generic Attacks on Hash Combiners
Hash combiners are a practical way to make cryptographic hash functions more tolerant to future attacks and compatible with existing infrastructure. A combiner combines two or more hash functions in a way that is hopefully more secure than each of the underlying hash functions, or at least remains secure as long as one of them is secure. Two classical hash combiners are the exclusive-or (XOR) combiner and the concatenation combiner . Both of them process the same message using the two underlying hash functions in parallel. Apart from parallel combiners, there are also cascade constructions sequentially calling the underlying hash functions to process the message repeatedly, such as Hash-Twice and the Zipper hash , where is the reverse of the message .
In this work, we study the security of these hash combiners by devising the best-known generic attacks. The results show that the security of most of the combiners is not as high as commonly believed. We summarize our attacks and their computational complexities (ignoring the polynomial factors) as follows:
1. Several generic preimage attacks on the XOR combiner:
-- A first attack with a best-case complexity of obtained for messages of length . It relies on a novel technical tool named Interchange Structure. It is applicable for combiners whose underlying hash functions follow the Merkle-Damgård construction or the HAIFA framework.
-- A second attack with a best-case complexity of obtained for messages of length . It exploits properties of functional graphs of random mappings. It achieves a significant improvement over the first attack but is only applicable when the underlying hash functions use the Merkle-Damgård construction.
-- An improvement upon the second attack with a best-case complexity of obtained for messages of length . It further exploits properties of functional graphs of random mappings and uses longer messages.
These attacks show a rather surprising result: regarding preimage resistance, the sum of two -bit narrow-pipe hash functions following the considered constructions can never provide -bit security.
2. A generic second-preimage attack on the concatenation combiner of two Merkle Damgård hash functions. This attack finds second preimages faster than for challenges longer than and has a best-case complexity of obtained for challenges of length . It also exploits properties of functional graphs of random mappings.
3. The first generic second-preimage attack on the Zipper hash with underlying hash functions following the Merkle-Damgård construction. The best-case complexity is , obtained for challenge messages of length .
4. An improved generic second-preimage attack on Hash-Twice with underlying hash functions following the Merkle-Damgård construction. The best-case complexity is , obtained for challenge messages of length .
The last three attacks show that regarding second-preimage resistance, the concatenation and cascade of two -bit narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård hash functions do not provide much more security than that can be provided by a single -bit hash function.
Our main technical contributions include the following:
1. The interchange structure, which enables simultaneously controlling the behaviours of two hash computations sharing the same input.
2. The simultaneous expandable message, which is a set of messages of length covering a whole appropriate range and being multi-collision for both of the underlying hash functions.
3. New ways to exploit the properties of functional graphs of random mappings generated by fixing the message block input to the underlying compression functions
Attaques Génériques sur des BBB MACs
International audienc
The Sum Can Be Weaker Than Each Part
International audienceIn this paper we study the security of summing the outputs of two independent hash functions, in an effort to increase the security of the resulting design, or to hedge against the failure of one of the hash functions. The exclusive-or (XOR) combiner H1(M)⊕H2(M) is one of the two most classical combiners, together with the concatenation combiner H1(M) H2(M). While the security of the concatenation of two hash functions is well understood since Joux's seminal work on multicollisions, the security of the sum of two hash functions has been much less studied. The XOR combiner is well known as a good PRF and MAC combiner, and is used in practice in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1. In a hash function setting, Hoch and Shamir have shown that if the compression functions are modeled as random oracles, or even weak random oracles (i.e. they can easily be inverted – in particular H1 and H2 offer no security), H1 ⊕ H2 is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound. In this work, we focus on the preimage resistance of the sum of two narrow-pipe n-bit hash functions, following the Merkle-Damgård or HAIFA structure (the internal state size and the output size are both n bits). We show a rather surprising result: the sum of two such hash functions, e.g. SHA-512 ⊕ Whirlpool, can never provide n-bit security for preimage resistance. More precisely, we present a generic preimage attack with a complexity of O(2 5n/6). While it is already known that the XOR combiner is not preserving for preimage resistance (i.e. there might be some instantiations where the hash functions are secure but the sum is not), our result is much stronger: for any narrow-pipe functions, the sum is not preimage resistant. Besides, we also provide concrete preimage attacks on the XOR combiner (and the concatenation combiner) when one or both of the compression functions are weak; this complements Hoch and Shamir's proof by showing its tightness for preimage resistance. Of independent interests, one of our main technical contributions is a novel structure to control simultaneously the behavior of independent hash computations which share the same input message. We hope that breaking the pairwise relationship between their internal states will have applications in related settings
Integrated-Key Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions have always played a major role in most cryptographic applications. Traditionally, hash functions were designed in the keyless setting, where a hash function accepts a variable-length message and returns a fixed-length fingerprint. Unfortunately, over the years, significant weaknesses were reported on instances of some popular ``keyless" hash functions. This has motivated the research community to start considering the dedicated-key setting, where a hash function is publicly keyed. In this approach, families of hash functions are constructed such that the individual members are indexed by different publicly-known keys. This has, evidently, also allowed for more rigorous security arguments. However, it turns out that converting an existing keyless hash function into a dedicated-key one is usually non-trivial since the underlying keyless compression function of the keyless hash function does not normally accommodate the extra key input. In this thesis we define and formalise a flexible approach to solve this problem. Hash functions adopting our approach are said to be constructed in the integrated-key setting, where keyless hash functions are seamlessly and transparently transformed into keyed variants by introducing an extra component accompanying the (still keyless) compression function to handle the key input separately outside the compression function. We also propose several integrated-key constructions and prove that they are collision resistant, pre-image resistant, 2nd pre-image resistant, indifferentiable from Random Oracle (RO), indistinguishable from Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) and Unforgeable when instantiated as Message Authentication Codes (MACs) in the private key setting. We further prove that hash functions constructed in the integrated-key setting are indistinguishable from their variants in the conventional dedicated-key setting, which implies that proofs from the dedicated-key setting can be naturally reduced to the integrated-key setting.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo
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