15,794 research outputs found
Fatalism as a Metaphysical Thesis
Even though fatalism has been an intermittent topic of philosophy since Greek antiquity, this paper argues that fate ought to be of little concern to metaphysicians. Fatalism is neither an interesting metaphysical thesis in its own right, nor can it be identified with theses that are, such as realism about the future or determinism
Jamesian Free Will, The Two-stage Model Of William James
Research into two-stage models of âfree willâ â first âfreeâ random generation of alternative possibilities, followed by âwilledâ adequately determined decisions consistent with character, values, and desires â suggests that William James was in 1884 the first of a dozen philosophers and scientists to propose such a two-stage model for free will. We review the later work to establish Jamesâs priority. By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to overcome the standard two-part argument against free will, i.e., that the will is either determined or random. James gave it elements of both, to establish freedom but preserve responsibility. We show that James was influenced by Darwinâs model of natural selection, as were most recent thinkers with a two-stage model. In view of Jamesâs famous decision to make his first act of freedom a choice to believe that his will is free, it is most fitting to celebrate Jamesâs priority in the free will debates by naming the two-stage model â first chance, then choice -âJamesianâ free will
Determinism and inevitability
In Freedom Evolves, Dan Dennett embarks on his second book-length attempt to lay to rest the deep metaphysical concerns that many philosophers have expressed about the possibility of human freedom.One of his main objectives in the earlier chapters of the book is to make determinism appear less threatening to our prospects for free agency than it has sometimes seemed, by attempting to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. In this paper, I want to consider Dennettâs striking argument for this conclusion in some detail. I shall begin by suggesting that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. I shall then develop a second interpretation which is more promising than the first, but will argue that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver, at best, only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. However, although I shall be arguing that his central argument fails, it is also part of the purpose of this paper to build on what I regard as some rather insightful and suggestive material which is developed by Dennett in the course of elaborating his views. His own development of these ideas is hampered, so I shall argue, by a framework for thinking about possibility that is too crude to accommodate the immense subtlety and complexity which is exhibited by the workings of the modal verb âcanâ and its past tense form, âcouldâ; and also, I believe, by the mistaken conviction, on Dennettâs part, that any naturalistically respectable solution to the problem of free will would have to be of a compatibilist stripe. I shall attempt, in the second half of the paper, to explain what seems to me to be wrong with the framework, and to make some points about the functioning of âcanâ and âcouldâ, which I believe any adequate replacement for Dennettâs framework must respect. Ironically, though, I shall argue that it is the rejection of Dennettâs own framework which holds the key to understanding how to defend the spirit (if not the letter) of his thoughts about the invulnerability of our ordinary modal thinking to alleged threats from determinism
There are no universal rules for induction
In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to universal schemas. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, nonprobabilistic systems in physics is posed, and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association.All right reserved
The actual future is open
Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is 'open,' i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to (branching-time) open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Kit Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open futurists must (i) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (ii) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of "actual future," (iii) open futurism is naturally coupled with the view that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions
Program equivalence for a concurrent lambda calculus with futures
Reasoning about the correctness of program transformations requires a notion of program equivalence. We present an observational semantics for the concurrent lambda calculus with futures Lambda(fut), which formalizes the operational semantics of the programming language Alice ML. We show that natural program optimizations, as well as partial evaluation with respect to deterministic rules, are correct for Lambda(fut). This relies on a number of fundamental properties that we establish for our observational semantics
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