The role of decision confidence in advice-taking and trust formation

In a world where ideas flow freely between people across multiple platforms, we often find ourselves relying on others' information without an objective standard to judge whether those opinions are accurate. The present study tests an agreement-in-confidence hypothesis of advice perception, which holds that internal metacognitive evaluations of decision confidence play an important functional role in the perception and use of social information, such as peers' advice. We propose that confidence can be used, computationally, to estimate advisors' trustworthiness and advice reliability. Specifically, these processes are hypothesized to be particularly important in situations where objective feedback is absent or difficult to acquire. Here, we use a judge-advisor system paradigm to precisely manipulate the profiles of virtual advisors whose opinions are provided to participants performing a perceptual decision making task. We find that when advisors' and participants' judgments are independent, people are able to discriminate subtle advice features, like confidence calibration, whether or not objective feedback is available. However, when observers' judgments (and judgment errors) are correlated - as is the case in many social contexts - predictable distortions can be observed between feedback and feedback-free scenarios. A simple model of advice reliability estimation, endowed with metacognitive insight, is able to explain key patterns of results observed in the human data. We use agent-based modeling to explore implications of these individual-level decision strategies for network-level patterns of trust and belief formation

Understanding the Platform Economy: Signals, Trust, and Social Interaction

Two-sided markets are gaining increasing importance. Examples include accommodation and car sharing, resale, shared mobility, crowd work, and many more. As these businesses rely on transactions among users, central aspects to virtually all platforms are the creation and maintenance of trust. While research has considered effects of trust-building on diverse platforms in isolation, the overall platform landscape has received much less attention. However, cross-platform comparison is important since platforms vary in their degree of social interaction, which, as we demonstrate in this paper, determines the adequacy and use of different trust mechanisms. Based on actual market data, we examine the mechanisms platforms employ and how frequent users rely on them. We contrast this view against survey data on users’ perceptions of the context-specific importance of these trust-building tools. Our findings provide robust evidence for our reasoning on the relation between platforms’ degree of social interaction and the associated expressive trust cues

Screening, Competition, and Job Design

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These “high-performance work systems” are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees

Using social media to support cluster development

Developing European transnational clusters is a cornerstone in current EU-policies towards a sustainable competitive and open European economy. Within this conceptual paper relates these objectives to new developments in the application of network IT or, in popular terms, the rise of social media. The growing importance of clusters is related to new theoretical insights. Based on this, the paper comes with suggestions for policy makers in governments, businesses and knowledge institutions such as universities. Opening Up is designed to look for a better service to citizens and businesses through the use of social media and open data. The opening-up project started in October 2011 and lasts three years

Screening, Competition, and Job Design

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These “high-performance work systems†are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.job design; high-performance work systems; screening; reputation; competition; trust; control; social preferences; complementarities

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.Job design, high-performance work systems, screening, reputation, competition, trust, control, social preferences, complementarities, SOEP

Interplay between network configurations and network governance mechanisms in supply networks a systematic literature review

Purpose: This work systematically reviews the extant academic management literature on supply networks. It specifically examines how network configurations and network governance mechanisms influence each other in supply networks. Design: 125 analytical and empirical studies were identified using an evidence-based approach to review the literature mainly published between 1985 and 2012. Synthesis: Drawing on a multi-disciplinary theoretical foundation, this work develops an integrative framework to identify three distinct yet interdependent themes that characterize the study of supply networks: a) Network Configurations (structures and relationships); b) Network Governance Mechanisms (formal and informal); and c) The Interplay between Network Configurations and Network Governance Mechanisms. Findings: Network configurations and network governance mechanisms mutually influence each other and cannot be considered in isolation. Formal and informal governance mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than as substitutes. The choice of governance mechanism depends on the nature of exchange; role of management; desired level of control; level of flexibility in formal contracts; and complementary role of formal and informal governance mechanism. Research implications: This nascent field has thematic and methodological research opportunities for academics. Comparative network analysis using longitudinal case studies offers a rich area for further study. Practical Implications: The complexity surrounding the conflicting roles of managers at the organisation and network levels poses a significant challenge during the development and implementation stage of strategic network policies. Originality/value: This review reveals that formal and informal governance mechanisms provide better control when used as complements rather than as substitutes

Reputation for complex societies

Reputation, the germ of gossip, is addressed in this chapter as a distributed instrument for social order. In literature, reputation is shown to promote (a) social control in cooperative contexts—like social groups and subgroups—and (b) partner selection in competitive ones, like (e-) markets and industrial districts. Current technology that affects, employs and extends reputation, applied to electronic markets or multi-agent systems, is discussed in light of its theoretical background. In order to compare reputation systems with their original analogue, a social cognitive model of reputation is presented. The application of the model to the theoretical study of norm-abiding behaviour and partner selection are discussed, as well as the refinement and improvement of current reputation technology. The chapter concludes with remarks and ideas for future research.</p

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.job design, high-performance work systems, screening, reputation, competition, trust, control, social preferences, complementarities