Examining trade-offs between social, psychological, and energy potential of urban form

Urban planners are often challenged with the task of developing design solutions which must meet multiple, and often contradictory, criteria. In this paper, we investigated the trade-offs between social, psychological, and energy potential of the fundamental elements of urban form: the street network and the building massing. Since formal methods to evaluate urban form from the psychological and social point of view are not readily available, we developed a methodological framework to quantify these criteria as the first contribution in this paper. To evaluate the psychological potential, we conducted a three-tiered empirical study starting from real world environments and then abstracting them to virtual environments. In each context, the implicit (physiological) response and explicit (subjective) response of pedestrians were measured. To quantify the social potential, we developed a street network centrality-based measure of social accessibility. For the energy potential, we created an energy model to analyze the impact of pure geometric form on the energy demand of the building stock. The second contribution of this work is a method to identify distinct clusters of urban form and, for each, explore the trade-offs between the select design criteria. We applied this method to two case studies identifying nine types of urban form and their respective potential trade-offs, which are directly applicable for the assessment of strategic decisions regarding urban form during the early planning stages

THE DANGERS OF FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH TECHNOCOMMUNITARIANISM: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION, EXPLORATION, AND UNMONITORED ACTIVITY IN URBAN SPACES

Part I of this article examines how some commentators can plausibly argue that constitutional liberty and privacy protections do not protect the individual liberty and privacy that modern individuals have come to expect in many public spaces, particularly in urban environments. Constitutional liberalism, this section points out, makes this question a difficult one, because it is marked by scrupulous neutrality towards different visions of “the good life.” In other words, the constitutional order does not condemn those who choose a communitarian way of life and favor those who prefer individualism. Rather, it tolerates both of these (and other) preferences about one’s social and cultural environment, and leaves citizens free to opt for the life of their choice. Part II suggests that it is difficult to make sense of our modern jurisprudence of First Amendment rights, especially as they relate to anonymous communication and association on the Internet and elsewhere, unless one allows room in our constitutional law for a jurisprudence that “captures” and preserves social incarnations of liberty and privacy that were not yet in existence when theConstitution was drafted. Therefore, it is possible for for courts and others to find that freedom-enabling institutions that did not exist earlier in American history, and might cease to exist in the future, deserve certain constitutional protection while they are here. Part III explains that like the virtual liberation offered by the Internet, city life offered and continues to offer an invaluable refuge for substantial expressive activity and intellectual exploration that would be far more elusive without this type of urban existence. It provides individuals with an incredibly rich bazaar of ideas, and allows them to browse among these deas, substantially free from outside monitoring or control. While First Amendment law does not single out urban environments for protection, it protects such environments indirectly by preserving certain opportunities that are characteristic of modern urban life: opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting strangers with ideas they may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for speaking or gathering information in the anonymity of the crowd

Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right To Assemble

Revived after a decades-long slumber, the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause has garnered robust attention of late. Endeavoring to reinvigorate this forgotten clause, legal scholars have outlined a normative vision of the assembly right that would better safeguard the freedom of association. This Note argues that such an approach—no matter its merits or its deficiencies—overlooks the Clause’s central aim. The assembly right is in fact best understood as an assembly right, not as a right about associations. This Note advances that proposition by closely analyzing the text and the history of the Assembly Clause, a project that has not yet been systematically undertaken. The evidence unearthed from this inquiry demonstrates that the Assembly Clause seeks, as its first-order concern, to protect in-person, flesh–and–blood gatherings. Such protection is thus ultimately of great import in rethinking both the freedoms afforded and the constraints imposed on dissent within our constitutional framework

STREETS: an agent-based pedestrian model.

8-11 Septembe

From York to New Earswick: reforming working-class homes, 1899-1914

How to improve the lives of the working class and the poor in Britain has been a key concern for social reformers, architects and designers, and local and national governments throughout twentieth century, but the origins of this were in the preceding century. From the middle of the nineteenth century, reformers had understood the necessity of improving the living conditions, diet and material environment of those with low incomes. Housing, at the core of this, was increasingly a political issue, but as this case study of the development of a garden village in the North of England demonstrates, it was also a moral and aesthetic one