Network infection source identification under the SIRI model

We study the problem of identifying a single infection source in a network under the susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI) model. We describe the infection model via a state-space model, and utilizing a state propagation approach, we derive an algorithm known as the heterogeneous infection spreading source (HISS) estimator, to infer the infection source. The HISS estimator uses the observations of node states at a particular time, where the elapsed time from the start of the infection is unknown. It is able to incorporate side information (if any) of the observed states of a subset of nodes at different times, and of the prior probability of each infected or recovered node to be the infection source. Simulation results suggest that the HISS estimator outperforms the dynamic message pass- ing and Jordan center estimators over a wide range of infection and reinfection rates.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures; to present in ICASSP 201

Contamination source inference in water distribution networks

We study the inference of the origin and the pattern of contamination in water distribution networks. We assume a simplified model for the dyanmics of the contamination spread inside a water distribution network, and assume that at some random location a sensor detects the presence of contaminants. We transform the source location problem into an optimization problem by considering discrete times and a binary contaminated/not contaminated state for the nodes of the network. The resulting problem is solved by Mixed Integer Linear Programming. We test our results on random networks as well as in the Modena city network

Observer Placement for Source Localization: The Effect of Budgets and Transmission Variance

When an epidemic spreads in a network, a key question is where was its source, i.e., the node that started the epidemic. If we know the time at which various nodes were infected, we can attempt to use this information in order to identify the source. However, maintaining observer nodes that can provide their infection time may be costly, and we may have a budget $k$ on the number of observer nodes we can maintain. Moreover, some nodes are more informative than others due to their location in the network. Hence, a pertinent question arises: Which nodes should we select as observers in order to maximize the probability that we can accurately identify the source? Inspired by the simple setting in which the node-to-node delays in the transmission of the epidemic are deterministic, we develop a principled approach for addressing the problem even when transmission delays are random. We show that the optimal observer-placement differs depending on the variance of the transmission delays and propose approaches in both low- and high-variance settings. We validate our methods by comparing them against state-of-the-art observer-placements and show that, in both settings, our approach identifies the source with higher accuracy.Comment: Accepted for presentation at the 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computin

On the Properties of Gromov Matrices and their Applications in Network Inference

The spanning tree heuristic is a commonly adopted procedure in network inference and estimation. It allows one to generalize an inference method developed for trees, which is usually based on a statistically rigorous approach, to a heuristic procedure for general graphs by (usually randomly) choosing a spanning tree in the graph to apply the approach developed for trees. However, there are an intractable number of spanning trees in a dense graph. In this paper, we represent a weighted tree with a matrix, which we call a Gromov matrix. We propose a method that constructs a family of Gromov matrices using convex combinations, which can be used for inference and estimation instead of a randomly selected spanning tree. This procedure increases the size of the candidate set and hence enhances the performance of the classical spanning tree heuristic. On the other hand, our new scheme is based on simple algebraic constructions using matrices, and hence is still computationally tractable. We discuss some applications on network inference and estimation to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method

Estimating Infection Sources in Networks Using Partial Timestamps

We study the problem of identifying infection sources in a network based on the network topology, and a subset of infection timestamps. In the case of a single infection source in a tree network, we derive the maximum likelihood estimator of the source and the unknown diffusion parameters. We then introduce a new heuristic involving an optimization over a parametrized family of Gromov matrices to develop a single source estimation algorithm for general graphs. Compared with the breadth-first search tree heuristic commonly adopted in the literature, simulations demonstrate that our approach achieves better estimation accuracy than several other benchmark algorithms, even though these require more information like the diffusion parameters. We next develop a multiple sources estimation algorithm for general graphs, which first partitions the graph into source candidate clusters, and then applies our single source estimation algorithm to each cluster. We show that if the graph is a tree, then each source candidate cluster contains at least one source. Simulations using synthetic and real networks, and experiments using real-world data suggest that our proposed algorithms are able to estimate the true infection source(s) to within a small number of hops with a small portion of the infection timestamps being observed.Comment: 15 pages, 15 figures, accepted by IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Securit

Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game

The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source identification problem as a strategic game, where the infection source and the network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that can probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source node and the Jordan center source estimator