Perspectival Objectivity or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Observer-Dependent Reality

Brukner (2018) proposes a no-go theorem for observer-independent facts. A possible consequence of the theorem is that there can be no absolute facts about the world, only facts relative to an observer. However, admitting such observer dependency runs the risk of licensing pernicious anthropocentrism in our account of reality, thereby precluding the possibility of objectivity in scientific inquiry, which would surely count as a mark against taking Brukner's result too seriously at face value. In this paper I argue that, properly understood, observer-dependent reality does not preclude objectivity, and I claim that this idea has philosophical pedigree, too. Working through the examples of colour perception and causality, I identify a perfectly reasonable notion of 'perspectival objectivity'. I argue that such a view would not be out of place in Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory, and claim that this notion of perspectival objectivity can be appropriated as part of an understanding of quantum phenomena to take the sting out of the possibility of observer-dependent reality, and permitting the objectivity required for scientific inquiry

Discovering Quantum Causal Models (final)

Costa and Shrapnel [2016] have recently proposed an interventionist theory of quantum causation. The formalism generalises the classical methods of Pearl [2000] and allows for the discovery of quantum causal structure via localised interventions. Classical causal structure is presented as a special case of this more general framework. I introduce the account and consider whether this formalism provides a causal explanation for the Bell correlations

Perspectival Objectivity or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Observer-Dependent Reality

Building on self-professed perspectival approaches to both scientific knowledge and causation, I explore the potentially radical suggestion that perspectivalism can be extended to account for a type of objectivity in science. Motivated by recent claims from quantum foundations that quantum mechanics must admit the possibility of observer-dependent facts, I develop the notion of 'perspectival objectivity', and suggest that an easier pill to swallow, philosophically speaking, than observer-dependency is perspective-dependency, allowing for a notion of observer-independence indexed to an agent perspective. Working through the case studies of colour perception and causal perspectivalism, I identify two places within which I claim perspectival objectivity is already employed, and make the connection to quantum mechanics through Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory. I contend that perspectival objectivity can ensure, despite the possibility of perspective-dependent scientific facts, the objectivity of scientific inquiry

Perspectival Objectivity or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Observer-Dependent Reality

Building on self-professed perspectival approaches to both scientific knowledge and causation, I explore the potentially radical suggestion that perspectivalism can be extended to account for a type of objectivity in science. Motivated by recent claims from quantum foundations that quantum mechanics must admit the possibility of observer-dependent facts, I develop the notion of 'perspectival objectivity', and suggest that an easier pill to swallow, philosophically speaking, than observer-dependency is perspective-dependency, allowing for a notion of observer-independence indexed to an agent perspective. Working through the case studies of colour perception and causal perspectivalism, I identify two places within which I claim perspectival objectivity is already employed, and make the connection to quantum mechanics through Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory. I contend that perspectival objectivity can ensure, despite the possibility of perspective-dependent scientific facts, the objectivity of scientific inquiry

What's So Spatial About Time Anyway?

Skow ([2007]), and much more recently Callender ([2017]), argue that time can be distinguished from space due to the special role it plays in our laws of nature: our laws determine the behaviour of physical systems across time, but not across space. In this work we assess the claim that the laws of nature might provide the basis for distinguishing time from space. We find that there is an obvious reason to be sceptical of the argument Skow submits for distinguishing time from space: Skow fails to pay sufficient attention to the relationship between the dynamical laws and the antecedent conditions required to establish a complete solution from the laws. Callender’s more sophisticated arguments in favour of distinguishing time from space by virtue of the laws of nature presents a much stronger basis to draw the distinction. By developing a radical reading of Callender’s view we propose a novel approach to differentiating time and space that we call temporal perspectivalism. This is the view according to which the difference between time and space is a function of the agentive perspective

A New Perspective On Time And Physical Laws

Callender claims that `time is the great informer' (Callender 2017, chapter 7), meaning that the direction(s) in which our `best' physical theories inform are temporal. This is intended to be a metaphysical claim, and as such expresses a relationship between the physical world and information-gathering systems such as ourselves. This paper gives two counterexamples to this claim, illustrating the fact that time and informative strength doubly dissociate, so the claim cannot be about physical theories in general. The first is a case where physical theories inform in directions that we have no reason to regard as temporal. The second is a case where our best physical theories fail to inform in directions that we have independent (pre-theoretic) reasons to regard as temporal. Taking these two cases into account suggests that the connection Callender makes between time and informativeness is perspectival. The second case demonstrates that, although scientists often seek information in temporal directions, the behaviour of the physical world can present serious difficulties for finding it. In response, this paper proposes a perspectival reading of Callender's claim, according to which the connection between time and informative strength has more to do with the aims and objectives of science than the workings of the physical world

