Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications For Network-Centric Infrastructures

There exists a widely recognized need to better understand and manage complex “systems of systems,” ranging from biology, ecology, and medicine to network-centric technologies. This is motivating the search for universal laws of highly evolved systems and driving demand for new mathematics and methods that are consistent, integrative, and predictive. However, the theoretical frameworks available today are not merely fragmented but sometimes contradictory and incompatible. We argue that complexity arises in highly evolved biological and technological systems primarily to provide mechanisms to create robustness. However, this complexity itself can be a source of new fragility, leading to “robust yet fragile” tradeoffs in system design. We focus on the role of robustness and architecture in networked infrastructures, and we highlight recent advances in the theory of distributed control driven by network technologies. This view of complexity in highly organized technological and biological systems is fundamentally different from the dominant perspective in the mainstream sciences, which downplays function, constraints, and tradeoffs, and tends to minimize the role of organization and design

On the tailoring of CAST-32A certification guidance to real COTS multicore architectures

The use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) multicores in real-time industry is on the rise due to multicores' potential performance increase and energy reduction. Yet, the unpredictable impact on timing of contention in shared hardware resources challenges certification. Furthermore, most safety certification standards target single-core architectures and do not provide explicit guidance for multicore processors. Recently, however, CAST-32A has been presented providing guidance for software planning, development and verification in multicores. In this paper, from a theoretical level, we provide a detailed review of CAST-32A objectives and the difficulty of reaching them under current COTS multicore design trends; at experimental level, we assess the difficulties of the application of CAST-32A to a real multicore processor, the NXP P4080.This work has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) under grant TIN2015-65316-P and the HiPEAC Network of Excellence. Jaume Abella has been partially supported by the MINECO under Ramon y Cajal grant RYC-2013-14717.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

FEMA's Integration of Preparedness and Development of Robust Regional Offices

In October 2006, Congress enacted major legislation to reform the function and organization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in response to the recognized failures in preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) focused national preparedness responsibilities within FEMA and directed additional resources and responsibilities to FEMA's ten regional offices. Directed by Congress, in October 2008 a National Academy Panel began an independent assessment of FEMA's integration of preparedness functions and progress in development of robust regional offices.Main FindingsOver the past three years, FEMA has taken significant steps in an effort to integrate preparedness and develop more robust regional offices. These efforts, undertaken by both the previous and current Administrations, are documented throughout this report and should be recognized and applauded. However, FEMA has yet to define specific goals and outcomes that would permit it, Congress or the public to determine when preparedness has been fully integrated into all aspects of FEMA's work and whether the development and ongoing operation of robust regional offices has been achieved. In the absence of well-defined, measurable outcome indicators, the National Academy Panel relied upon the assessments of FEMA leaders and staff, documentation provided by FEMA, and a review of secondary sources material to inform its findings and recommendations. Based upon this evidence, the Panel has concluded that, while progress has been made: (1) preparedness is not fully integrated across FEMA, (2) FEMA's regional offices do not yet have the capacity required to ensure the nation is fully prepared, (3) stakeholders are not yet full partners with FEMA in national preparedness, and (4) FEMA has ineffective internal business practices, particularly with regard to human resource management. The Panel made seven recommendations for FEMA:Establish a cross-organizational process, with participation from internal and external stakeholders, to develop a shared understanding of preparedness integrationEstablish a robust set of outcome metrics and standards for preparedness integration, as well as a system to monitor and evaluate progress on an ongoing basisWork to eliminate organizational barriers that are adversely impacting the full integration of preparedness across the agencyContinue to build regional office capacity and monitor implementation consistent with the Administrator's recent policy guidanceUndertake steps to improve the ongoing working relationship between headquarters and the regions in accord with Panel-identified principlesTake steps to improve stakeholder engagement and relationships at all levels in accord with Panel-identified principles; andStrengthen internal business practices, especially in the area of human capital planning

Empowering Effective Teachers: Readiness for Reform

Outlines a spectrum of conditions needed for the successful implementation of teacher effectiveness reform, including shared leadership, vision, and commitment; a culture of data-driven decision making; stakeholder engagement; and supportive policies