4,237,310 research outputs found

    How to play a disc brake

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    We consider a gyroscopic system under the action of small dissipative and non-conservative positional forces, which has its origin in the models of rotating bodies of revolution being in frictional contact. The spectrum of the unperturbed gyroscopic system forms a "spectral mesh" in the plane "frequency -gyroscopic parameter" with double semi-simple purely imaginary eigenvalues at zero value of the gyroscopic parameter. It is shown that dissipative forces lead to the splitting of the semi-simple eigenvalue with the creation of the so-called "bubble of instability" - a ring in the three-dimensional space of the gyroscopic parameter and real and imaginary parts of eigenvalues, which corresponds to complex eigenvalues. In case of full dissipation with a positive-definite damping matrix the eigenvalues of the ring have negative real parts making the bubble a latent source of instability because it can "emerge" to the region of eigenvalues with positive real parts due to action of both indefinite damping and non-conservative positional forces. In the paper, the instability mechanism is analytically described with the use of the perturbation theory of multiple eigenvalues. As an example stability of a rotating circular string constrained by a stationary load system is studied in detail. The theory developed seems to give a first clear explanation of the mechanism of self-excited vibrations in the rotating structures in frictional contact, that is responsible for such well-known phenomena of acoustics of friction as the squealing disc brake and the singing wine glass.Comment: 25 pages, 9 figures, Presented at BIRS 07w5068 Workshop "Geometric Mechanics: Continuous and discrete, finite and infinite dimensional", August 12-17, 2007, Banff, Canad

    How to Play the “Playing God” Card

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    When the phrase “playing God” is used in debates concerning the use of new technologies, such as cloning or genetic engineering, it is usually interpreted as a warning not to interfere with God’s creation or nature. I think that this interpretation of “playing God” arguments as a call to non-interference with nature is too narrow. In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation of “playing God” arguments. Taking an argumentation theory approach, I provide an argumentation scheme and accompanying critical questions that capture the moral concerns expressed by “playing God” arguments. If I am right, then “playing God” arguments should be understood, not as a warning to leave God’s creation or nature alone, but rather as an invitation to think carefully about all the ways in which the use of new technologies could go seriously wrong

    Learning How to Play Nicely: Repositories and CRIS

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    More than 60 delegates convened at the Rose Bowl in Leeds on 7 May 2010 for this event to explore the developing relationship and overlap between Open Access research repositories and so called 'CRISs' – Current Research Information Systems – that are increasingly being implemented at universities. The Welsh Repository Network (WRN) [1], a collaborative venture between the Higher Education institutions (HEIs) in Wales, funded by JISC, had clearly hit upon an engaging topic du jour. The event, jointly supported by JISC [2] and ARMA (Association of Research Managers and Administrators)[3], was fully booked within just five days of being announced. In the main, delegates were either research managers and administrators, or repository managers, and one of the themes that came up throughout the day was the need for greater communication between research offices and libraries (where repository services are often managed.) As well as JISC and ARMA, euroCRIS [4], a not-for- profit organisation that aims to be an internationally recognised point of reference for CRISs, was represented at the event. Delegates could also visit the software exhibition and speak with representatives of Atira, Symplectic Ltd and Thomson Reuters, among others

    How to Play Unique Games against a Semi-Random Adversary

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    In this paper, we study the average case complexity of the Unique Games problem. We propose a natural semi-random model, in which a unique game instance is generated in several steps. First an adversary selects a completely satisfiable instance of Unique Games, then she chooses an epsilon-fraction of all edges, and finally replaces ("corrupts") the constraints corresponding to these edges with new constraints. If all steps are adversarial, the adversary can obtain any (1-epsilon) satisfiable instance, so then the problem is as hard as in the worst case. In our semi-random model, one of the steps is random, and all other steps are adversarial. We show that known algorithms for unique games (in particular, all algorithms that use the standard SDP relaxation) fail to solve semi-random instances of Unique Games. We present an algorithm that with high probability finds a solution satisfying a (1-delta) fraction of all constraints in semi-random instances (we require that the average degree of the graph is Omega(log k). To this end, we consider a new non-standard SDP program for Unique Games, which is not a relaxation for the problem, and show how to analyze it. We present a new rounding scheme that simultaneously uses SDP and LP solutions, which we believe is of independent interest. Our result holds only for epsilon less than some absolute constant. We prove that if epsilon > 1/2, then the problem is hard in one of the models, the result assumes the 2-to-2 conjecture. Finally, we study semi-random instances of Unique Games that are at most (1-epsilon) satisfiable. We present an algorithm that with high probability, distinguishes between the case when the instance is a semi-random instance and the case when the instance is an (arbitrary) (1-delta) satisfiable instance if epsilon > c delta

    How to Play 3x3-Games A Strategy Method Experiment

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    We report an experiment that uses the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit subjects' general strategy for playing any 2-person 3x3-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. Each two subjects' strategies play 500000 games in each of the 5 tournaments. For games with pure strategy equilibria (ca. 80%), the frequency of pure strategy equilibrium play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, in which there is equilibrium play in 98% of all games with only one pure equilibrium. In games with more than one pure equilibrium, a tendency towards the selection of the one with the maximum joint payoff is observed. For games without pure equilibria, subjects’ strategies do not search for mixed equilibria. The strategy programs are based on much simpler strategic concepts combined in various ways. The simplest one is MAP, maximal average payoff, the strategy which maximizes the sum of the three payoffs obtainable against the possible choices of the other player. BR-MAP, the best reply to MAP, and BR-BR-MAP, the best reply to BR-MAP, are also important ingredients of the strategy programs. Together these three form a hierarchy to which we refer to as the best-reply cascade.2-person games, experimental economics

    How To Play the Blues

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