Physical grounds for causal perspectivalism

In this paper we ground the asymmetry of causal relations in the internal physical states of a special kind of open dissipative physical system, a causal agent. A causal agent is an autonomous physical system, maintained far from equilibrium by a low entropy source of energy, with accurate sensors and actuators. It has a memory to record sensor measurements and actuator operations. It contains a learning system that can access the sensor and actuator records to learn and represent the causal relations. We claim that causal relations are relations between the internal sensor and actuator records and the causal concept inherent in these correlations is then inscribed in the physical dynamics of the internal learning machine. The existence of contingent internal memory states means each causal agent is in a different physical state. We argue that it is in this sense that causal relations are perspectival. From the outside, averaging over internal states, the causal agents are identical thermodynamic systems.Comment: 25 pages. Revised list of reference

Retrokausaliteetin mahdollisuus : Huw Pricen näkemys kausaliteetista

Tämä maisterintutkielma käsittelee australialaisen filosofin, Huw Pricen, käsitystä kausaliteetista. Pricen mukaan kausaliteetin suunta on ihmiskeskeistä ja Price uskoo retrokausaliteetin eli taaksepäin suuntautuvan kausaliteetin olevan mahdollista. Työn tavoite on tiivistää Pricen näkemyksiä ja selvittää, miten retrokausaliteetin mahdollisuus Pricen mukaan syntyy. Artikkelissaan ”Causation as a Secondary Quality” Peter Menzies ja Price esittelevät oman kausaliteettiteoriansa, toimijuusteorian, jonka mukaan kausaliteetista on kyse silloin, kun vapaasti toimiva agentti voi A:ta muokkaamalla aiheuttaa B:n esiintymän. Toimijuusteoria nojaa agenttitodennäköisyyksille, jotka ovat ehdollisia todennäköisyyksiä. Toimijuusteoriassa toimijan eli agentin toiminta on keskiössä. Toimijuusteoria on saanut kritiikkiä siitä, että se on liian ihmiskeskeinen. Toinen tutkielman päälähde on Pricen kirja “Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time”. Price esittelee kirjassaan muun muassa perspektivalistisen näkemyksen, jonka mukaan kausaliteetti on ihmisestä lähtöisin olevaa. Kausaliteetti riippuu ihmisen perspektiivistä, joka taas johtuu entropian suunnasta. Jossakin muualla universumissa, jossa entropian suunta olisi eri, voisi myös ihmisen kokema kausaliteetin suunta olla vastakkainen. Pricen mukaan retrokausaliteetin avulla voidaan selittää kvanttimekaniikan outouksia, esimerkiksi kaukovaikutus. Price kuuluu niihin ihmisiin, joiden mielestä kvanttimekaniikka on epätäydellinen kuvaus todellisuudesta ja on olemassa piilomuuttujia, jotka selittävät kvanttimekaniikan ilmiöt. Retrokausaliteettia vastaan esitetyn niin sanotun bilking-argumentin Price kiertää siinä olevan porsaanreiän avulla: kvanttimekaniikassa mittaus, joka on syy, on aina tapahtunut, ennen kuin efekti voidaan huomata. Kausaliteetti ei Pricen mukaan ole ulkona maailmassa oleva asia, vaan ihmisen projektio maailmaan. Ihmisen harkintakyky on epäsymmetristä. Yleensä ajattelemme, että voimme vaikuttaa tulevaisuuteen, joka on avoin, ja tiedämme menneisyyden, joka on kiinnitetty. Kuitenkin, jos osaa menneisyydestä ei pidettäisikään tiedollisesti saavutettavissa olevana, voisi retrokausaliteetti tapahtua tällä alueella

Perspectival Objectivity or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Observer-Dependent Reality

Brukner (2018) proposes a no-go theorem for observer-independent facts. A possible consequence of the theorem is that there can be no absolute facts about the world, only facts relative to an observer. However, admitting such observer dependency runs the risk of licensing pernicious anthropocentrism in our account of reality, thereby precluding the possibility of objectivity in scientific inquiry, which would surely count as a mark against taking Brukner's result too seriously at face value. In this paper I argue that, properly understood, observer-dependent reality does not preclude objectivity, and I claim that this idea has philosophical pedigree, too. Working through the examples of colour perception and causality, I identify a perfectly reasonable notion of 'perspectival objectivity'. I argue that such a view would not be out of place in Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory, and claim that this notion of perspectival objectivity can be appropriated as part of an understanding of quantum phenomena to take the sting out of the possibility of observer-dependent reality, and permitting the objectivity required for scientific inquiry

Causal asymmetry from the perspective of a causal agent

Agency accounts of causation are often criticised as being unacceptably subjective or anthropocentric. According to such criticisms, if there were no human agents then there would be no causal relations, or, at the very least, if humans had been different then so too would causal relations. Here we describe a model of a causal agent that is not human with a view to exploring this latter claim. This model obeys the known laws of physics, and we claim that it endows the causal agent with a "causal viewpoint: a distinctive mix of knowledge, ignorance and practical ability that a creature must apparently exemplify, if it is to be capable of employing causal concepts" (Price, 2007, p.255). We argue that this model of a causal agent provides a clear illustration of the epistemic constraints that define such a 'causal perspective', and we employ the model to demonstrate how shared constraints lead to a shared perspective. Furthermore, we use this model to scrutinise the alignment of three familiar asymmetries with the causal asymmetry: the thermodynamic arrow, the arrow of time, and the arrow of deliberation and action