Resistance to Digitisation: Curated Memory Cards Artefact

date-added: 2015-03-24 04:16:59 +0000 date-modified: 2015-03-24 04:16:59 +0000date-added: 2015-03-24 04:16:59 +0000 date-modified: 2015-03-24 04:16:59 +0000The act of networking in any context has some element of ceremonial performance attached to it. In an analogue world these performances have historically included the act of exchanging business cards. This ‘ceremony of networking’ has the potential to be altered by the emergence of new media, especially digital technology, displacing the old ceremony of business card exchanges and disrupting what can traditional be seen as networking. The history of business cards have shown that, despite several digital alternatives, they are still resistant to digitisation and so predominantly still physical and tangible. So, we sought to explore the ceremony around giving business cards as the sharing of ‘curated memory’, to better understand how and why we share and co-create curated memories with others. Including the sharing curated memories more generally, and the changing nature of networking, arising from the ever-increasing connectivity and digital embeddedness associated with the information age. Therefore, exploring the ceremony around needing, creating, sharing and using business cards, within different contexts and cultures. Also, identifying the tasks that people are trying to perform and optimise at different stages (before, during, and after) in a range of scenarios. Also, to explore how the ceremonies of networking might be significantly altered as a result of digital media and tools. The approach of using sets of cards around Who, How, Why and Where emerged from the need for a tool that could build narratives around the considerable diversity of the disjointed scenarios of networking we observed. So, the cards provide a reference by which to share general understanding in an entertaining and easily accessible manner. Second, provides a tool to summarise narratives from the scenarios we observed, and that we could then use to create new scenarios to explore insights such as post-meeting curation of ‘shared memories’ when networking. Third, define a number of ‘games’ to help anyone explore how to better understand and utilise aspects of networking in their current approaches, and challenge them to develop new approaches. Therefore, generating debate and self-reflection on the ways players use business cards themselves

Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures

This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity. The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii) to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures, focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v

The Challenge of Believability in Video Games: Definitions, Agents Models and Imitation Learning

In this paper, we address the problem of creating believable agents (virtual characters) in video games. We consider only one meaning of believability, ``giving the feeling of being controlled by a player'', and outline the problem of its evaluation. We present several models for agents in games which can produce believable behaviours, both from industry and research. For high level of believability, learning and especially imitation learning seems to be the way to go. We make a quick overview of different approaches to make video games' agents learn from players. To conclude we propose a two-step method to develop new models for believable agents. First we must find the criteria for believability for our application and define an evaluation method. Then the model and the learning algorithm can be designed

Extensive Games with Possibly Unaware Players

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they may not be aware of moves that they and other agents can make. We show how such games can be represented; the key idea is to describe the game from the point of view of every agent at every node of the game tree. We provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and show that every game with awareness has a generalized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we extend these results to games with awareness of unawareness, where a player i may be aware that a player j can make moves that i is not aware of, and to subjective games, where payers may have no common knowledge regarding the actual game and their beliefs are incompatible with a common prior.Comment: 45 pages, 3 figures, a preliminary version was presented at AAMAS0

Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the types of other players. Unfortunately, games in incomplete information settings lose many of the nice properties of complete information games: the quality of equilibria can become worse, the equilibria lose their ex-post properties, and coordinating on an equilibrium becomes even more difficult. Because of these problems, we would like to study games of incomplete information, but still implement equilibria of the complete information game induced by the (unknown) realized player types. This problem was recently studied by Kearns et al. and solved in large games by means of introducing a weak mediator: their mediator took as input reported types of players, and output suggested actions which formed a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. Players had the option to play independently of the mediator, or ignore its suggestions, but crucially, if they decided to opt-in to the mediator, they did not have the power to lie about their type. In this paper, we rectify this deficiency in the setting of large congestion games. We give, in a sense, the weakest possible mediator: it cannot enforce participation, verify types, or enforce its suggestions. Moreover, our mediator implements a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. We show that it is an (asymptotic) ex-post equilibrium of the incomplete information game for all players to use the mediator honestly, and that when they do so, they end up playing an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In particular, truthful use of the mediator is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in any Bayesian game for any prior.Comment: The conference version of this paper appeared in EC 2014. This manuscript has been merged and subsumed by the preprint "Robust Mediators in Large Games": http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.0269

Uniform Strategies

We consider turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve bundles of plays, that arise from some semantical motive. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed strategies, such as being observation-based. We propose a formal language to specify uniformity properties and demonstrate its relevance by rephrasing various known problems from the literature. Note that the ability to correlate different plays cannot be achieved by any branching-time logic if not equipped with an additional modality, so-called R in this contribution. We also study an automated procedure to synthesize strategies subject to a uniformity property, which strictly extends existing results based on, say standard temporal logics. We exhibit a generic solution for the synthesis problem provided the bundles of plays rely on any binary relation definable by a finite state transducer. This solution yields a non-elementary procedure.Comment: (2012